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Abstract 
 
This study is an evaluation of the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium 
National Industrial Programme project, South African Royal 
Manufacturers (SARM), which forms part of BAE Systems/SAAB’s 
National Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP) obligations resulting 
from their participation in South Africa’s 1998 Strategic Procurement 
Programme (popularly referred to as the ‘arms deal’).   
 
SARM was a gold chain manufacturing plant, located in the Free State 
mining town of Virginia and which was implemented by the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium in partnership with the Harmony Gold Mining 
Company.  Funding for the business was provided by the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium as part of their industrial participation 
obligation.  This funding was supplemented with a loan obtained from 
the South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to the value 
of 40% of the cash funds; while land and buildings, as well as loans in 
the form of gold granules and bars, were provided by Harmony Gold 
Company, as part of what they describe as their corporate social 
responsibility towards the Virginia area where they are the only mining 
company operating; and also simultaneously as their obligation towards 
gold beneficiation as required by law.  The business failed after less than 
12 months of operation amidst allegations of theft of gold and the 
sudden lay-off of approximately 500 poor black rural women.  The 
company’s liquidation appears to be on the backburner indefinitely. 
 
The study was conducted over a period of 18 months, and this thesis 
written over several more.  As part of this evaluation several issues were 
investigated.  These issues are: the push for beneficiation of South 
African mined metals; the National Industrial Participation Programme; 
local government development; the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium and 
other similar companies which are involved in jewellery production for 
export as part of both the country’s beneficiation drive, as well as the 
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NIPP.   These other companies are used in this study as a ‘control’ 
group against which SARM’s performance can be measured realistically.   
 
Different research methods were used during the evaluation, including 
secondary document reviews, face-to-face and telephonic interviews 
with key-informants, the use of e-mail to contact key-informants, as well 
as conducting face-to-face questionnaires with random interviewees, 
and a focus group discussion with SARM ex-workers. 
 
There were several limitations to this study.  The primary limitation was 
the inaccessibility of official and legal documents pertaining to both 
SARM, and the 1998 arms deal.  SARM no longer exists, and thus the 
evaluation results should be used as lessons learned for similar projects 
in the future.   
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
In its 1998 Strategic Procurement Programme (SPP) – herein after 
referred to as ‘the arms deal’ - , South Africa purchased warships and 
military aircraft from various European-based companies in an effort to 
re-equip its navy and air force, creating in the process what has been 
termed a ‘complicated beast’ (Holden, 2008).  This ‘beast’ has generated 
over ten thousand newspaper articles, several court cases - including a 
court case involving Jacob Zuma, the current president, who was at the 
time of the court case the former deputy president of the country -, 
conferences, books, and some academic articles and theses.   
 
The arms deal is estimated to cost between R30 billion and R60 billion 
(February, 2004), and remains steeped in controversy.  The cost of the 
deal is but one of the controversies.  The total cost of the deal cannot be 
calculated with total accuracy as the foreign loans procured for the deals 
were pegged to the exchange rate and the costs of the deal changes as 
the value of the Rand fluctuates against the value of the foreign currency 
used (February, 2004; Crawford-Browne, 2007; Feinstein, 2007; Holden, 
2008).    Other controversies include the debate of whether a country at 
peace, with no imminent threat of war, but plagued with what often 
appears to be insurmountable socio-economic problems, should be 
spending billions on military equipment.   
 
However, the biggest controversy surrounding the deal has been the use 
of offsets as part of the deal.  Local and international media and 
academic criticism of the inclusion of offsets as part of the arms deal 
include the over-optimistic foreign direct investment claims by obligors; 
instances of promised investment that failed to materialize; the 
disappearance of a number of projects on the initial offset project list; 
and the filing of claims of export earnings by obligors without any 
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significant foreign investment in local firms (Haines, 2006).  At the time 
of the signing of the arms deal, offsets were estimated to result in 
between R104 billion and R110 billion (US$20 billion), as well as the 
creation of approximately 65,000 jobs over an eleven year period 
(Modise, 1999; Business Times, 07 March 1999; Haines, 2004, 
Crawford-Browne, 2002; 2007; Feinstein, 2007; Holden, 2008).  
Subsequent assessments based on the actual awards judged, have 
found that the economic benefit will actually be about US$12 billion over 
an 11 year period, with about 20% of the benefit accruing to local 
defence firms, 45% from counter-purchase of commercial products, and 
35% from foreign investments in South African companies (Engelbrecht, 
17 September 1999).    
 
The suppliers of the military equipment1 (and the obligors of the offsets) 
are: 
(i) the United Kingdom’s BAE Systems, who is supplying 24 Lead-in 
Fighter Trainer aircrafts (popularly known as ‘Hawks’);  
(ii) a joint venture between BAE and Sweden’s SAAB is supplying 28 
Advance Light Fighter aircrafts (popularly known as Gripen);  
(iii) a consortium between Germany’s Thyssen and Ferostaal, France’s 
Thomson CSF (now called Thales) and the South African based African 
Defence Systems are providing the four Corvettes (Meko A200) – while 
Thyssen and Ferostaal provides the ship platform, Thales and African 
Defence Systems are providing the combat suite for the Corvettes; and  
(iv) Italy’s Augusta which is supplying 30 Light Utility helicopters (Agusta 
A109M).   
 
At approximately the same time as the arms deal was designed and 
concluded, South Africa’s legislation guarding the country’s mineral 
wealth and mining operations changed significantly and the local 
beneficiation of minerals became a legislated obligation.  Mining 
companies were scrambling for ways and partners to beneficiate its 
                                                 
1
 A full description of the purchases is included as Appendix C. 
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products, while the arms deal obligors were searching for investment 
opportunities.  It is thus not surprising that since 1999, six NIP precious 
metal beneficiation-related projects have been established.  Of these six, 
four are gold and platinum jewellery manufacturers, and of these four, 
only two are still operational.  They are the Filk Gold Chains of South 
Africa, an Augusta NIP obligation, and Silplat, a BAE Systems/SAAB 
consortium NIP obligation.  The failed factories, Oro-Maska and SARM, 
were both located in the mining town, Virginia, in the Free State 
Province goldfields, and both were BAE Systems/SAAB consortium 
National Industrial Programme (NIP) projects implemented together with 
Harmony Gold Mining Company (DTI, 2002b; 2003b; 2007, 2008; 
Wellmann, 2004; Wellmann and Haines, 2005; Wellmann, 2005).   
 
1.2 Motivation of the study 
 
This study is an evaluation of one of the gold beneficiation projects 
implemented by the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium as part of their 
National Industrial Programme (offsets) obligations.  The project was a 
gold chain manufacturing plant, called the South African Royal 
Manufacturers (commonly referred to as SARM), which was located in 
the Free State mining town of Virginia and which was implemented in 
partnership with Harmony Gold Mining Company.  Funding for the 
business was provided by the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium as part of 
their industrial participation obligation, as well as a loan obtained from 
the South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC); while land 
and buildings, as well as gold loans were provided by Harmony Gold 
Company.  The business failed after less than 12 months of operation 
and is under liquidation. 
 
Much remains to be investigated regarding offsets’ theoretical, potential 
and actual economic benefits and costs.  In particular, there are few 
empirical studies of the actual implementation and economic impact of 
offsets in the recipient country.  Brauer and Dunne (2009) found that a 
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literature search for the period from 2004 and 2009 yielded no new 
empirical research on international arms trade offsets.  In South Africa 
several macro-level studies have been conducted looking at the 
industrial participation programme over the past few years (see Dunne 
and Haines, 2001; Hosking, Haines and Bank, 2002; Hosking and 
Haines, 2003; Haines, 2004; Haines and Wellmann, 2005), but micro-
level studies on the National Industrial Participation (NIP) projects are 
still somewhat scarce although the literature is growing.  There has been 
some small-scale research on specific NIP projects and geographical 
regional NIP projects (see Dunne and Haines, 2001; Haines, 2002, 
2003, 2004; Haines and Wellmann, 2005), as well as work done by 
journalists, but little has been done in the way of an evaluation of a 
particular NIP project, apart from an evaluation of the Augusta Westland 
Filk Gold Chains in South Africa NIP project (see Wellmann, 2004).   
 
The lack of empirical research and evaluations on offsets, especially 
those linked to the South African arms deal; leave a dearth in the 
understanding of the actual fulfilment of individual offset contracts and 
whether the fulfilment of an offset contract has also resulted in the 
fulfilment of a country’s long-term policy goals.  The evaluation of SARM 
will add to academic literature and knowledge on offsets, as well as the 
literature and knowledge on the socio-economic aspects of precious 
metal beneficiation in South Africa.    
 
Only a few countries have tried to conduct evaluations of their offset 
programmes, among them Finland, Sweden and Belgium (Skőns, 2004, 
Struys, 2004).  There are several obstacles in the way of doing an 
evaluation of this kind, including access to data (Martin, 1996) and 
finding instruments to measure offsets (Willet and Anthony, 1998).  Also, 
the term “offsets” does not refer to a well-defined homogenous activity 
but to a broad range of transactions and activities, each with different 
economic, social and environmental effects (Hall and Markowski, 1994; 
Martin, 1996), making it easier to focus an evaluation on a specific 
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project within the programme, instead of the programme as a whole, 
which is what I have done. 
 
SARM is evaluated in the context of the 1998 arms deal; the South 
African NIPP; the decentralization of government and the powers, 
obligations and needs of local government in the country; the increasing 
need for companies to be good corporate citizens; the fast changing 
mining industry and mining legislation; and the drive for local 
beneficiation of minerals and metals.  The evaluation is an “ex-post 
evaluation” (Bowden, 1988) that aims to assess the project’s 
effectiveness and efficiency (Rossi and Friedman, 1993) and is 
knowledge-oriented (Scriven, 1980) in order to contribute to the debate 
on military offsets and the South African NIPP in general. 
 
The importance of this specific offset deal lies in that it encapsulates all 
the possible pitfalls of offset projects, i.e. rushing into a huge financial 
deal without conducting due diligence and in so doing opening up the 
possibility of illegal activities such as theft and corruption; sourcing the 
majority of the funding from local sources, instead of the obligor; 
awarding of credits for failed projects; and exposing the lack of 
monitoring and auditing of these projects, as well as the lack of political 
will to investigate the failure of such projects.  The project also highlights 
the lack of understanding of terms such as ‘sustainability’ when 
implementing economic projects that are linked to socio-economic 
policies. 
 
1.3 Definition of concepts 
 
The context in which any project is implemented is important when 
evaluating such a project.  An industrial participation (or offsets) project, 
or a project that is a beneficiation project, is not different.  The South 
African Royal Manufacturers (SARM) project was implemented, and 
failed, within the context of a developing country plagued with social 
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inequality and poverty; a decentralized government system; a declining 
gold industry operating within a new legislative environment; 
international pressure for businesses to behave and conduct their 
business as socially responsible entities that strive towards sustainable 
development in their outputs; and last but not least, as part of an offset 
in a controversial weapons deal.  The evaluation required a thorough 
understanding of all of these issues and concepts.  
 
Conceptualisation is the process through which researchers specify 
what is meant when they use particular terms (Babbie, 2004:118).  
Although it is a continuing process throughout the thesis, I will at this 
point specifically describe and contextualize the leading concepts used 
and referred to in this study. 
 
1.3.1 Industrial Participation 
 
Industrial participation (also known as ‘offsets’ and referred to as such in 
this thesis) is viewed increasingly as an inevitable part of the 
international arms trade, even though the January 1996 World Trade 
Organisation’s Agreement on Government Procurement generally 
forbids the use of offsets in government procurement: “Entities shall not, 
in the qualification and selection of suppliers, products or services, or in 
the evaluation of tenders and award of contracts, impose, seek or 
consider offsets” (World Trade Organisation, 1996).  The World Trade 
Organisation describes offsets on their website as “measures to 
encourage local development or improve the balance-of-payments 
accounts by means of domestic content, licensing of technology, 
investment requirements, countertrade or similar requirements” 
(www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_overview_e.htm)2. 
 
In order to fully understand industrial participation it is important to define 
the various aspects of such economic trade.  Barter, countertrade, 
                                                 
2
 Downloaded on 06 August 2009. 
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buybacks and offsets are not new concepts or activities.  One could 
even speculate that money was invented to alleviate many of the more 
obvious inconsistencies of these forms of trade.   
 1.3.1.1 Barter 
 
Barter is the process of trading goods and services for other goods and 
services, for example the exchange of a thousand barrels of crude oil for 
a specific quantity of, for example, chemical solvents.  It is a simple 
method of transaction in which no money is exchanged.   
 
The enduring persistence of barter over the centuries has always been 
acknowledged, but it was usually located in situations of political 
disorder or disorder brought about by natural disasters, and presumed to 
disappear as soon as normalcy had been restored.  However, in recent 
decades, barter and its varieties, such as countertrade, offsets and 
buybacks, have become common in international trade (de Miramon, 
1982; Cohen and Zysman, 1986).    
 
1.3.1.2 Countertrade 
 
Countertrade is similar to barter, but there are many forms of 
countertrade and often money is exchanged.  The practice of 
countertrade is sometimes called industrial participation, industrial co-
operation, economic compensation agreements, co-production 
agreements, and offsets.  Just as the terminology used to describe 
them, these deals are elaborate, inventive and extremely diverse.   
 
Definitions of the countertrade practice as used by industry, or those 
definitions found in literature, are inconsistent.  Sometimes countertrade 
is used as an umbrella term for a broad range of industrial and 
commercial “offsetting” practices, such as those related to government 
procurements of high-cost defence or non-military hardware -  Gauchery 
(undated) describes it as a range of reciprocal or compensatory trade 
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mechanisms including barter, compensation, counter-purchase, 
buyback, offsets, switch-trading, and tolling with the main objective to 
oblige the seller to generate foreign exchange for the buyer -; while at 
other times, use of the term is restricted to contractually linked imports 
and exports.   
 
Rowe (1989) describes countertrade as one of the oldest methods of 
payment in international trade and that it generally involves the 
exchange of goods and/or services as a condition of purchase, or as 
financing of purchases.  The Legal Guide on Countertrade Transactions 
(1993) published by the United Nations also provides an extensive 
countertrade terminology and sets out general guidelines, which are 
however not mandated, leaving the terms of each deal to be negotiated 
individually by the particular buyer and seller.   
 
Notwithstanding this myriad of definitions, I will try to define countertrade 
in its simplest form.  Countertrade is similar to barter, except that the 
seller is given a broader choice of products that s/he can choose from in 
exchange for whatever s/he is selling.  For example: a seller is obliged to 
take payment of up to 100% (although more and more this is reportedly 
as high as 150%) of the value of the product being sold in the form of a 
product produced by the purchaser.  In some instances, the result of 
these agreements has been amusing.  An article published in IMF 
(January 1984) reports how McDonnell Douglas3, in partial payment for 
aircraft equipment sold to Romania, found itself with, amongst other 
countertraded items, a huge supply of canned ham, which the firm’s staff 
was expected to munch its way through at the company’s canteen for 
years to come.  Similarly, Caterpillar found itself inundated with Algerian 
wine it could not sell, and that was served in the company’s cafeterias 
for many years (Yoffie, 1984). 
 
                                                 
3
 McDonnell Douglas was a major US aerospace manufacturer and defence contractor.  
It merged with Boeing in 1997. 
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Although countertrade practices were long associated primarily with 
East-West trade, there has been a significant spread to North-South and 
South-South countertrade since the early 1980s (OECD, 1985; Wülker-
Mirbach, 1990).  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) found that countertrade increased so significantly 
due to the oil-producing nations insisting on using oil in countertrade 
when buying other goods from consuming nations, and that in 1983, 
approximately 4.8% of world trade involved countertrade (OECD, 1985).  
In 1984, Forbes Magazine (12 March 1984) reported that the United 
States Department of Commerce estimated then that between 20% and 
30% of world trade is now subject to some form of counter-purchase, 
buyback or offset and that the proportion could reach 50% by 1999.  The 
article further reported that surveys by the National Foreign Trade 
Council Foundation in the United States, found that the number of 
reported transactions involving some form of barter, counter-trade, offset 
or buyback had increased at rates of 50% in 1981, 64% in 1982, and 
117% in 1983.4    
 
Countertrade has also evolved during the cold war years as an important 
tool for doing business in difficult markets (de Miramon, 1982).  A good 
example of this is a deal between Poland, then an East bloc country 
caught in a debt crises, and Austrian suppliers in the early 1980s.  
Cohen and Zysman (1986) describe how a Polish apple pulp factory 
needed equipment that could only be provided by a number of Western 
firms.  Due to Poland’s financial situation, no bank based in the United 
States would supply the necessary financing to the factory.  An Austrian 
bank and Austrian supplier of the equipment needed, made a deal with 
the Polish government to assist.  The Austrian bank guaranteed the 
promissory notes and made a deal to receive a substantial portion of the 
apple juice produced at the new plant.  The bank would then sell the 
apple juice in the West.  At the most basic of analysis it looks as if 
everyone gained from this deal: both the Austrian bank and the supplier 
                                                 
4
 Forbes Magazine, 12 March 1984. 
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of the equipment benefitted from business which they would not 
normally have gotten.  The manufacturer of the equipment was able to 
charge a far higher price than a normal market transaction would permit, 
while the bank received fees that were much larger than those 
generated by just opening letters of credit.  The Poles received the apple 
processors.  However, a more in-depth analysis indicates that the Polish 
tax payers – the holders of the Polish debt who thought export earnings 
would go towards servicing the debt, and the apple pulp producers who 
overpaid for the machinery – gained nothing useful through this process 
(Countertrade, Vol.11, No: 15, as cited in Cohen and Zysman, 1986:3).  
This rings very close to findings by most researchers and analysts who 
have analysed the countertrade trade, with Yavas and Freed (2001) 
referring to countertrade as an inefficient way of doing business. 
 
Hew (undated) found that approximately 130 out of 192 countries 
internationally require countertrade, in one form or the other, when 
procuring goods.  South Africa is one of these countries.  He also points 
out that many global companies have dedicated in-house specialists 
dealing specifically with countertrade and its derivatives and that 
although no-one really knows what the correct percentages are and how 
large the market size is, it is estimated that the annual global market size 
for countertrade is between US$200 billion to US$500 billion. 
1.3.1.3 Buybacks 
 
Buybacks involve longer-term agreements that frequently involve 
continued market links.  Simply put: it involves the delivery of a product 
or service such as infrastructure, technology, or even training to a 
purchaser, who then agrees that a certain percentage of the product (or 
output) produced, will be accepted as partial payment for the product or 
services delivered.  As early as the 1970s buybacks were used in the 
German-Soviet Union gas pipelines deal, in which Mannesmann, a 
German company, delivered gas pipelines to the Soviet Union in 
exchange for gas from Siberia (Wülker-Mirbach, 1990). 
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1.3.1.4 Switch-trading 
 
Although switch-trading exists, it is not a frequent occurrence, and has 
not been noticed in the South African arms deal.  Switch-trading entails 
one company selling to another company its obligation to a specific 
country. 
 
1.3.1.5 Offsets 
 
“Offsets are simply goods and services which form elements of complex 
voluntary transactions negotiated between governments as purchasers 
and foreign suppliers…they are goods and services on which 
government chooses to place the label ‘offsets’…” (Hall and Markowski, 
1994:179) 
 
As Hall and Markowski so succinctly describes above, offsets, which are 
often classified as a type of countertrade, occurs when a large supply 
contract is conditional upon the incorporation into the contract of certain 
goods or services supplied by the buyer’s country and which should be 
offset from the final price.  Unlike countertrade that is generally used for 
short-term trade purposes, offsets have longer term implications.  As we 
have seen here in South Africa, these offset activities may be in the form 
of investments, joint ventures, purchasing transactions, training 
programmes, technology transfers, licences, job creations or export 
promotions.  They can also include buyback options. 
 
Gauchery (undated) describes the industrial objectives generally linked 
to offsets as a way for the purchasing country to access new 
technologies; to gain support for product development; to subsidise 
training costs; to subsidise its infrastructure development; and to get 
exposure to new markets.  He describes the economic objectives of 
offsets as a way for purchasing countries to most frequently lessen their 
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burden of overseas expenditure; to create local capability through 
investment, technology transfer and training; to reduce subsidies on 
state-owned industry and more frequently than not, to pave the way 
towards privatisation of these industries (similar to what has happened 
with Denel); to encourage industrial diversification; and to create 
employment.   
 
Although offsets are used in non-military procurements, it is in the realm 
of military procurement where the practice is most frequently used, 
making the arms industry the largest international generator of 
countertrade and offset deals (Cohen and Zysman, 1983).   In the last 
three decades, the international arms trade have experienced far 
reaching changes.  During the Cold War the wealthy countries in the 
North each possessed their own arms industry and buyer-seller 
relationships were mainly horizontal within a national market; with on a 
much smaller scale some North-South and trans-Atlantic trade.  After the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, ushering in the end of the Cold War, the demand 
for arms fell dramatically on a world-wide scale and this started the shift 
in the arms manufacturing industry, leading to several national and 
cross-border mergers and joint ventures (Markusen, 2004).  South 
Africa, which had significantly enlarged its arms industry during the 
Apartheid-era, found itself in post-1994 as once again part of the 
international trade community and as affected by events and trends as 
other arms producers.   
 
The arms trade sector is characterized by discrete, giant contracts 
where a large initial sale locks in a broad stream of follow-up sales of 
such items as spare parts, support equipment, training services, 
maintenance services, and up-grade kits.  This practice has led over the 
past decades to a particularly controversial manner of engaging in trade, 
prompting leading arms producing countries to introduce government 
policies that deal explicitly with offset agreements.  
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In a memorandum dated 04 May 1978, the then Deputy Secretary of 
Defense in the United States, Charles Duncan, stated that a “basic 
policy with respect to compensatory coproduction and offset agreements 
with other nations” need to be established.  The memorandum stated 
that “[b]ecause of the inherent difficulties in negotiating and 
implementing compensatory coproduction and offset agreements, and 
the economic inefficiencies they often entail, DOD [Department of 
Defense] shall not normally enter into such agreements.  An exception 
will be made only when there is no feasible alternative to ensure the 
successful completion of transactions considered to be of significant 
importance to the United States national security interests”.  The policy 
has subsequently been adapted and reads: “It is the DOD policy not to 
enter into government-to-government offset arrangements because of 
inherent difficulties in negotiating and implementing such arrangements.  
Any foreign government requesting offset should be informed that the 
responsibility of negotiating any offset arrangements resides with the US 
contractor involved.  The US Government will not commit a US 
contractor to an offset commitment without having its prior concurrence” 
(as quoted in Eisenhour, 1989). 
 
Although governments were grappling with issues related to the 
burgeoning use of offsets as early as the 1970s, reports on offsets first 
entered the mainstream media in the late 1980s when Boeing was 
accused by the British government of delaying the implementation of 
offset obligations under a contract to supply an AWACS airborne radar 
system to the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence.  In the agreement 
Boeing has undertaken to purchase British goods worth 130% of the 
value of the AWACS sale (Wülker-Mirbach, 1990).   
 
Although there is evidence of offsets being practiced prior to, and during, 
the Cold War period (Brauer, 1991, 2000, 2004), it is only during the last 
decade that dedicated research has been conducted on offsets.  Within 
the context of increasing literature on offsets, there are also many 
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different definitions of offsets, with the most widely used definitions those 
used by Udis and Maskus (1991) and Martin and Hartley (1995). 
 
Martin and Hartley (1995) describe offsets as the process where a 
supplier of goods, or services, provides agreed-upon additional goods, 
or services, at no extra costs to the buyer.  
 
Udis and Maskus (1991) describe offsets as a contract that requires the 
supplier of goods, or service, to provide extra services at no extra cost to 
allow the buyer to recoup some of the purchase costs. 
1.3.1.6 Direct and Indirect Offsets 
 
Offsets can be divided into two different types: direct and indirect offsets. 
 
Direct offsets include delivering of goods and services directly related to 
the industry of the products purchased.  In the case of military arms, the 
goods and services that forms part of the offset would directly relate to 
the military or weapons industry.   By describing an offset as occurring 
“… when the supplier places work to an agreed value with firms in the 
buying country, over and above what it would have bought in the 
absence of the offset”, Martin and Hartley (199:125) refer more to direct 
offsets aiming to enhance the local industry.   
 
Udis and Maskus, 1991:152 (in Brauer and Dunne, 2004:3-4) refer to an 
offset as “… a contract imposing performance conditions on the seller of 
a good or service so that the purchasing government can recoup, or 
offset, some of its investment.  In some way, reciprocity beyond that 
associated with normal market exchange of goods and services is 
involved”.  This definition is more applicable to the indirect offsets aimed 
at developing local economic markets and the export of non-military 
products.  Indirect purchases are services and goods that are unrelated 
to the specific defence equipment purchased and are to enhance civil 
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and social development activities (See: Brask & Johnsson 2002; Haines 
2002; Brauer 2003; Wrigley 2003; Brauer & Dunne 2004).   
 
The South Africa Government has divided offsets into two categories:  
• the Defence Industrial Participation (DIP), which requires the 
foreign company to buy directly from, or procure business for, 
South African defence companies; and  
• the National Industrial Participation (NIP), which requires a 
separate set of contracts and investments in the civilian market. 
 
While DIP is administered by the Department of Defence and Armscor, 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) administers the NIP 
Programme (DTI, undated).   
1.3.1.7 The costs of offsets 
 
The relationship between socio-economic (and other relevant) policy 
promotion through procurement and value for money comes into play 
when discussing offsets.  Government procurement traditionally requires 
that when organs of state contract for goods or services, they must do 
so in accordance with a system which is ‘cost-effective’ – thus to procure 
goods or services from a contractor on the best possible terms, and this 
was generally the case in South Africa prior to 1996, when price was the 
overriding criterion for the procurement of goods and services by the 
government and tenders were awarded strictly based on price.  The 
lowest tender was only overlooked “when there [was] clear evidence the 
he [did] not have the necessary experience or capacity to undertake the 
work or [was] financially unsound” (Ministry of Finance and Public 
Works, 1997, clause 3.4.1).  With the 1996 Constitution the practice of 
awarding tenders strictly based on price has to a large extent changed, 
and although still an important criterion, price is no longer a decisive 
criterion.  Section 217 of the 1996 Constitution explicitly recognises 
government procurement as a means of addressing past discriminatory 
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policies and practices.  Government procurement is discussed in more 
detail in below.     
 
At the time of promoting the arms deal, the country’s Minister of Defence 
presented his budget speech to Parliament.  This was approximately six 
months before the deal was signed.  In the speech, the minister 
indicated that for the R30 odd million spent on the arms deal, an 
approximate R110 billion will be invested in the country: “Re-equipping 
the defence force is being done in such a way to add value to our 
economy.  In return for our expenditure, our economy will benefit by an 
estimated R110 billion of new investment and industrial participation 
programmes...” (Modise, 1999). 
 
However, international research suggests that military spending yields 
no statistically significant economic growth in developing countries 
(Brauer, 1991; Dunne, 1995, 1996; Batchelor and Willet, 1998).  
Although empirical data is difficult to obtain as it is considered by both 
the private companies and government to be commercially sensitive, the 
bulk of critical scholarship indicate that economic impacts that can be 
linked to offsets are at best limited and more often problematic or even 
counter-productive (see Brauer and Dunne, 2004).  Markusen (2004) 
found that any economic impact would be minimally positive, primarily 
because the arms market is characterized by “illiberal trade” and the 
objective of the arms dealers is to make a sale and not contribute to 
economic or social development (Dumas, 2004a). 
   
Indeed, international research has found that arms trade offsets seldom 
deliver what they advertise in terms of job creation, technology transfer 
and trade linkages (Williamson, 1983; Hall and Markowski, 1994; 
Matthews, R, 1996; Struys, 2001; Batchelor and Dunne, 2000; Dunne 
and Haines 2001; Brauer, 2002; Brauer and Dunne, 2002; Sköns, 2004; 
Struys, 2004; Baskaran, 2004; Brauer and Dunne 2004; Dunne and 
Lamb, 2004; Haines 2004; Bitzinger, 2004; Chinworth, 2004; Dumas, 
2004a; Dumas, 2004b;  Perlo-Freeman, 2004; Wellmann, 2004; 
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Markusen, 2004; Brauer and Dunne, 2005; Haines and Hosking 2005; 
Haines and Wellmann 2005; Brauer and Dunne, 2009).  
 
Although an odd small offset project might be successful, there is no 
economic theory or empirical evidence suggesting that these 
arrangements yield benefits for a country’s economic development at 
large.  Even with a successful smaller project it is not possible to isolate 
the offset contribution as the main catalyst for the project’s success 
(Wellmann, 2004).   
 
Brauer and Dunne (2002) found that when offsets are tied in, military 
spending is detrimental to the broader economic development.  One 
example of this is the high cost of arms deals when offsets form part of 
it.  As early as 1989, Eisenhour warned that offsets can alter the nature 
of arms transfers in that it can introduce rigidities in the process, and 
more significantly, can substantially increase costs of the procurement 
process because the presence of offsets as part of the deal may prevent 
the supplier from obtaining needed commodities from the most cost-
effective sources.  Skőns (2004) found that when countries are known to 
have mandatory offset agreements, as is the case with South Africa, 
suppliers ensure themselves against the risk of fines resulting from 
penalty clauses that are included in the agreement, should an offset 
obligation not be fully implemented.    The cost of this insurance is 
absorbed into the complete cost of the transaction.  Further research, 
such as that done by Batchelor and Dunne, has found that frequently the 
sellers of the weaponry will increase the price of the goods offered for 
sale in order to cover any penalties they might have to pay in the 
process of implementing attached offsets: “... the costs incurred by arms 
companies as a result of the offset deals are simply passed on to the 
recipient” (Batchelor and Dunne, 2002, as quoted in Holden, 2008:23).   
 
Struys (2004) found that Belgium has had to pay approximately 30% 
more for purchases that have offsets tied in than for those without 
offsets.  In research conducted in the United Kingdom by Stephen 
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Martin, he found that arms deals that include offsets “... do cost more 
than off-the-shelf purchases and, not surprisingly, that vendors seek to 
include most of this premium in the selling price” (Martin, 1996:7-8).   
This is not surprising as it would make little to no business sense to sell 
a product at a certain price and then pay, on top of delivering the 
product, an additional amount to the buyer.   As the arms industry is not 
a charity, the arms seller must find a way to recoup the money that will 
flow into the offsets.  Consumers generally pay for the expenses 
incurred by a retailer, whether that is transport, building lease, security 
and municipal services.  The retailer adds these costs onto the 
wholesale price of the product and in so doing recoups the expenses 
from the consumer.  The most obvious and direct way for the arms seller 
to recoup the added costs, is from the buyer.  There is no free lunch – 
the guest might enjoy it with no charge attached, but the host must still 
pay for it.           
 
The South African arms deal was no different from recorded 
international experiences.  Dunne and Lamb (2004) show that the South 
African government invested considerable effort into negotiating offsets 
to benefit both the local defence industry, as well as the national 
economy, but that they at no time considered buying off-the-shelf 
products.  Batchelor and Dunne (2000) suggest that off-the-shelf 
purchases for the South African arms deal would most probably have 
been less expensive.   The less expensive purchases “would have 
allowed the government to allocate the savings to encourage conversion 
in the defence related industries” (Batchelor and Dunne, 2000:24). 
1.3.1.8 Offsets and Socio-economic Development 
 
Even though there is much evidence that suggest that offsets are 
becoming increasingly part of the normal arms and civil trade, and the 
literature looking at the economic and military theory related to offsets is 
increasing, there is still a limited amount of researchers and authors 
writing on the impact of offsets on social development (Brauer, 1991, 
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2000, 2004; Dumas, 1995; Murrell, 1982; Hennart, 1989; Hall and 
Markowski, 1994; Taylor, 2000; Udis and Maskus, 1991). 
 
The offset literature that does deal with social development have found 
that the arms trade offsets seldom deliver what they advertise in terms of 
job creation, technology transfer and trade linkages (Williamson, 1983; 
Matthews, R, 1996; Struys, 2001; Batchelor and Dunne, 2000).   
 
The vast employment generation as the result of an arms deal offset has 
not as yet materialized anywhere in the world.  Matthews (1996) found 
that Saudi Arabia’s multiple offset have managed to create only 
approximately 2000 local jobs of which most are unskilled, instead of the 
75 000 promised.    
 
In terms of technology transfer, there is no evidence that offset-related 
technology transfer is sustainable (Williamson, 1983).  This is mainly 
because the transferring country would not ship out its newest and most 
advanced technology, and/or wait for the receiving country to advance 
enough to catch up on a technological scale.  It will immediately set out 
to further enhance its technology and the receiving country will remain 
one step (or more frequently many steps) behind.  Up-to-date 
technology transfer does not make any commercial sense.  For-profit 
companies generally guard their trade linkages and it would make little 
sense that an offset obligor would be genuinely assisting a buyer in 
creating sustainable trade linkages.  To make a sale and a profit is the 
main (and often only) objective of the arms producer.  It is not in a for-
profit business in order to contribute to economic or social development 
in a foreign country (Dumas, 2004). 
     
When considering an offset as a vehicle for foreign direct investment in 
the local economy, it is imperative to ask how an offset activity is being 
financed.  In the case of the beneficiation-related offset NIP projects 
described in this document, it has been easy to raise capital for 
investment within South Africa, primarily through IDC and the mining 
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industry, and thus the IP obligor only supplemented the venture’s 
funding.  The foreign direct investment was thus minimal.  Similarly the 
number of permanent local jobs created, as opposed to jobs filled by 
foreigners, need to be investigated.   
 
1.3.1.9 Evaluations of Offsets 
 Monitoring 
 
Even before an evaluation is considered or conducted, there is a need 
for more sophisticated and stringent monitoring of offset activities in 
developing countries (Skőns, 2004).     
 
Monitoring is an integral part of the day-to-day management of projects 
and programmes.  The monitoring process is necessary to determine if 
predetermined and planned activities are being implemented as 
planned, and whether these are implemented successfully and on time.  
It is only through regular monitoring that one can keep track of activities, 
their deviation or convergence with original plans and targets, and their 
expected, or more importantly, unexpected results.    
 
In the event of a large and multi-faceted programme such as the NIPP, a 
stringent monitoring and evaluation system is crucial.  The Department 
of Trade and Industry has no strenuous monitoring and evaluation 
system in place for the NIPP, instead depends on ad hoc monitoring of 
projects (interviews with Ms Jogessar, DTI, 19 September 2002; and 
with Mr. Dion Haroldt, DTI, 23 June 2005).  Dunne and Lamb (2004) 
confirmed this status and found that the reason for this is the limited 
capacity within the government to monitor the NIPP.   
 Evaluations 
 
Very few independent evaluations of offset packages have been 
conducted internationally.  The majority of available evaluations have 
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been conducted by the purchasing government.  These include 
evaluations done by Finland and Sweden (Skőns, 2004, Struys, 2004). 
 
The main reason for this lack of independent evaluations is the lack of 
accessible data.  Very little, if any, data related to offsets are routinely 
published (Martin, 1996).  The reason that is most frequently provided 
for this lack of available data is that the information is commercially 
sensitive and thus not for public perusal.  Gupta et al (2001) have found 
that defence-related contracts are often excluded from freedom of 
information legislation, and thus to a certain extent outside the realm of 
normal public scrutiny.  Because it is not possible to get documentation, 
information often needs to be gathered through interviews with industry 
and government representatives, who all have vested interests (Martin, 
1996).   
 
Although it is relatively easy to monitor formal fulfilment of offsets in 
terms of contracts signed, it becomes nearly impossible to evaluate 
offsets as a group.  The complexity of offsets makes it difficult to find 
instruments to measure the impacts of the offsets (Willet and Anthony, 
1998).  Offsets refer to a collective and not to a well-defined 
homogenous activity.  Each part of the collective has its own activities 
and goals, which will each have a different economic effect, and would 
require different evaluation methods and techniques.  It is thus nearly 
impossible to use the same instrument to measure and evaluate the 
whole.   
1.3.1.10 Why offsets? 
 
Hadjiminas (undated) ponders the question of why, when there appears 
to be so little benefit to offsets, more and more countries continue to use 
it as a bargaining tool.  He argues that if indeed offsets are no more than 
expensive ‘white elephants’, the use of offsets would have dwindled or 
even perished, and that every new government would have used the use 
of offsets to discredit their predecessor and abolish the use of offsets in 
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the future.  He concludes that offsets are akin to a virus that despite their 
shortcomings, no government wants to risk letting go of. 
 
Hew (2006) argues that based on past benefits to developed countries, 
offsets can be successful provided the offset programme is properly 
conceived and implemented, utilizing the right resources (time, money 
and experts).  He does however warn that most developed countries’ 
military offset models are aimed at direct offsets and are targeted solely 
at building a defence industrial base, while developing counties, 
because of their huge socio-economic needs, require both direct and 
indirect offsets.    
 
1.3.2 Poverty 
 
Chronic poverty is of key relevance to South Africa and evidence 
indicates that poverty is proving to be much more intractable than initially 
hoped, despite the many initiatives in place to address poverty 
(Leibbrandt and Woolard, 2001; Seekings et al, 2003).  Poverty is 
without doubt the single most important issue that has been facing the 
country for decades and so enquiries into levels of poverty amongst 
South Africans is not new.  One of the first studies undertaken, in the 
form of a commission of enquiry, was the first Carnegie Commission 
Inquiry into poverty in the Great Depression in 1928 (Magasela, 2005).  
Since then there has been several more national studies into poverty in 
South Africa and in particular the extent to which poverty levels have 
changed overall and for different subgroups of the population during the 
first years of democracy (see Adato et al, 2004; Bhorat et al, 2004; 
Bhorat and Cassim, 2004; Bhorat and Kanbur, 2005; Hoogeveen and 
Ozler, 2006; Leibrant and Woolard, 1999; Leibrandt et al, 2001; May and 
Meth, 2005; Meth, 2006; Van der Berg et al., 2006; and Woolard and 
Klasen, 2005).   
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Comparisons between the studies done prior to 1990 and those after 
1990, indicate that more often than not the task of defining poverty falls 
to those in power and hence the conceptualisation as well as what 
defines poverty is reflective of the dominant ideologies (Magasela, 
2005).   Internationally, as well as here in South Africa, poverty has 
always been a political issue because it relates to the allocation and 
redistribution of resources, and reflects the impact of past and present 
policy choices (Meth, 2006), but because the concept is very nuanced 
and complex, it is also used by politicians and the media in a subjective, 
emotionally responsive manner (du Toit, 2005).   
 
Since 1994, there has been much political interest nationally (and 
internationally) regarding the extent to which poverty has increased (or 
decreased) in the country since the change of government.  Pertinent 
national issues, of which the arms deal is an excellent example, tend to 
raise the interest of the media and the broader population in issues 
related to poverty and inequality.  In the public discourse on these 
issues, poverty and inequality are normally linked and treated as an 
expression of the same problem, even though the issues are very 
different, each with its own public policy consequences.   
1.3.2.1 Inequality 
 
Inequality can be described as a state in which a specific society finds 
itself, and is measured by the Gini coefficient, which can vary between 
zero (0) and one (1) and measure the distribution of the national income.  
The closer to 1, the more unequal a society, and the closer to 0, the 
more equal a society.   
 
Concepts of poverty are also frequently used interchangeably in the 
press, and frequently different issues such as ‘absolute poverty’ and 
‘relative poverty’ are confused.   
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1.3.2.2 Absolute Poverty 
 
Absolute poverty, also referred in Rowntree (1901) as ‘primary poverty’, 
refers to a state of deprivation defined in relation to what is supposed to 
be an objective, invariant and value free external definition of basic 
human needs.  Today, this objective, invariant and value free external 
definition of basic human needs is used by the World Bank when 
conceptualising poverty in the international development context to 
mean ‘anyone living on an income below US$1 per day’ (World Bank, 
2000a).  Even though this ‘below US$1 per day’ indicator for absolute 
poverty is used as an indicator for the Millennium Development Goals, 
its use has been heavily criticized by scholars such as Townsend and 
Gordon (2002) who criticised it for being an inaccurate indicator and for 
being set too low.   
 
The 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen 
described absolute poverty as “a condition characterized by severe 
deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, 
sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information (World 
Summit for Social Development, 1995).  The summit then significantly 
added that the state of poverty “... depends not only on income but also 
on access to social services” (World Summit for Social Development, 
1995).   
 
Statistics South Africa uses two absolute poverty lines: the ‘lower-bound’ 
poverty line and the ‘upper-bound’ poverty line (Statistics South Africa, 
2007).  Both these poverty lines are based on a household’s 
consumption level, rather than the income level of the household.  There 
are three reasons why, instead of household income level, the 
household’s consumption level is a better indicator for the measurement 
of poverty.  These reasons are that of the two measures, consumption is 
more closely related to well-being in the sense of having enough to meet 
current basic needs; consumption is usually the better measured 
aggregate of the two because it is less subject to short-term variation; 
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and consumption more accurately reflects households’ true standard of 
living and ability to meet basic needs, which depend on current income 
as well as access to credit markets and households savings (Statistics 
South Africa, 2007; 2008a).   
 
Using food prices from 2000, Statistics South Africa calculates that the 
‘lower-bound’ poverty line, which provides for essential food and 
essential non-food consumption, amounts to R322 per capita per month. 
Using the exchange rate for 01 July 2000, this is approximately US$1.50 
per day per person (Statistics South Africa, 2007; 2008b).  The ‘upper-
bound’ poverty line includes an additional R271 for non-essential non-
food items, and amounts to R593 per capita per month (Statistics South 
Africa, 2007; 2008b).  Using the exchange rate for 01 July 2000, this 
calculates to approximately US$2.90 per person per day. 
1.3.2.3 Relative Poverty 
 
‘Relative poverty’ as a concept relates poverty to a reference group, and 
links poverty to a particular point on the distribution curve of a particular 
variable, e.g. income.  Thus simply put – people are poor if they are poor 
in comparison to those around them in society.   
 
May (1998) describes relative poverty in relation to the national 
distribution of income and expenditure, and satisfying a socially 
acceptable minimum standard of living, while Galbraith (1958) and later 
Townsend (1979) defines it as living not in a way which is customary, or 
average, for society:  “People are poverty stricken when their income, 
even if adequate for survival, falls markedly behind that of the 
community.  Then they cannot have what the larger community regards 
as the minimum necessary for decency; and they cannot wholly escape, 
therefore, the judgement of the larger community that they are indecent.  
They are degraded, for, in a literal sense, they live outside the grades or 
categories which the community regards as respectable” (Galbraith, 
1958:323).   
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In the 1980s, Sen developed his ‘capabilities approach’ for poverty, 
conceiving poverty as being absolute in the space of ‘capabilities’, i.e. 
having both the capability to do something as well as the commodity, or 
mode, to do so within the context of the society in which one lives (Sen, 
1983).  Like Galbraith, he links poverty, degradation and shame, and 
talks about the capability to ‘avoid shame’: “...from failure to meet social 
conventions, participating in social activities and retaining self-respect” 
(Sen, 1983:167).  Noble et al (2004) expands the concept further to 
indicate that ‘relative poverty’ implies that a person, or family, or social 
group, living in poverty is unable to participate fully in society.   
 
The vision articulated for the South African society in the preamble to 
1997 White Paper on Social Welfare is consistent with a 
multidimensional and relative approach to poverty that incorporates the 
meeting of basic needs and capabilities.  The White Paper views the 
South African society as “a humane, peaceful, just and caring society 
which will uphold welfare rights, facilitate the basic needs, release 
people’s creative energies, help them achieve their aspirations, build 
human capacity and self-reliance, and participate fully in all spheres of 
social, economic and political life” (Department of Welfare, 1997: 
Preamble).   
1.3.2.4 Poverty in South Africa 
 
One might ask the question of why the issues of poverty and inequality 
are relevant, or even important, in a discussion of the arms deal, and 
more specifically, a discussion of those offsets linked to the arms deal.  
Simply put, the issues of poverty and inequality cannot be ignored.  It is 
also not possible to fully discuss the implications of mineral and metal 
beneficiation without considering the implications it has for the poorest of 
the poor.  The success or failure of initiatives such as beneficiation and 
industrial participation will have an impact on the overall aim to reduce 
poverty. 
 37
 
In the public debate that has taken place, and continues to take place, 
since the signing of the 1998 South African arms deal, many have 
argued against purchasing of military armaments, referring to it as a 
wasteful distraction from pressing development needs in a country 
dogged by chronic poverty and inequality (see Crawford-Browne, 2000).  
The Cape Times (28 March 1995) wrote: “Can the expenditure of at 
least R1,7 billion on naval ships, in peacetime, be justified while millions 
of South Africans still live in squalor with minimal access to the most 
basic facilities?  At a pinch the navy can manage a little while longer with 
the strike craft and other vessels it already has, but there can be no 
greater urgency than housing the homeless.”  
 
South Africa is one of the few countries in the world that guarantees 
socio-economic rights within its constitution, and as such has won 
international praise.  These socio-economic rights are captured in the 
1996 Constitution’s second chapter, the Bill of Rights, and include 
access to housing (Section 26), health care, food, water, social security 
(Section 27), and education (Section 29).  While the Bill of Rights does 
not guarantee a specific level of income for any person, nor more 
importantly in the light of the arms deal offsets, the right to a job or paid 
employment, it does address a number of domains that relate to 
people’s well-being, in particular the right to adequate housing, to health 
care, to sufficient food and water, and to social security, including social 
assistance, and to education (Liebenberg, 2006). 
 
The issue of poverty becomes relevant in the context of the arms deal 
because at the time of signing the deal, questions were raised in 
Parliament on the affordability of the deal, particularly in relation to the 
country’s socio-economic needs, in particular the number of people 
without access to adequate housing, without adequate access to safe, 
potable water and adequate sanitation, health care and the rising 
incidence of HIV/AIDS.  Just shortly before the deal was concluded, the 
Minister of Health rejected the idea of providing anti-retroviral drugs to 
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pregnant mothers as the programme was deemed too expensive to even 
contemplate (Holden, 2008: 28). 
 
In 2007, there was an estimated 5.7 million people living with HIV in 
South Africa (UNAIDS, 2008).  During the period from 1997 to 2005, the 
total number of deaths in the country increased by 87%, with the death 
rate more than tripling for women aged 20 to 39, and more than doubling 
for males aged 30 to 44 (Statistics SA, 2005; Statistics SA, 2006).  It is 
estimated that at least 40% of these deaths is attributable to HIV 
(UNAIDS, 2008).     
 
Maternal, infant and child mortality ratios strongly reflect the overall 
effectiveness of a country’s health system.  Data for South African 
maternal mortality since 1998 are available through the National 
Committee on Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths (NCCEMD), 
which captures maternal deaths through the Confidential Enquiries into 
Maternal Deaths (CEMD) system.  The system indicates that the 
reported maternal mortality ratio has increased every year.  It rose from 
117 per 100,000 in 1998 to 147 in 2004 (Department of Health, 2007).  
The last official data from the CEMD was for 2004.  Although the CEMD 
system should capture all the maternal deaths occurring in the country, it 
is not clear whether all deaths occurring outside health facilities, 
including home deaths, are actually captured on the CEMD (Department 
of Health, 2007).    
 
At least 260 women, babies, and children die every day in South Africa, 
and no measurable progress has been made to reduce this mortality 
rate.  Approximately 50% of all maternal deaths take place within one 
day of childbirth, while approximately 40% of stillbirths occur during 
labour.  Between one third and one half of all newborn deaths are on the 
first day of life, many due to asphyxia resulting from poor quality of care 
during childbirth (South African Every Death Counts Writing Group, 
2008).   
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UNICEF defines ‘infant mortality’ as the probability of dying between 
birth and exactly one year of age, expressed per 1000 live births during 
a specific period.  The 1998 Demographic Health Survey was the last 
population survey to provide reliable data on infant mortality in South 
Africa.  The 2000 South African National Burden of Disease Study, 
which draws on the 1998 health survey data, indicates that the infant 
mortality rate was 59 deaths per 1000 live births.    All indications are 
that infant and child mortality has increased since 1990.   
 
An assessment done by UNICEF (2007) found that: 
• South Africa's under-five child mortality rate was not reduced, but 
had risen between 1990 and 2006 from 60 to 69 deaths per 1000 live 
births. 
• With this, South Africa puts itself on a list of 15 countries such as 
Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe who had made no progress meeting 
the MDG. 
• The main cause for under-five deaths was HIV/AIDS, responsible for 
57% of child deaths. 
• If South Africa wants to meet the fourth Millennium Development 
Goal, it would have to reduce its mortality number to 20 per 1000 live 
births by 2015  
 
Malnutrition contributes to child mortality by increasing the risk of death 
(Black et al., 2008).  The South African Child Healthcare Problem 
Identification Programme (PIP) data indicate that 60% of deceased 
children nationally were underweight-for-age and 33% were severely 
malnourished (Stephen et al., 2009).   
 
The extent of food insecurity in households is measured by using 
‘hunger’ as indicator.  In the Statistics South Africa General Household 
Survey, which is conducted annually since 2002, respondents are asked 
to indicate whether any child, aged between birth and 17 years old, in 
the household ‘seldom, sometimes, often, always, or never went hungry 
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in the past 12 months’.  Although child hunger is emotive and subjective, 
it is assumed that variation and reporting error will be consistent so as to 
allow for the reporting of trends from year to year.  The results of the 
2002 survey indicated that 29% of children experienced child hunger 
nationally, the percentage remained the same in 2003; but decreased to 
25% in 2004; 22% in 2005; 16% in 2006 and 15% in 2007 (Proudlock et 
al., 2008; and Pendleburg et al., 2009).   
  
Racial disparities are stark for this indicator and confirm that hunger, like 
poverty and unemployment, is most likely to be found among black 
children.  Nationally, in 2007, approximately 2.5 million black children 
lived in households that reported child hunger.  Thus approximately 17% 
of the total black child population experience hunger, compared to 11% 
coloured, one percent (1%) Indian and 0.1% white children (Pendleburg 
et al., 2009).   
 
In reality, the development indicators for the country have been 
indicating a downhill spiral for several years.  In terms of the United 
Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI) 
for 1998 (the year that the arms deal was entered into), South Africa 
ranked 103 out of 174 countries, just below Tunisia and just above El 
Salvadore and Cape Verde (UNDP, 2000).  By 2005, the country had 
slid to being ranked 121 out of 177 countries (UNDP, 2007). 
 
Van der Berg and Louw (2003) found that there is a link between the 
number of people living in poverty and the growth in population 
experienced in the country.  They found that although the proportion of 
people living in poverty had declined between 1970 and 2000, a growing 
population has led to more individuals living in poverty, as illustrated 
below.  
 
 Population Living in Poverty Proportion 
1970 22 million 11 million 50% 
2000 44.6 million 17 million 38% 
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Change +22,6 million +6 million -12% 
Source: Van der Berg and Louw (2003). 
  
The Human Sciences Research Council found that in 2001 
approximately 57% of individuals in South Africa were living below the 
poverty income line, a situation that was unchanged from 1996 (Human 
Sciences Research Council; Press Release, 26 July 2004).   
 
In its 2003 report on development in South Africa, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) reports that in the years leading up to 
2003; income, poverty and inequality had increased in the country 
(UNDP, 2003).  At the same time, the South African Human Sciences 
Research Council found that the country’s Gini score (that indicates 
inequality) was approximately 0.77 (Human Sciences Research Council; 
Press Release, 26 July 2004). 
 
In the past inequality in South Africa was largely defined along race 
lines, and the main driver of inequality was the Black/White divide.  In 
recent years, however, inequality has become increasingly defined by 
inequality within population groups as the gap between rich and poor 
within each group has increased substantially.   The Gini coefficient for 
the Black population has risen from 0.62 in 1991 to 0.72 in 2001 (Bhorat, 
2003; Van der Berg and Louw, 2003).  This level of inequality is 
comparable with the most unequal societies in the world.  The White 
population has a Gini coefficient of 0.60 (Bhorat, 2003; Van der Berg 
and Louw, 2003), which is extremely high for a group whose education 
and occupational profile matches that of societies in highly industrialised 
countries (Human Sciences Research Council; Press Release, 26 July 
2004). 
 
 
1991 1996 2001 
Black 0.62 0.66 0.72 
White 0.46 0.50 0.60 
Coloured 0.52 0.56 0.64 
Asian 0.49 0.52 0.60 
 42
Total 0.68 0.69 0.77 
Source: Human Sciences Research Council; Press Release, 26 July 2004 
 
With specific importance to this evaluation of the SARM factory, which 
was located in a rural area of the Free State Province, is the poverty 
incidence and rates for rural South Africa.  It is important in that the 
implicit reasons provided for the establishment of SARM are job creation 
and poverty reduction for the poor, unemployed black women of the 
area.  Traditionally the incidence of poverty is much higher in the rural 
areas of the country, where in 2007, the incidence of poverty of 
households was 54.2% and that of individuals were 67.7%.  These 
incidences were more than double the corresponding rates for urban 
areas, which was 21.9% for households and 32.7% for individuals during 
the same period (Statistics South Africa, 2008a).  Statistics South Africa 
(2008a, b, c) further found that 57.1% of all poor households and 59.3% 
of poor individuals in 2007 were rural dwellers despite the fact that the 
rural areas housed well below 50% of the country’s population. 
 
1.3.3 Sustainable Development 
 
The term ‘sustainable development’ is not new.  Many scholars consider 
1962 as the seminal year in which people gained understanding of how 
closely linked the environment and development are.   
 
Rachel Carson’s book “Silent Spring” shattered the assumption that the 
environment had an infinite capacity to absorb pollutants.  Her research 
indicates that agricultural pesticides were building to catastrophic levels 
and that it was damaging to animal and human health.  In 1968 Paul 
Ehrlich’s “Population Bomb” was published.  The book explores the 
connection between human population, resource exploitation and the 
environment.  The following year, 1969, the USA passed the National 
Environmental Policy Act that led to the creation of the first national 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ever.  In 1972 the concept of 
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‘sustainable development’ is used at the United Nations Conference on 
Human Environment in Stockholm, to present a resolution to the 
environmental vs development dilemma.  The conference led to the 
establishment of numerous national environmental protection agencies 
and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (Dhar and 
Thakur, 1996).   
  
The term ‘sustainable development’ however came to prominence with 
the publication of the “Our Common Future” report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development in 1987.  This report is 
more commonly known as the Brundland report.  The definition of 
sustainable development as defined in the Brundland report as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own” is widely regarded as 
the fundamental definition of sustainable development.  For the first time 
‘sustainable development’ was not linked only to environmental issues, 
but also to the actions of both government and business.  The 
interpretation of this definition has led to confusion and heated debate.  
The confusion is closely linked to the lack of agreement regarding 
exactly what is to be sustained, for whom, and by what means (Redclift, 
1992; Frazier, 1997), and the argument is primarily between the eco-
centrism and techno-centrism viewpoints.   
1.3.3.1 Eco-centrism vs Techno-centrism 
 
Eco-centrism is a philosophy that recognizes that humans are but a 
component of the planet’s ecosystem, and thus the environment as the 
source and support of all life, is more important and significant than the 
economy or social well-being (Shields and Šolar, 2004; Rowe, 1987).   
 
Techno-centrism is the opposing view and argues that humans have the 
ability to provide technical solutions to control environmental and social 
problems.  The free market and economic efficiency is emphasised by 
techno-centrism (Solow, 1993). 
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Jacobs (1999) narrows down the debate between these two viewpoints 
to the four basic questions:  
• the degree of environmental protection that is envisioned to attain 
sustainable development;  
• the emphasis placed on equity as a prerequisite for sustainable 
development;  
• the measures and nature of participation required to attain 
sustainable development; and  
• the scope of the subject area covered by the concept of 
sustainable development (Jacobs, 1999).   
 
These questions were adapted and now forms part of the “Five Capitals” 
model that is widely used within companies to measure their overall 
sustainability and social responsibility (Sigma Guidelines, 2004). 
1.3.3.2 The Capitals 
 
The ‘capitals’ are defined as follows: 
• ‘Human capital” refers to the health, knowledge, skills, intellectual 
outputs, motivation and capacity for relationships of the individual.  
In the business context it includes the elements needed for 
people to engage in productive work. 
• ‘Social capital’ refers to any value added to the economic outputs 
of a business by human relationships, partnerships and 
cooperation.  It includes amongst others, communities, trade 
unions, networks, and other businesses. 
• ‘Manufactured capital’ refers to material goods and infrastructure 
owned, leased or controlled by the business that contribute to the 
production, but do not form part of the output (thus for a gold 
mine, it would include buildings, machines, tools, etc, but not the 
gold which forms part of the mine’s product.) 
• ‘Financial capital’ refers to the assets that exist in the form of 
currency that can be owned and traded, such as shares, bonds, 
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and money in the bank; and reflects the productive power and 
value of the other four types of capital. 
• ‘Natural capital’ refers to natural resources, such as energy and 
matter, which companies require to produce their products and 
deliver their services (Carney, 1998, Sigma Guidelines, 2004). 
 
Social, human and manufactured aspects (‘capitals’) are critical 
components of a company and its activities.  A company’s activities in 
this context include delivering value to other businesses and society, as 
well as the quality of life of stakeholders.  The stakeholders are those 
groups who affect and/or are affected by the business and its activities.  
These may include employees, trade unions, owners, shareholders, 
customers, business partners, neighbouring communities, suppliers and 
government, amongst others.   
 
Natural capital encompasses the natural resources and ecological 
systems on which the company and wider society depends.   
 
Financial capital is crucial to the survival of the business and 
accountability is crucial.  The principle of accountability represents the 
relationship that the business has with its stakeholders.  Accountability 
includes transparency; responsiveness to the needs of stakeholders, 
and compliance to rules, regulations and standards to which a business 
must comply.   
 
These aspects discussed above are interdependent and changes in one 
of these aspects of business are likely to cause an impact on another 
aspect (Sigma Guidelines, 2004). 
1.3.4 The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
Since 1994, most of the South African government’s policies have been 
aimed at the upliftment of the country’s previously disadvantaged 
individuals and their communities.  At the same time, the shift within the 
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country towards a greater use of industrial policy formed part of a 
broader shift within the post-Apartheid government to utilise partnerships 
and to leverage private sector investment.  These partnerships and 
investments are used to reduce, and to a large degree offset, the state’s 
costs of supporting and subsidising domestic industrial activity (Haines, 
2000; Bond, 2002).  Both beneficiation and industrial participation are 
built primarily on the principles of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), adopted in 1995 and focused on redressing the 
social imbalances created by Apartheid.   
Feinstein (2007) recounts how the programme was a result of efforts by 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), supported by the Macroeconomic Research 
Group, which consisted of a group of progressive international 
economists.  The RDP was intended to be people-driven and envisaged 
a massive national public works programme to facilitate employment and 
reduce inequalities (Feinstein, 2007:45).   
 
The programme was designed so as to acknowledge the importance of 
reducing poverty as a way to uplift communities.  Its main principles are: 
• Eliminate poverty and inequality 
• Raise living standards through meeting the people’s basic needs, 
such as housing, water and electricity 
• Developing the country’s human resources 
• Building the economy, and  
• Democratizing the state and society 
 
The five-year RDP had several goals of which the most relevant ones 
have been captured in the table below for easy reference. 
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  Selected RDP Goals 
Housing: Provide well-located and 
affordable shelter for all by the year 
2003. Build one million houses in 
five years 
Water:  Supply 20 to 30 liters of 
clean water each day to every 
person in two years and 50 to 60 
liters per day within five years from 
a point no more than 200 meters 
from their dwelling. 
Electricity: Supply 2.5 million 
more households and all schools 
and clinics with electricity by the 
year 2000. 
Health care: Give free medical 
care to children under six years 
and to homeless children; improve 
maternity care for women; 
organize programs to prevent and 
treat major diseases like TB and 
AIDS. 
Land reform: Implement land 
reform based on redistribution of 
residential and productive land to 
those who need it but cannot afford 
it and restitution to those who lost 
land because of apartheid laws. 
Job Creation through public 
works: A national public works 
program to provide basic needs 
such as water supply, sewerage 
and roads and at the same time 
create jobs, particularly in poor and 
rural areas. 
Social security and social 
welfare: A new system to provide 
for all people regardless of their 
race, gender or physical disability.  
A pension system to meet the 
needs of works in the formal and 
informal sectors. 
Education and training: Literacy 
for all, equal opportunity, 10 years 
of free and compulsory education, 
class sizes of no more than 40 
pupils, training workers to meet the 
challenges of the new political and 
economic conditions. 
Source: Knight, 2001. 
In his study on South Africa’s economic policy and development, Knight 
(2001) found that there were both proponents and detractors of the RDP 
programme.  Proponents argued that the programme oversaw many 
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major advances in dealing with South Africa's most severe social 
problems such as:  
• Housing: Between 1994 and the start of 2001, over 1.1 million 
cheap houses eligible for government subsidies had been built, 
accommodating five million of the estimated 12.5 million South 
Africans without proper housing.  
• Clean water: By the beginning of 1998, standpipes had been 
installed within 200 metres of the dwellings of about 1.3 million 
rural people.  By August 1998, the Minister of Water Affairs stated 
that since he had taken office, more than 2.5 million people had 
been given access to fresh safe water.  By 2000, a total of 236 
projects had supplied clean piped water to nearly 4.9 million 
people, most of whom were inhabitants of former homelands.  
• Electrification: Between 1994 and May 2000 around 1.75 million 
homes had been connected to the national grid, while the 
proportion of rural homes with electricity grew from 12 percent to 
42 percent.  
• Land Reform: By 1999 some 39,000 families had been settled on 
3,550 square kilometres of land.  Authorities claimed that 250,000 
people had "received land" within four years.  
• Healthcare: Between April 1994 and the end of 1998, around 500 
new clinics gave an additional five million people access to 
primary health care.  Under the polio-hepatitis vaccination 
programme that began in 1998, eight million children were 
immunised within two years.  
• Public works: A community-based public works programme 
provided employment over five years to 240,000 people on road-
building schemes and the installation of sewage, sanitation 
facilities and water supplies (Knight, 2001). 
Critics on the other hand have questioned the scope of change 
represented by many of the statistics, arguing that realities on the 
ground signify a far more modest improvement.  They have criticised the 
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standards of housing and water delivery, healthcare improvements and 
the success of the land reform policy and agricultural reforms:  
• Housing: Critics mentioned the poor quality of the housing and 
the often dreary planning and layout making the RDP housing 
units strongly resemble the bleak building programmes 
implemented by the Apartheid government during the 1950s and 
60s.  
• Clean water: Critics have cited an array of problems and 
complications with RDP water provision policies that have led to 
their partial or complete failure during the implementation stage.  
• Land Reform: The number of families settled on land under the 
RDP was far below the Programme's goal.  The RDP had aimed 
to resettle families on 300,000 square kilometres of land, in 
reality, only just over one percent of this goal was achieved.  In 
addition, the advances in many other areas of public services 
came partly through the removal of agricultural subsidies, which 
resulted in huge job losses.  Between 1994 and 1998, the number 
of workers on commercial farms declined from 1.4 million to just 
637,000.  Thus, the number of people employed in the agricultural 
sector actually declined substantially under the RDP.  
• Healthcare:  Critics argued that access to healthcare improved 
only slightly under the RDP and that standards at many medical 
institutions declined rapidly. They note that use of healthcare 
facilities increased by just 1.6% between 1995 and 1999, and that 
even these modest improvements have been eclipsed by the 
advance of the AIDS pandemic and other health epidemics, such 
as malaria (Knight, 2001). 
A key aspect of the RDP was that it linked reconstruction and 
development and attempted to combine measures to boost the 
economy, such as contained fiscal spending, sustained or lowered 
taxes, reduction of government debt, and trade liberalisation, with 
socially minded social-service provisions and infrastructure projects.  
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And as such it was frequently referred to in the arms deal – initially in the 
1996 White Paper on National Defence, which urges the reduction in 
defence spending in the light of the needs of the RDP: “...in the South 
African context there is pressure to reduce defence spending 
substantially.  There is urgent requirement to divert financial resources 
to the RDP in order to meet basic socio-economic needs.  A failure to 
meet these needs will generate conflict and instability.” (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996b).  Later the RDP (and how the offsets would assist 
towards reaching its goals) was referred to by Armscor in its arguments 
for offsets: “Normally, foreign procurement entails a net outflow of 
reserves, negative impact on our trade balance, and an increase in our 
defence burden.  However, the counter trade aspect has added a new 
dimension to foreign acquisition.  Subject to the defence budget and 
cabinet approval, the acquisition of the corvettes meets convincingly the 
needs of both the RDP and defence and it is pure butter!” (Weekend 
Argus, 26 February 1995, as quoted in Holden, 2008:9).  A few months 
later, Armscor indicated that the corvette deal “successfully straddles the 
gap between state security and protection of the populace.  It will also 
create employment and resources by protecting our marine 
environment.  Furthermore, it will boost the RDP through countertrade 
inherent in the corvette deal” (Daily News, 26 May 1995, as quoted in 
Holden, 2008:9). 
But the increasing socio-economic challenge in the country forced the 
government’s hand and their response was to significantly adjust the 
RDP programme, and adopt the neo-liberal macro-economic Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in 1996.   
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1.3.5 The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy 
 
"The need to create employment and a better life for our people is the 
central objective of the economic policy of this government. The 
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) remains the basic 
policy framework to achieve this objective.  The Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) program is the associated macroeconomic 
strategy used.  At the beginning of this year the President announced 
an Action Plan to Accelerate Growth.  This action plan marked an 
increased emphasis on macroeconomic reform to further increase 
investment…" (Alec Erwin, Minister of Trade and Industry, May 2001) 
 
Underlying the introduction of GEAR was the realization that 
development and poverty reduction would have to be fuelled by market-
led economic growth, shifting the focus to structural economic reforms 
(Gelb, 2006).  It also significantly meant that social spending would be 
reduced while the country tries to reduce its international debt burden 
accrued during the Apartheid era (Holden, 2008). 
  
Stolten (undated) lists the macroeconomic strategies contained in GEAR 
as: growth through exports and investments; redistribution through the 
creation of jobs and the national budget; sharpened focus on budget 
reform; faster reduction in the fiscal deficit; public service restructuring; a 
low and stable inflation rate; gradual relaxation of exchange controls; 
removal of trade barriers; encourage new investments; public investment 
in infrastructure; sale of government assets; and flexibility and training in 
the labour market.   
Central to all the above is the enhancement of non-gold exports, 
increased private sector investments (with a primary focus on increasing 
labour opportunities), development of infrastructure and improved 
service delivery (Knight, 2001).   
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As noted earlier, the country’s industrial participation policy was 
conceived and implemented in the context of an increased emphasis on 
economic and industrial strategy, as formulated particularly in the GEAR 
strategy.  One of the most notable approaches to achieving the aims of 
the GEAR strategy (and with particular reference to the SARM factory) is 
the ‘value-chain’ approach of the Integrated Manufacturing Strategy 
introduced by the Department of Trade and Industry (Department of 
Industry, 2002c; 2003b), which links up with the Department of Minerals 
and Energy’s drive for local beneficiation of metals and minerals mined 
in the country (Wellmann, 2005).  The Integrated Manufacturing Strategy 
emphasises the centrality of knowledge-intensive production processes 
in manufacturing and the need to construct integrated supply and/or 
value chains with both a national and international reach.  The strategy 
places particular emphasis on five sectors of the economy: agriculture 
and food production; tourism; information and telecommunications 
technologies; cultural industries; and exports sectors, including minerals 
and metals, clothing and textiles, automobiles, agro-processing and 
chemicals (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001:30).  The National 
Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP)5 echoes the emphasis on the 
same five economic sectors (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003b).  
In the August 1997 presentation to Parliament of the Defence Review 
and the list of weaponry to be purchased, the then Deputy Minister of 
Defence, Mr. Ronnie Kasrils, explicitly linked offsets, manufacturing and 
the implementation of the GEAR Strategy: “There will be substantial off-
set agreements so that, for instance, South African steel and other local 
components and equipment will be used in production.  There will be 
major off-set or counter-trade agreements, so that for every rand spent 
abroad, the same amount will be invested in South Africa.  Such 
packages will be of enormous benefits to our GEAR Strategy.  It will 
bring in investment and create jobs.  Therefore Defence acquisition will 
be Trade and Industry led.  Far from being a drain on our resources, it 
                                                 
5
 A detailed description of the NIPP is found in Chapter 3. 
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will provide a tremendous boost to our economy and Treasury” (Kasrils, 
1997).    
The GEAR Strategy’s emphasis on export capacity and the focus on 
attracting foreign capital to drive the country’s development process led 
to the country negotiating free trade area agreements with its two largest 
trading partners, the European Union (EU) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) (Gelb, 2006).  These two agreements, 
combined with the United States government’s African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (Public Law 106-200 – May 18, 2000), commonly 
referred to as AGOA, are very relevant to the SARM evaluation.  AGOA 
allows for the duty-free export of mainly energy-related products, 
transportation equipment, minerals and metals, agricultural products and 
textiles and apparel from qualifying Sub-Saharan countries, which 
includes South Africa, to the United States of America.  On July 12, 
2004, the USA extended the whole AGOA Programme to 2015.   
The key ingredients of the GEAR Strategy that impact specifically on 
defence-related industries, include:  
• Liberalisation of the capital account of the balance of payments 
and the possible abolition of exchange controls.  
• The speeding up of tariff reductions to facilitate industrial 
restructuring.  
• The improvement of incentives and facilities to promote the 
investment, technology development, and human resource 
development in industry to promote competitive and labour 
absorbing projects.  
• The strengthening of competition policy, and the promotion of 
small, micro and medium enterprises.  
• The promotion of sectoral industrial strategies employing cluster 
support programmes and related programmes and facilities.  
• The restructuring of state assets (privatisation) and the 
introduction of schemes to allow the broader population to 
become owners of such assets.  
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• Greater support for human resource development in industry, and 
suitably flexible labour market policies to encourage the 
employment of new entrants into the labour market and 
marginalised groups.  
• The continued rationalisation and reduction of import protection in 
order to encourage the emergence of truly competitive producers 
and service providers (Sylvester, 2006).  
One of the GEAR’s most outspoken critics is the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU)6.  Knight (2001) writes that the National 
Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), a COSATU 
formed research institute, found that the GEAR policy has failed to 
deliver the promised economic and job growth, nor did it significantly 
redistribute income and socio-economic opportunities in favour of the 
poor.  The group further found that GEAR brought about deep cuts in 
government spending between 1996 and 1999, resulting in failed efforts 
to improve services to the poor suffered, and that the positive 
consequences anticipated by GEAR did not result. 
 
Much of the debates around the RDP, GEAR and the arms deal have 
focused on the high levels of unemployment and poverty in the country.  
Poverty has already been discussed above.   
 
South African unemployment rates are high.  Gross national income per 
capita has declined during the 1998-2002 period in spite of positive 
economic growth (May, 2004).  This situation occurred  because while 
between 1.4 million and two million new jobs were created during this 
period, even greater increases in labour supply meant that overall 
employment rate also increased (McCord and Bhorat, 2003; Mayer and 
Altman, 2005; Casale et al, 2005).  Statistics South Africa (as quoted by 
                                                 
6
 COSATU is a federation of 19 unions with a combined membership of over 1.8 
million.  Its views cannot be ignored by government due to its alliance with the ANC, 
the federation’s size and its ability to organize its members.  
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Knight, 2001) said unemployment was 22.5% in 2001, down from 23.3% 
in 1999 - but this is a narrow definition of unemployment and only 
includes those actively seeking work, excluding discouraged job 
seekers.  COSATU, using the broader definition for unemployment, 
indicated that it believed unemployment rose to 37.3% in 2001 from 
36.3% in 1999 (Knight, 2001).  In February 2001, President Thabo 
Mbeki said in his annual state of the nation address that there had been 
a net gain of 1.1 million jobs between 1996 and 1999.  And Bhorat 
(2003) found that between 1995 and 2002 approximately 1.6 million net 
new jobs were created in the South African labour market, which is an 
average growth rate of about 2.1% per annum in the number of jobs.  At 
the same time, however, more than five million people entered the 
labour market, resulting in an increase in the number of unemployed of 
more than three million (Bhorat, 2003).   
 
Another aspect of the jobs created is that those jobs were largely 
created in the informal sector, while jobs were shed in the formal sector.  
NALEDI (as quoted in Knight, 2001) noted in December 2000 that some 
official estimates suggest that up to one million jobs in the informal 
sector have been created since 1995, but the opposite was the case in 
the formal sector:  "Between 1996 and 1999 more than 400,000 formal 
sector jobs were lost.  The impact on families is disastrous, as there is 
little in the way of social security protection for the unemployed.  The 
jobs that are being created are generally informal and lowly paid 
positions." 
 
Unskilled employment declined during 1998 to 2002 (Seekings, 2003a, 
2003b; Seekings et al, 2003), which impacted most severely on unskilled 
black, rural workers (McCord and Bhorat, 2003; Mayer and Altman, 
2005).  In the context of these socio-economic problems, local economic 
development and job creation became even more important in terms of 
the arms deal and its accompanying offsets.  Unfortunately, despite 
promises of as many as 65,000 jobs to be created as part of the arms 
deal offsets, very few long-term, sustainable jobs have been created as 
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a direct result of the offsets (Batchelor and Dunne, 2004; Haines, 2004; 
Wellmann, 2004).  Many commentators have indicated that a more 
sensible strategy would have been to leverage offsets investment into 
those sectors with a high capacity for mass employment creation that 
would help to improve the infrastructure and make a positive contribution 
towards meeting basic needs in public utilities sectors, such as housing, 
transport, tourism, energy and communication (Haines, 2006).   
 
Employment and job creation is core to the reasons given by the South 
African government as to why offsets had to form part of the arms deal 
(Crawford-Browne, 2007; Feinstein, 2007; Holden, 2008).  Irrespective 
of political rhetoric, the importance of the labour market in any attempt to 
reduce poverty cannot be ignored, and without an expanding labour 
market that creates sustainable jobs, progress cannot be made.   In 
2003, the Director-General of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), Juan Somavia, stated in a report to the ILO’s annual conference 
that “[j]ob creation should be put at the centre of global efforts to halve 
extreme poverty by 2015” (as quoted in Financial Times, 09 June 2003).  
Most of the South African government’s policies on job creation links the 
notion to that of local economic development. 
1.3.6 Local Economic Development 
Local economic development (LED), both internationally and nationally, 
has become one of the key post-1970s development interventions.  It 
has been recognised by the South African government as a critical 
approach to pursue within the context of empowered local authorities, 
pro-active actions by local citizens, and the need to ensure that 
development is pro-poor in its focus and outcomes.  The 1994 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) document overtly 
support community-based development and locality-based initiatives, 
and make implicit references to the notion of local economic 
development (ANC, 1994).  In 1996, the national Constitution mandated 
local governments to pursue ‘economic and social development’ 
(Republic of South Africa, 1996c), and the concept was taken 
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significantly further in 1998 when the Local Government White Paper 
was released (Republic of South Africa, 1998b).  The White Paper 
introduced the notion of ‘developmental local government’, which is 
defined as ‘...local government committed to working with citizens and 
groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their 
social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their 
lives’ (Republic of South Africa, 1998b:17). 
 
Local economic development is defined as locality-based interventions 
undertaken by local stakeholders, usually operating through 
partnerships, to achieve economic and employment improvements 
within that specific locality.  “LED is the process by which public, 
business and non-governmental sector partners work collectively to 
create better conditions for economic growth and employment 
generation. The aim is to improve the quality of life for all” (World Bank, 
2000b:1).  Zaaijer and Sara (1993:129) defines it as “... essentially a 
process in which local governments and/or community-based groups 
manage their existing resources and enter into partnership 
arrangements with the private sector, or with each other, to create new 
jobs and stimulate economic activity in an economic area”.  In South 
Africa, LED tends to have a more distinctive pro-poor orientation 
(Rogerson, 2003; Nel, 2001).   
 
It is both a spatial and a sectoral intervention, focusing at one level on 
the enhancement of the employment levels and the comparative and 
competitive advantages of any given locality; while at another level it is 
related to the development of specific economic sectors, such as the 
SMME and tourism sectors.  In the Free State, where the case study 
was located, LED also has a role to play in the promotion of alternative 
growth options in the context of the economic decline linked to the 
decline of the gold mining industry and the agricultural sector. 
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The goals of LED tend to revolve around issues of job creation; 
empowerment; the pursuit of economic growth; the restoration of 
economic vitality and diversification in areas subject to economic 
decline.  There are two broad LED orientations – a market-led approach, 
based on business development; and a bottom-up (or market-critical) 
approach, based on community development (Rogerson, 2000).  The 
market-led approach focuses on the pursuit of economic growth, 
investment attraction and courting the high-profile business sector; while 
the bottom-up approach tends to be associated more with support for 
emerging micro and community businesses.  Both of these approaches 
are equally valid, and could be pursued in conjunction with each other in 
order to meet the needs of a wide spectrum of stakeholders and to 
provide for balanced growth by ensuring that capital-generating large 
businesses can generate meaningful spin-offs for the small and 
emerging business sectors (Nel, Hill and Eising, 2002).   
LED can also either have a ‘pro-poor’ focus seeking poverty alleviation 
as encouraged by the Department of Provincial and Local Government, 
or a ‘pro-growth’ focus seeking economic growth, as encouraged by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (Tomlinson, 2003).  The ‘pro-growth’ 
approach of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) links LED firmly 
to mainstream economic development and particularly to small business 
promotion (Rogerson, 2002).  Tomlinson (2003) argues that the ‘pro-
poor’ variant of LED may well, inadvertently, be marginalised by the 
focus on Industrial Development Zones, Export Processing Zones and 
other GEAR related initiatives. 
Nel (2001) has identified four variants of LED as it is currently applied in 
South Africa.  They are the local government-led LED where the elected 
local authority becomes the active change agent; NGO- or Community-
led LED, often in the absence of other logical economic leaders; 
Development Corporation or Section 21 Initiatives (of which SARM was 
one); and ‘Top-down’ LED referring to instances where significant 
government or external resources are specifically targeted at an area in 
an endeavour to catalyse LED (of which SARM was also an example).   
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Tomlinson (2003) finds that LED is being marginalised by the lack of 
available resources; the dominance of large scale state interventions, 
such as projects for the Industrial Development Zones (and to some 
degree the NIPP); the narrow conceptualization of what LED is; and that 
“LED is increasingly being used by central government to shift to local 
government some of the responsibility for dealing with unemployment 
and poverty”’ (2003:113). 
SARM is not the only LED initiative that has failed.  Implementation of 
LED has not been without difficulty and not all LED projects succeed 
(Nel, 2001; Marais et al, 2002; Tomlinson, 2003; Nel and Rogerson, 
2004; Hindson, 2003; Meyer-Stamer, 2003).  Hindson (2003:4) found 
that the results have generally been disappointing and Nel (2001) found 
that the main reasons for failure were linked to capacity and resource 
constraints.   
 
Companies, whether big or small, operate within municipalities.  The 
Municipal Systems Act devotes a great deal of attention to Integrated 
Development Plans (IDPs), of which LED is a key element (Republic of 
South Africa, 2000b).   
1.3.7 Integrated Development Planning 
 
Internationally more and more government functions are decentralized to 
municipal level as municipalities are being recognized as being crucial in 
the process of enhancing local development (Nel, 2001).   
 
The South African Constitution assigns a clear development role to local 
government.  These are described in Sections 152 and 153 of the 
Constitution and various pieces of legislation were enacted to implement 
this role.  To be effective, development has to be managed at local level 
and this requires decentralization of functions and powers.  The 
Municipal Systems Act No 32 of 2000 laid the groundwork for a 
decentralized local government.  Another reason why decentralization 
was inevitable is the new municipal system that was introduced post-
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1994.  South Africa now has a ‘wall-to-wall’7 municipal system which is 
constitutionally recognized as a sphere of government and is receiving 
an increasing share of the national budget in the form of the ‘equitable 
share’.  The ‘equitable share’ is a series of grants that can be used for 
development within the municipality.  The funding for these grants is 
made available from nationally raided revenue.  Equitable share funding 
is separate from the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) and the 
Capacity Building Grants that are also made available to municipalities.  
Government funding allocations to local governments are determined by 
the nature of planning and development priorities identified in 
municipalities’ integrated development plans. 
 
Since 2000, South African municipalities are now constitutionally bound 
to local economic development and poverty alleviation programmes and 
as such are legally required to develop Integrated Development Plans 
(IDPs).  The development of these plans is the first real opportunity for 
integrated development planning in most municipalities in the country 
(Setplan, 2008).  In essence, according to the Department of Provincial 
and Local Government, the IDP is “...conceived as a tool to assist 
municipalities in achieving their developmental mandates” (Department 
of Provincial and Local Government, 2000:21), and as a planning and 
implementation instrument it is to bring together the various functions 
and development objectives of municipalities.   
Integrated development planning has been defined as “... a participatory 
approach to integrate economic, sectoral, spatial, social, institutional, 
environmental and fiscal strategies in order to support the optimal 
allocation of scarce resources between sectors and geographical areas 
and across the population in a manner that provides sustainable growth, 
equity and the empowerment of the poor and the marginalised” 
(Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2000:15).  It is 
essentially a planning process by which planning efforts of different 
                                                 
7
 Every centimeter of the country now falls within a municipality. 
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spheres and sectors of government, other institutions and stakeholders 
within a specific local area are coordinated at the local government level.  
Through this coordinating process, various economic, social, 
environmental, legal, infrastructural and special aspects of development 
planning are brought together.  It is a continuous process, whereby 
consultative relationships, including that with the public through public 
consultation activities, are built into all aspects of local governance.  The 
following diagram illustrates the various role players involved in drawing 
up an IDP. 
 
Figure 1 The IDP Process 
 
 
 
Business forms part of both the ‘economy’ sector and the community, 
and as such is a significant role player.  It is thus of vital importance that 
the business sector remains involved throughout the process.  This is 
even more important in a rural municipality with a small economy, such 
as Virginia in the Free State.   
 
The IDP should be reviewed on a continuous basis as demonstrated by 
the diagram below.   
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Figure 2  The on-going IDP process 
 
 
1.3.8 Government Procurement 
 
Another policy that was reformed in order to accommodate the 
objectives of the RDP and later that of the GEAR strategy, was that of 
government procurement.  Government procurement involves the 
process through which government creates, manages and concludes 
contracts with the private sector for such goods and services 
(Watermeyer, 2000).  This includes purchases made for the military.   
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Prior to 1994, government procurement favoured large and established 
businesses making it nearly impossible for newly established business 
to enter the procurement system (Arrowsmith et al., 2000; Watermeyer, 
2000).  With the distinct aim of addressing the injustices of the past, 
government procurement was granted constitutional status in the 1996 
Constitution, and was recognised as a means of addressing past 
discriminatory policies and practices (Section 217 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa - Act 108 of 1996).  This means that aside 
from government procurement being a form of business - in that it is the 
acquisition of goods and services on the best possible terms -  it also 
has broader social, economic and political implications in that it can be 
used to promote social, industrial, and/or environmental policies 
(Arrowsmith et al, 2000; Labuschagne, 1985; Morris, 1998; Turpin, 
1989).   
 
Subsection (1) of Section 217 of the 1996 Constitution, provides that 
when organs of state contract for goods or services, they must do so in 
accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective.  Subsection (2) provides that “subsection 
(1) does not prevent [organs of state] from implementing a procurement 
policy providing for (a) categories of preference in the allocation of 
contracts and (b) the protection or advancement of person, or categories 
of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination”.  Section 217 thus 
allows, but does not obligate, organs of state to make use of “targeted 
procurement” when awarding contracts, provided it is in accordance with 
the 2001 Procurement Act8.   Although the Procurement Act was 
promulgated some years after the arms purchase, the essentials of 
Section 217 was applicable to the deal.  The aims and visions of the 
Industrial Participation policy are aligned with the sentiments of the 
Procurement Act.  The Industrial Participation policy is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
                                                 
8
 This is in line with the amendment to Section 217 (3).   
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South Africa is not alone in its endeavour to use government 
procurement to address the inequalities of the past, and to kick-start the 
country’s economy.  The European Community undertook a study on 
government procurement in 1995 and found that procurement has been 
used by governments to amongst others, stimulate economic activity; 
protect national industry against foreign competition; protect national 
industry against foreign competition; and improve the competitiveness of 
certain industrial sectors.  Government procurement was also employed 
to foster the creation of jobs, promote fair labour conditions, promote the 
use of local labour as a means to prevent discrimination against minority 
groups such as the disabled, and to protect the environment 
(Watermeyer, 2000).   
 
The freedom of governments to use procurement as a policy tool has to 
a large extent been restrained due to the international implementation of 
measures aimed at achieving free trade in public markets, in the form of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Government 
Procurement.  This happened at about the same time as the 1996 South 
African constitution was adopted.  The relevance to this study of the 
constraints imposed by the WTO in its Agreement on Government 
Procurement, lies in that offsets are usually prohibited, except in relation 
to developing countries (see Article XVI of the WTO Plurilateral 
Agreement on Government Procurement), and those developed 
countries that can provide reasons pertaining to national security and 
public health (see Article XXIII of the Agreement).  “Entities shall not, in 
the qualification and selection of suppliers, products or services, or in the 
evaluation of tenders and award of contracts, impose, seek or consider 
offsets.  Nevertheless, having regard to general policy considerations, 
including those relating to development, a developing country may at the 
time of accession negotiate conditions for the use of offsets, such as 
requirements for the incorporation of domestic content.  Such 
requirements shall be used only for qualification to participate in the 
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procurement process and not as criteria for awarding contracts” (Article 
XVI of the WTO Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement).   
 
Although South Africa is signatory to the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement, the country uses its status as a developing 
country which exempts it from the constraints related to offsets, to allow 
it to use mandatory offsets for any government purchase equalling or 
exceeding US$10 million (Crawford-Browne, 2007; Holden, 2008).  The 
South African government argues that offsets and other countertrade 
agreements are the norm for all foreign procurement of defence systems 
(de Waal, 1993; Republic of South Africa, 2006a) and that offsets can be 
used to stimulate existing local industries, develop new industries, 
provide assistance in finding new markets for exports and diversify the 
country’s manufacturing base; all activities which would assist towards 
the alleviation of the development needs within the country (Feinstein, 
2007; Crawford-Browne, 2007; Holden, 2008).   
 
1.3.9 Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Good governance has become a key focal point in development and 
poverty reduction, and includes the notions of transparency, 
accountability, human rights, the rule of law, and anti-corruption (World 
Bank 1994; Potter, 2000; Minogue, 2002; Aubut, 2004; Wood, 2004).  
The World Bank emphasises that good governance can only happen in 
a context of efficiency, sound public management and good government 
practices, and that this context is essential for the economic 
development (World Bank, 1998), and that “[g]ood governance is 
epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making, a 
bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos acting in furtherance of 
the public good, the rule of the law, transparent processes, and a strong 
civil society participating in public affairs” (World Bank, 1994:7).   
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Although the governance referred to in the paragraph above mainly 
refers to political governance, all of the principles apply to governance 
within corporations as well.  Corporate governance arrangements are 
those processes shaping the relationship between ownership and 
management of enterprises within the society in which the enterprise 
operates.  Management and corporate behaviour styles have changed 
dramatically in the last decade.  Although the basic management 
functions remained the same, the characteristics of the additional 
functions and focus have changed.  There is an acknowledgement by 
corporations that a company and its business practices cannot be 
separated from the society in which it operates.  The society referred to 
is the number of stakeholders to which the company has a responsibility 
– and depending on the size of the enterprise, the stakeholders can 
include a large part of a community (or more than one community, 
region, and even country in the case of multinationals).  Sir Adrian 
Cadbury describe corporate governance as being ‘...concerned with 
holding the balance between economic and social goals and between 
individual and communal goals... the aim is to align as nearly as possible 
the interests of individuals, corporations and society’ (in Foreword to 
World Bank Governance Overview, 1999).   
 
Management focusing entirely on profit is no longer acceptable.  Those 
opposed to good corporate citizenship often quote Adam Smith’s 
“Wealth of Nations” (1904)9, where he argues that general welfare was 
better served by people pursuing their enlightened self-interest than by 
misguided attempts to serve society.  But those in opposition to good 
corporate citizenship are dwindling in numbers and there is evidence of 
a rise in corporate conscience.10  
 
It is now accepted that companies can only experience sustainable 
business growth if they operate in strong, sustainable communities, and 
                                                 
9
 First published in 1776   
10
 The Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2005 
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have good relationships with these communities.  Indeed, sustainability 
has become a pragmatic pursuit, not an ideological exercise.  It is about 
increasing opportunities and not limiting them (Strongman, 2002).  In a 
business context, sustainability means that each business must balance 
the need for long-term viability and prosperity of the enterprise, the 
affected communities and the environment; with the requirement for 
short-term competitiveness and financial gain (King Committee, 
2002:91).   
 
The three generally accepted11 dimensions of sustainable development 
are economic, social and environmental, often referred to as the ‘triple 
bottom line’.  The developing world’s, and indeed South Africa’s, needs 
differ from those of the First World in that they are overwhelmingly social 
and economic and of the here and now; concentrating on how to get 
today’s generation out of poverty and build strong sustainable 
communities (Wellmann, 2005).  Corporate governance in South Africa 
became institutionalised by the publication of the first ‘King Report on 
Corporate Governance’ in November 1994.  And in the light of the 
country’s social and economic needs, the industrial sustainable 
development indicators proposed for South African companies are as 
follows: 
                                                 
11
 It is my opinion that there is a fourth, equally important dimension of sustainable 
development in the form of central and local governance within the country where the 
company and/or its operations are based.  Without a functional central and local 
government in place, it is impossible for development to be sustainable in the long-term 
irrespective of the type or amount of the economic, social or environmental inputs.    
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Table 1  Industrial development indicators for South Africa 
 
Economic Elements 
(developing financial capital) 
Environmental Elements 
(protecting natural capital) 
Social Elements 
(promoting social capital) 
Employment creation Promoting energy and water 
efficiency 
Poverty alleviation 
Ensuring competitiveness in 
global market 
Maintain biodiversity  Provision of education and 
training 
Increasing foreign exchange 
reserves 
Addressing climate change Reducing crime 
Developing skilled workforce Maintaining air and water quality Access to housing and basic 
infrastructure 
Maximising natural resource 
productivity 
Minimising waste and pollution Protecting consumer rights and 
interests 
 Preventing/remediating land 
contamination 
Ensuring health and safety in the 
workplace 
 Promoting use of renewables Promoting community health 
Adapted from Business Council for Sustainable Development South Africa (2002: 2) 
 
Although Harmony Gold Mining Company would be assessed against all 
three legs of the indicators, the SARM factory is only be assessed 
against the economic and social elements.  The environmental factors 
were not considered as it is assumed that: (i) an environmental impact 
assessment would have been required by government prior to the 
establishment of the factory; (ii) there is less environmental impacts 
associated with a gold jewellery factory compared to the gold mining and 
gold refining processes leading to jewellery manufacturing; and (iii) that 
the jewellery factory’s impact on the environment would have been 
minimal compared to its economic and social impacts.  Further, a full 
environmental impact assessment of SARM would be outside the scope 
of this evaluation. 
1.3.10 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
 
Sometimes the notion of ‘corporate governance’ is used interchangeably 
with that of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR), even though there is a 
difference between the two notions.  Good corporate governance 
ensures that corporations use their capital efficiently within the legal, 
institutional and regulatory climate in which they operate; while corporate 
social responsibility addresses social and environmental needs in the 
society within which a corporate conducts its business, and in doing so 
operates for the benefit of society as a whole.  Many governments, 
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including the South African government, have taken up the rhetoric of 
CSR.  Corporate Social Responsibility is explicitly referred to in the 2002 
Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act.     
 
Other terms also used to refer to CSR are ‘corporate responsibility’, 
‘business responsibility’, ‘corporate citizenship’, ‘business citizenship’, 
‘community relations’ and ‘social responsibility’.   
 
Although corporate governance is by no means a new notion – 
researchers at Cardiff University in the United Kingdom have found 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility as far back as 
the time of King Hammurabi of Ancient Mesopotamia in 1700 BC 
(BRASS Centre, 2007) – the emergence of the cry and slogan ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ has been a significant feature of the twenty-first 
century (Lockett et al., 2006).  Holme and Watts (2000) describe 
corporate social responsibility as “the continuing commitment by 
business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development 
while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as 
well as of the local community and society at large” (Holme and Watts, 
2000:8).  This commitment and obligation is often referred to as the 
‘licence to operate’ and Porter and Kramer (2006) considers the concept 
of ‘licence to operate’ as one of the traditional reasons for the 
implementation of CSR.   
 
Porter and Kramer also consider the importance of CSR as the shared 
value that business has with society.  They echo the European 
Commission’s key communication of 2002 that reported that companies 
can contribute to sustainable development by managing their operations 
in such a way as to enhance economic growth and increase 
competitiveness while ensuring environmental protection and promoting 
social responsibility (European Commission, 2002).   
 
There is broad international consensus that CSR is intrinsically linked to 
the concept of sustainable development, and that it is not an optional 
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“add-on” to business principles, but that it lies at the core of how 
businesses are managed.   The most broadly accepted definition of CSR 
is that of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development that 
describes corporate social responsibility as ‘the continuing commitment 
by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development 
while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as 
well as of the local community and society at large” (SDU, 2007).  
However, for the purposes of evaluating SARM, and the CSR obligations 
under which both the BAE/SAAB consortium and Harmony Gold 
Company operate, the best definition for this context is that captured in 
the University of Miami’s 2007 document, ‘A Guide to Social 
Responsibility’.  The guide describes CSR as a means of analyzing the 
inter-dependent relationships that exist between businesses, economic 
systems, and the communities within which they are based.  The 
document further describes it as a means of probing any obligations a 
business has to its immediate society; a way of proposing policy ideas 
on how those obligations can be met; as well as a tool by which the 
benefits to a business for meeting those obligations can be identified.   
 
Companies are very aware of the negative consequences of being 
viewed as an irresponsible corporate citizen.  Recent examples are the 
child labour scandals that hit the Adidas and Nike brands in 2000 and 
2001 (The Observer, 19 November 2000; The Independent, 20 October 
2001); and the on-going public health and welfare controversy in relation 
to Nestlé’s powdered milk products (The Guardian, 15 May 2007).  
Closer to home, albeit from another era, one remembers the bad 
publicity and the effective public protests aimed at Barclays Bank for 
doing business with South Africa during the period of sanctions against 
the country (John, 2000).  
 
In his presentation at the March 2006 SMI Publishing-sponsored annual 
conference on international offsets and industrial cooperation, Hew 
significantly links procurement offsets to comprising, among other 
needs, a need for the selling company to discharge corporate social 
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responsibility (Hew, 2006).  This links up with the idea that offsets can 
be a vehicle for socio-economic projects and ultimately the vehicle for 
poverty and inequality reduction in developing countries.   In South 
Africa, the changing of existing legislation and policies, and the 
introduction of new policies, over the past fifteen years, each one 
seeking to correct the injustices of the Apartheid era, has provided a 
conducive political and economical climate for both local and 
international companies to participate in development programmes, and 
a convenient avenue for companies to discharge their corporate social 
responsibility.  The Industrial Participation policy is one of these policies, 
together with others such as the policies on black economic 
empowerment12, land reform, and mineral ownership reform. 
 
I do not agree with Hew that offsets can be seen as companies 
engaging in social corporate social responsibility.  In the case of 
corporate social investment, there are many companies that fund social 
projects, which on occasion have been small or micro businesses.  This 
is done voluntary - thus although it is expected on a social and even on 
a moral level from the company by society, it is not legislated.  Corporate 
social engagement with society is expected as part of the company’s 
investment in the communities within their operational footprint.  
Generally there are no strings attached to corporate social responsibility 
donations or investments, and thus corporate social investment is 
generally viewed in a positive light.  Offsets, even indirect offsets, can 
however not be described as corporate social investment.   
 
In a similar argument to that of Hew above, some researchers, most 
notably Franko-Jones (1987-1988), have argued that public-private 
                                                 
12
 Black economic empowerment can be defined as an integrated and coherent socio-
economic process that directly contribute to the economic transformation of South 
Africa and brings about significant increases in the number of black people who 
manage, own and control the country’s economy (www.thedti.gov.za ; Business Day, 
March 20, 2003; Mail and Guardian, August 21, 2003; 
www.southafrica.info/doing_business/trends/empowerment/bee.htm). 
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partnerships (PPP) can be beneficial for any government.  A public-
private partnership can be viewed as a method of procurement involving 
the use of private sector capital to fund an asset which is used to deliver 
outcomes for a public or state-owned entity – much in the same way as 
offsets.  Franko-Jones points out that in less than 20 years, Brazil 
became one of the ten largest exporters of conventional armaments 
primarily through the use of public-private partnerships in developing its 
defence industry.  Although it is true that the value for money from PPPs 
can be the delivery of a service or capability at a lower cost and the 
greater certainty of the financial outcome due to less exposure to 
significant risks, I do not necessarily agree that the traditional PPP set-
up is similar to that of offsets, and that engaging offsets obligors as PPP 
partners would be any different from what the outcome would be if it was 
just a ‘normal’ offset project. 
1.3.11 Precious metals beneficiation 
 
For the past few years there has also been a firm push towards local 
beneficiation of metals and minerals mined within the country rather than 
exporting the raw material to other countries and then importing the 
processed product.  Generally, beneficiation is defined as the process 
that eliminates the first layers of waste material in raw ore after mining.  
This process results in a product with a higher mineral content, thus 
widening the processing options.  However, in the South African 
legislative sense, beneficiation is defined as the conversion of the 
minerals and metals mined into value-added products as far as possible 
down the value chain.  In the case of precious metals and minerals, the 
ultimate result of the chain of beneficiation, will result in the 
manufacturing of jewellery (Jourdan, 1993; MPRDA, 2002).   
 
Although there are several beneficiation offset projects that are base 
metal beneficiation projects, such as the production of catalytic 
converters for export, this study concentrates on the beneficiation of 
precious metals, particularly gold and to some degree, platinum.  
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The gold sector in South Africa is a mature industry and many mines are 
exploiting increasingly marginal ore deposits.  The rules and legislation 
governing investment in the mining sector have changed, primarily in the 
domain of ownership of minerals.  At the same time the country is 
participating in the AGAO13 opportunities provided by the USA and the 
EU-SA Free Trade Agreement, which makes it attractive for foreign 
investment for the production of certain products.  This contributed to 
South Africa’s jewellery exports increasing by 68% over a two year 
period from US$11.8 million in 1997 to US$19.8 million in 1999 (Wesgro; 
DTI).  Exports of South African manufactured jewellery increased in the 
five years from 1999 to 2004, growing at an estimated average rate of 
23% per annum per volume (Virtual Metals, 2006). 
 
The changing mining legislation and the push for beneficiation, 
combined with advantageous export opportunities for jewellery products, 
have attracted several offset projects.  Since 1999, six NIP precious 
metal beneficiation-related projects have been established14.  At this 
point it should be borne in mind though that the reporting of the NIPP by 
the Department of Trade and Industry has been erratic throughout the 
years and not always accurate.  This has been demonstrated by the 
Winecorp project in the Western Cape.  The proposed Winecorp project 
was to entail the buy-out of Longridge Winery, the Longridge brand, and 
the Nooitgedacht farm by the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium from 
Winecorp as part of BAE Systems/SAAB’s offsets.  This proposed 
project was rejected in March 2003 by the NIPP on the grounds that it “is 
not sufficiently attractive from a national industrial participation credit 
                                                 
13
 The USA “African Growth and Opportunity Act” (Public Law 106-200 – May 18, 2000) 
that allows for the duty-free export of the mainly energy-related products, transportation 
equipment, minerals and metals, agricultural products and textiles and apparel from 
qualifying Sub-Saharan countries to the United States of America. 
14
 The 2008 annual report of the NIPP refers to a seventh gold and silver jewellery 
factory located in the Northern Cape.  At the time of writing more information on this 
project was not immediately available. 
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ration perspective to justify a potential co-operation between SA National 
Industrial Participation and Winecorp SA (Pty) Ltd.  Given our current 
portfolio of projects, our risk profile employed and the time frame of your 
project, we feel that we have to develop and focus on the projects in 
which we are currently involved or those in which we are about to 
engage”15.  The Department of Trade and Industry reported in its June 
2003 annual report on the NIPP that this project at that time created 210 
jobs (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003b).  Within the annual 
NIPP reports there is limited information as to the nature and the scope 
of the projects, and there also appears to be a relative lack of contact 
between the obligors and their agents, the Department of Trade and 
Industry, on the one hand, and organised business and local and 
provincial government on the other (Haines and Wellmann, 2005). 
 
Of the six precious metals beneficiation offset projects, four are jewellery 
manufacturers, and of the four, only two are still operational.  The two 
are the Filk Gold Chains of South Africa, an Augusta NIP obligation, and 
Silplat, a BAE Systems/SAAB consortium NIP obligation.  The failed 
factories, Oro-Maska and SARM, were both located in the mining town, 
Virginia, in the Free State Province goldfields, and both were BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium NIP projects implemented together with 
Harmony Gold Mining Company.  Both these projects also received 
funding from local sources: Oro-Maska received funding from the Free 
State Development Fund and IDC, while SARM was provided funding by 
IDC (Harmony Gold Mining Company, 2002; 2003; IDC, 2001a; 2001b; 
DTI, 2004; Wellmann, 2004).   
 
1.4 Goals and Objectives of the Study 
 
The main goal of this study is to conduct an ex-post evaluation of the 
South African Royal Manufacturing (SARM) company that was created 
                                                 
15
 Letter from Mr. Emile du Toit, Project Manager SANational Industrial Participation, to 
Mr. Frans Bicard-Carton, Spier Holdings – as quoted in Haines and Wellmann, 2005. 
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as a National Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP) offset.  The 
company was also a company that was involved in the process of 
beneficiating precious metals (gold) mined in this country.  The 
evaluation takes place in this narrow context, but also within a broader 
context of South Africa’s large socio-economic problems, the country’s 
devolved local government system that strongly supports local economic 
development; as well as the fast changing South African mining industry 
and the legislation governing it.  The evaluation aims to be knowledge-
oriented in order to contribute to the broader debate on military offsets 
and the South African NIPP in particular.   
 
The objectives of the evaluation are to: 
• Explore the 1998 South African arms deal, and in particular the 
Industrial Participation (offsets) component of the deal;   
• Explore the background to SARM, and its predecessors, and in 
so doing to explore the relationship between the main characters 
involved; and to 
• Evaluate SARM as an offsets, precious metal beneficiation 
project against other similar offsets, precious metal beneficiation 
projects in order to establish the obvious, as well as the 
underlying, reasons for its demise, and whether it could have 
survived under different circumstances. 
    
1.5 The value of the study 
 
As indicated earlier in this thesis, there is a limited body of literature on 
military sales offsets (Bauer and Dunne, 2009) and even fewer studies 
that evaluate specific projects.  The value of this case study lies in the 
potential to add to this limited body of literature, as well as to add to the 
still nearly non-existent body of literature on precious metal beneficiation 
in South Africa.   
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The study informs on possible pitfalls and risks, including the risk of 
corruption, when establishing a similar business.  It also informs through 
its findings policy makers and implementers, on: 
• The negative effects that the tendency of offsets obligors have of 
starting new ‘greenfields’ projects, instead of building on already 
existing ‘brownfields’ projects.   
• The necessity for strict financial accountability in these projects 
• The need for the implementers of the offsets projects to embrace 
the triple bottom line and to balance the need for short-term 
competitiveness and financial gain and in doing so earning a 
moral ‘licence to operate’.  
• The necessity for strict monitoring and evaluation processes in 
any Industrial Participation programme and/or projects; as well as 
the need for regular independent evaluations. 
•  The necessity that foreign direct investment is indeed just that.  
 
1.6 Outline of the Study 
 
The thesis consists of seven chapters.  This first chapter not only 
discussed the motivation and goals of the study, but also provided a 
thorough definitions and literature review of those concepts that are 
important in this evaluation.   
 
Chapter 2 describes the research design, methodology and evaluation 
process.  The main questions that guided this research was (i) whether 
the project adhered to the objectives of the NIPP; (ii) whether even as it 
failed, the project contributed something worthwhile to any of the NIPP 
objectives, and then (iii) the reasons for its failure.  These three main 
questions and their sub-questions are answered through three phases of 
research, from literary review to verification and interpretation of the 
data.  A full description of the data collection methods, which included 
document analysis, key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions, is provided.  The chapter ends with a description of the 
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limitation of the study, which in essence is the widespread lack of access 
to data. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the evolution of the South African arms industry and 
the 1998 arms deal within the context of the changing legislative and 
policy environment within the country.  This chapter is important as it 
sketches one of the political and economic contexts in which SARM was 
founded and existed, and that is important to understand when 
conducting an evaluation of the company.  The chapter provides a brief 
history of the South African arms industry from pre-1989 to post-1996.  
The process that led to the reform of the South African National Defence 
Force procurement policies and methods is chronicled before discussing 
the 1998 arms deal.  The chapter gives a full overview of the South 
African Industrial Participation (offsets), both present and past, but 
focussing on primarily the 1998 arms deal offsets. 
 
Chapter 4, like Chapter 3, describes another important context in which 
the SARM was founded and operated in, that of the beneficiation of 
precious metals.  The chapter defines and discusses beneficiation and 
the need for beneficiation, before describing each of the six of the other 
beneficiation-related NIP projects in the country.  These projects are: 
• The Musuku Beneficiation Systems, which was located in 
Virginia, Free State Province.  It was a gold refinery and a gold 
processing factory focused on value-addition.  It was a subsidiary 
of Harmony Gold Mining Company and was funded with US$9 
million by the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium as part of their 
offset obligations.   
• The Harmony Jewellery School, located in Virginia, Free State 
Province, owned by Harmony Gold Mining Company.  The BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium provided US$ 400 000 to the school 
as part of its offset obligations. 
• The Oro-Maska jewellery manufacturing plant, which was 
established in October 2001 in Virginia, Free State Province.  
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The factory was part owned by Harmony Gold Mining Company 
and received funding from the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium 
as part of its offset obligations.  The factory stopped production in 
May 2002. 
• The Silplat platinum jewellery factory, which is located in Cape 
Town and was established in 2004 as a result of collaboration 
between Implats16 and Silmar SpA, a leading Italian Jewellery 
manufacturer.  The BAE Systems/SAAB consortium invested 
US$ 47 million into the project as part of their IP obligations. 
• The Gold Advance Scheme, which has recently come into play, 
is a collaborative effort between Gold Fields, AngloGold Ashanti 
and Standard Bank to provide a gold advance scheme to gold 
jewellery manufacturers in South Africa. The BAE Systems/SAAB 
consortium will provide funding as part of its IP obligations to 
cover the collateral support needed by the jewellers.   
• The Filk Gold Chains of South Africa, which forms part of the 
OroAfrica jewellery manufacturer based in Cape Town, has 
received funding from Augusta Westland as part of Augusta’s IP 
obligations.  As this NIP project has been evaluated before (see 
Wellmann, 2004), that evaluation of Filk Gold Chains of South 
Africa is discussed in detail.  The findings of the SARM 
evaluation are listed in a similar manner to that of the findings of 
the Filk Gold Chains evaluation to allow for comparison in 
Chapter 6. 
 
The reason for including these other projects, in what is essentially a 
case study of the SARM, is to provide a type of a ‘control’ group to the 
SARM evaluation.  All these projects are NIPP (offsets) projects and 
they are also precious metal beneficiation projects.  The reasons why 
some of these projects would succeed and others would fail is important 
to the process of learning more about how offsets can be made 
successful, even if just in a limited form.  This is particularly important if 
                                                 
16
 Impala Platinum Holdings Limited 
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one considers that offsets appear to be here to stay, particularly as they 
form part of the country’s policy on industrial growth and government 
procurement.  There are also researchers and practitioners, in particular 
Hew (undated) and Hadjiminas (undated) who argue that offsets will 
continue to form a part of large scale purchases (and not necessarily 
only arms purchases) for a long time to come still, and that the only time 
offsets could stop being used would be when there is a completely equal 
international trading system.    
 
Chapter 5 describes the South African Royal Manufacturers (SARM).  
The description starts with the first layer of the context,  the physical and 
geographical location; the second layer is that of political governance 
both locally and provincially; the third layer is reasons why it was 
established; the fourth layer refers to how it was funded, and the fifth, 
and last, layer refers to how it was managed.  Thus the description starts 
from the broader angle of its provincial context, narrowing in to the 
district and local context, before describing the company’s shareholders 
and investors, and then finally describing SARM’s formation, owners and 
investors, and its inevitable decline and demise. 
 
The chapter discusses the Free State Province’s steady decline in GGP 
during the past decade.  One of the reasons for this is the steady decline 
in the gold mining industry in the area, particularly in the Virginia area 
where SARM was located.   Harmony Gold Mining Company is also the 
only mining company operating in this town and finds itself under 
pressure to invest in socio-economic projects and in recent years, the 
pressure to invest in gold beneficiation.  The discussion of SARM’s short 
existence and its quick demise indicates that although on the surface the 
company fails because of theft of gold, there are more complex reasons 
for its failure.   
 
Chapter 7 discusses the findings of the evaluation.  The company is 
evaluated against the NIPP objectives: sustainable economic growth; 
establishment of new trading partners; foreign investment into South 
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Africa; exports of South African “value-added” goods and services; job 
creation; human resource development; technology transfer; economic 
advantages for previously disadvantaged communities.   To further 
enhance the findings of the evaluation, SARM was also evaluated 
against the performance of two other jewellery manufacturing 
beneficiation projects:  Filk Gold Chains of South Africa and Silplat (Pty) 
Ltd.   
 
The findings conclude that there is really no reason why SARM should 
have failed.    Apart from what can be considered to be ill-intentions of its 
owners and investors, the company had the potential to be successful. 
   
Chapter 8 discusses the findings and conclusions drawn from the 
evaluation.  The evaluation’s findings significantly raise the questions of 
how much direct foreign investment should offsets projects contain; and 
how offsets credits are calculated.  It also raises a red flag around the 
issue of the transfer of foreign technology.  The conclusion is reached 
that such a transfer will never really happen to the extent anticipated by 
those who conceptualise these offset deals, as it makes no business 
sense, especially not from the obligor’s shoes. 
 
The importance of reliable foreign trading partners and how valuable 
these can be to a small company provided that the obligor has a genuine 
interest in sharing markets (or that there are actually markets to share) 
are discussed in the light of the failure of SARM and the success of the 
other two similar projects, particularly OroAfrica.  If this part of an offsets 
deal is implemented well, and provided the company produces good 
quality products to international standards, it can lead to sustained 
exports that will benefit both the company, the local economy in which it 
operates, and the country. 
 
These are only a few of the issues raised and discussed in this 
evaluation of SARM. 
 
 81
1.7 Conclusion 
 
The 1998 South African arms deal is estimated to cost between R30 
billion and R60 billion, and included offsets as part of the deal.  The 
value of these offsets were estimated to be between R104 billion and 
R110 billion and it was further estimated that it would create 65,000 jobs 
over an 11-year period.  This evaluation of one such an offset project will 
contribute both to the academic literature and knowledge on the 
phenomenon of offsets, as well as the literature and knowledge on the 
socio-economic aspects related to the beneficiation of precious metals in 
the country.  It will be one of few empirical research studies on these 
subjects.  The next chapter details the methodology used for the study. 
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2  THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCESS 
2.1 Research Hypothesis 
 
In deciding whether the research design should be exploratory or 
hypothesis testing, the former was chosen.  Even though there were 
several tentative hypotheses thrown around in the press as to what led 
to the failure of the project, the choice for exploration rather than 
hypothesis testing was made to avoid pre-biasing the evaluation.   
 
I did not want to pre-bias my findings by 
• hypothesizing that the business failed because a large amount of 
gold had been stolen from the business by management; or  
• hypothesizing that due to Harmony Gold Mining Company’s 
unorthodox business practices SARM would inevitably fail; or 
• hypothesizing that as the two previous factories established by 
Harmony Gold Mining Company in Virginia had failed, and as the 
business methodology used for the establishment of SARM was 
similar to those used for the previous businesses, SARM was 
due to fail as well; or 
• hypothesizing that because it is an offset project it failed due to 
lack of commitment by the obligor and/or lack of monitoring by 
DTI.   
 
The evaluation was not done to establish whether SARM was a failure or 
not.  The fact that it closed its doors for business indicates that it was a 
failure.  The evaluation was conducted with the aim to explore the 
processes that formed part of the establishment of SARM and its 
demise, and in so doing see what lessons can be learned to share with 
other NIPP initiated beneficiation projects.    
 
 83
2.2 Research Question 
 
The aim of the research is to do an evaluation on the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium SARM offset component of the South Africa 
National Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP) project.   
 
With this aim in mind, the research was guided by the following three 
questions:   
1. Did the project adhere to the objectives of the NIPP? 
2. Even in the failure of the project, did it contribute successfully 
to any of the NIPP objectives? 
3. Why did the project fail? 
  
Within these main research questions, certain sub-questions were asked 
to further guide the evaluation: 
• How many jobs did the project create? 
• What backward and forward business and socio-economic 
linkages were forged and reinforced? 
• How did the project contribute to the industrial cluster in which it 
was located? 
• How did it contribute to the process of beneficiation of raw 
materials? 
2.2.1 The Research Plan and Process 
 
An evaluation is not just about the findings.  The actual process of 
engaging in an evaluation can have as much, or even more impact, than 
the findings generated.  The process of participation and collaboration 
has an impact on evaluation participants that often goes beyond 
whatever they accomplish together.  This links well to Patton’s (1997) 
findings that active participation in evaluation leads to increased 
ownership of the findings and, therefore, increases their utility level.  
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The research plan for the SARM evaluation was conceptualized as 
exploratory and multi-method.  It comprised of three main phases: 
2.2.1.1 Phase 1 
This phase entailed a broad and eclectic literary review, plus an 
extensive relevant documentation analysis.  The literary review had to 
encompass literature on social development, mining, economics and 
military procurement.  Accessing original documents relating directly to 
the firm’s financial, human resources or assets proved impossible.  
However, other documents that were made available, plus those found 
on relevant internet sites proved very useful.  Media reports on the 
subject of NIPP, the arms deal and SARM were also consulted and 
selectively used.  These are the records which serve as sources of 
information for the evaluation.   
 
Document analysis is a way of accessing and understanding some of 
the cultural, historical and political meta-contexts of the subject (Low, 
1987).  It provides essential background information for both the 
researcher and the reader.  In particular historical information highlights 
the evolution of the present situation and provides meaning to the 
context.  This allows much of what interviewees say in the interview 
phase of a study to gain richness when placed within the context of what 
the document analysis yields.   
 
The data collected from the literature survey was augmented by a series 
of key informant interviews.  Newspaper articles, although primary 
sources in respect of certain events that form part of the evaluation, can 
be biased, presenting slanted versions or explanations of events.  The 
key informants were selected to be strategic in order to compensate for 
this phenomenon, as well as the dearth of original documents relating 
directly to the firm’s financial and human resources or assets.   
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2.2.1.2 Phase 2   
 
The second phase corresponds with the ‘observation’ and ‘self-report’ 
sources of information for evaluations. 
 
This phase entailed key informant interviews.  These interviews were 
done both face-to-face, as well as telephonically.  On occasion 
information was solicited via e-mail.   
 
A request to visit the now moth-balled SARM factory was denied, but a 
visit to Musuku Refinery was offered instead.  I visited the refinery in July 
2005.  I also visited the Harmony Jewellery School in June 2006.  This 
was useful in terms of Barker’s (1968) ecological behaviour setting 
theory, which aims to describe naturally occurring behaviour in its 
natural surroundings.  The visits to the refinery and the jewellery school 
allowed me access not only to individuals who had dealings with SARM 
in their capacity as Harmony Gold Mining Company employers, as well 
as observing the refinery where the gold came from and the school 
where some of the workers were trained.  The primary purpose of this 
was to answer questions such as:  
 
• What is happening in this setting?   
• What are the natural units in the stream of happenings I see 
here? (Kaminski, 1989).   
 
The need to observe that is stressed in Barker’s theory is echoed in 
Kvale’s injunction to the researcher to ‘hang around’ the context of the 
study during interview research (Kvale, 1996). 
 
The second part of this phase entailed three focus group discussions 
with several women who worked for SARM.  The main aim was to 
ascertain what they know of the NIP project, their working conditions, 
and what has happened since the factory shut down. 
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Fifty two-minute interviews with persons on the streets of Virginia and 
Meloding were conducted over a three day period in May 2006.  The 
main purpose of this was to ascertain whether the person being 
interviewed was aware of the arms deal, industrial participation and 
SARM.  Although in the final analysis this specific exercise did not 
contribute anything of real value to the evaluation, the responses were 
interesting.  The results are attached in Appendix A. 
2.2.1.3 Phase 3 
 
The last phase entailed the verification and interpretation of data. 
2.2.2 Data collection methods 
 
“Different kinds of data provide researchers with different vantage points 
on events.  And research methods differ in their strengths and 
weaknesses … No strategy, design or method used alone is worth a 
damn.  Multiple approaches are required…” (Wicker, 1987: 644-645). 
 
The four methods used to obtain data in this study are:  
• document analysis,  
• observation,  
• face-to-face, telephonic and e-mail interviews,  
• focus group discussions, and  
• questionnaire administration.   
 
The key informants included Mr. Luis Perez, CEO of SARM; Mr. Ferdi 
Dippenaar, Marketing Director of Harmony Gold Mining Company; De 
Wet Schutte, Harmony Gold Mining Company; Mr. Denzel Young, 
Musuku Beneficiation Systems; Mr. Michael Wightman, Musuku 
Beneficiation Systems; and Ms Alta Wessels, Harmony Jewellery 
School.  These individuals were selected to be interviewed because of 
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their position in relation to SARM and their knowledge of SARM would 
supplement the information that was available for this study. 
 
Questions probed the history of the business; the reasons for its 
establishment; the official reasons for its demise; the perceived reasons 
for its demise; what led up to the demise; what monitoring measures and 
checks and balances were in place; what happened since its demise, 
etcetera. 
 
Other key informants included Ms Chandrika Jogessar, DTI; Mr. Zikode, 
DTI; Mr. Dion Haroldt, DTI; Mr. Kevin Jacobs, IDC; Mr. Linden Birns, 
BAE Systems/SAAB; and Mr. Johan Smit, Silplat (previously BAE 
Systems/SAAB).  These individuals were selected to be interviewed 
because of their position either in central government or in the two most 
prominent funders of SARM.  Unfortunately it was impossible to conduct 
an interview with a representative of the Free State Province 
government. 
 
Questions probed the reasons for funding the business; how far the 
funders were involved in the day-to-day operations of the business; 
whether there were monitoring measures and checks and balances in 
place, whether at the business as well as through the funders, or both; 
what monitoring and evaluation measures are in place at DTI to 
measure NIPP projects; when the funders became aware of the demise; 
what they did when this knowledge emerged; and what has happened 
since the demise of the business. 
 
Kvale (1996) insists that the interview should have an implicit structure, 
whether or not this structure is translated into actual questions or not.  
This structure, which is derived from some pre-knowledge of the 
phenomenon being investigated, both guides the interview itself and 
provides the framework for the subsequent analysis.  Although I agree 
with Kvale as to the importance of structure within an interview, I chose 
to conduct unstructured interviews in order to allow for the interview to 
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create its own flow and move in the direction which is most beneficial to 
information gathering.  This works well to put reluctant interviewees at 
ease.  Questions such as (i) could you tell me more about this? and (ii) 
could you specify further? were frequently asked.  This was done taking 
great care not to give any suggestions to the interviewees. 
 
Although I opted for this type of interview for my interviews with key-
informants, I did prepare myself fully prior to each interview in order to 
obtain as much information from the respondent as possible.  Part of the 
preparation included writing down a list of specific issues to be covered 
for that specific interview to ensure that all issues were covered.  This 
was essential as most key informants had limited time available and 
most of the key informant interviews were conducted via the telephone.   
   
The only formalized questionnaire that was used consisted of four close-
ended questions, which was administered to passers-by in Virginia 
central business district at random in both Afrikaans and English.  The 
questions were: 
1. Do you know about the weapons deal? 
2. Do you know about offsets? 
3. Do you know about SARM? 
4. When did you hear about SARM:  
o Before the opening of the factory 
o During the time the factory was functioning 
o After the closing of the factory? 
 
The main purpose of this was to ascertain whether the person being 
interviewed was aware of the arms deal, industrial participation and 
SARM.   
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2.2.3 Designing the key-informant interview 
 
Kvale (1996) suggests that interview research be conceptualized in 
seven stages: thematizing, designing, interviewing, transcribing, 
analyzing, verifying and reporting.   
 
Thematizing of the interview refers to the three main tasks the 
researcher must accomplish.  These tasks are to establish: 
• what she wishes to know (why the NIP project failed), 
• why she wishes to know it (to assess the reasons for the failure of 
the project within the context of its existence) and  
• how she wishes to acquire this knowledge (through 
documentation analysis, key-informant interviews and focus-
group discussions).   
 
Using interviews as one of the main methods of research is often viewed 
as conducting non-scientific research (Kvale, 1996).  In particular the 
reliability, generalizability and validity/verification of the method, is 
criticized.  Verification and triangulation thus become crucial.  Although 
verification is represented as part of the third phase of the research 
process, it ran like a thread through all the phases of this evaluation. 
 
According to Kvale (1996:49) the qualitative interview researcher should 
have extensive knowledge of the research topic so that she may be “… 
sensitive to the nuances of meanings expressed and the different 
contexts into which the meanings may enter.”  Before the interviewing 
phase began, literature relating to development theories and the theories 
and methods behind conducting evaluations of development projects, as 
well as studying documents and debates on the South African 
Government procurement policies, industrial participation, the arms deal, 
the state of mining and beneficiation, SARM and BAE Systems/SAAB 
was studied.  I drew heavily on my experience as a socio-economic 
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researcher who frequently conducts evaluations of projects and who has 
spent many years in the mining and rural environments.   
 
The next step was to decide whether the research design should be 
exploratory or hypothesis testing.  In order not to pre-bias the evaluation, 
the former was selected. 
2.2.3.1 Interviewing 
 
The interviews were conducted only by me.  This ensured reliability and 
consistency.  Maximum transparency in data gathering and analysis 
during the interview phase was adopted, so that the key informants 
could judge for themselves in how far they agreed with interpretations.  
Where possible, transcripts of the interview were e-mailed to the key 
informants for comments.  This worked well.   
 
The same technique was applied in the focus group discussion.  
Throughout correspondence as a qualitative equivalent of validity was 
endeavoured - that is, to ensure that there is confidence that the 
respondent is saying what I said he or she is saying.  This is achieved 
through Kvale’s (1996) self-correcting method.  He considers one of the 
strengths of interview research to be the possibility to contact a key-
informant later in order to follow up loose ends.  This was frequently 
done through follow-up e-mails and telephone calls to key informants.   
 
While interviewing key informants on sensitive subjects, the researcher 
frequently runs the risk of the ‘don’t know’ response.  There are two 
main reasons for this response: 
• The interviewee could not know the answer, thus it is a legitimate 
response; or  
• The interviewee prefers not to answer the question for various 
reasons even though the response is known. 
Cooper and Schindler (2001: 432-433) advise that such responses could 
present special problems for data interpretation.  Special care was thus 
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taken to ascertain that when the interviewee uses the ‘don’t know’ 
response, that it is a legitimate response.   
 
In interview research, the reader is primarily dependent on what the 
researcher says the respondent is saying (Kvale, 1996).  Kvale 
recommends that reliability and validity in the transcription stage of the 
design should be sought by: 
• Using more than one transcriber; and/or 
• Employing the method of inter-transcriber reliability; and/or 
• Adopting a clear, written editorial policy. 
Of these methods I opted for the last only.  The reason for this was 
primarily that I conducted all the interviews myself and that most of these 
were telephonic and required arduous note-taking.  
 
The purpose of any study, including a qualitative study or evaluation, is 
to produce systematic knowledge.  This is derived primarily from the 
analysis stage.  Kvale (1996) consolidates the many available methods 
into five main approaches: condensation, categorization, narrative, 
interpretation and ad hoc.  Mainly the interpretation method was used. 
2.2.3.2 Focus Group Discussions 
 
A focus group discussion is a direct method of accessing information as 
part of qualitative research.  It is a structured group process used to 
obtain information about a particular topic.  This qualitative research 
method requires four characteristics: 
• The proper composition 
• An open environment 
• A probing moderator, and 
• In-depth analysis. 
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2.2.3.3 Moderating 
 
Focus group interviewing techniques have been used increasingly over 
the past decade as both a self-contained method of conducting 
qualitative research, and in conjunction with other research methods 
(Morgan, 1996).   
 
Discussion with focus groups is an effective means to identify and 
understand different perspectives, conflicts, concerns and aspirations 
within a given community.  The method often offers more substantive 
details than surveys. Smaller groups of approximately six to eight 
participants are better when trying to get really in-depth discussions 
(Morgan, 1997).   
 
Focus groups are also useful in identifying issues that might be better 
explored by interviewing knowledgeable key informants.  These key 
informants may be used as another means of acquiring more detailed 
information on complex issues and past events, which may be difficult to 
gather at a group level, or alternatively to confirm data gathered at a 
focus group discussion.     
 
2.2.3.4 The participants 
The process 
 
I had originally requested Harmony Gold Mining Company to assist me 
with access to potential focus group participants.  Harmony Gold Mining 
Company refused and advised me not to conduct focus groups until after 
SARM’s liquidation process had been completed.   
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While interviewing the Project Manager of the Harmony Jewellery 
School17, she told me that after the closure of SARM a few of the SARM 
workers were offered jobs at the jewellery school. They had been 
students of the school previously.  When I requested to speak with these 
persons, the request was refused.  I was also again warned not to speak 
to individuals about SARM until after the liquidation was completed.  I 
consulted a lawyer about the implications of holding focus groups with 
ex-workers and was informed that legally Harmony Gold Mining 
Company cannot prevent me from interviewing ex-workers or conducting 
focus group discussions.  I thus went ahead without Harmony Gold 
Mining Company or the jewellery school’s assistance to find focus group 
participants in Meloding, the township outside Virginia where the 
majority of the ex-workers live.   
 
I managed to put together and conduct three focus group discussions, 
consisting of a total of 17 women.  The groups consisted of two groups 
of five and one group of seven women.  The women were eager to talk 
but afraid that they might be punished for speaking to me.  They feared 
that when the liquidation was completed they might forfeit any monies 
that could come to them from the settlement because they spoke with 
me.  I assured them that they can all remain anonymous and that they 
would not be identified to Harmony Gold or anyone else.  They also did 
not want me to take any photographs of them.    
 
The characteristics of the groups 
 
Each of the three focus groups in this study was homogeneous with 
respect to certain independent variables such as gender and age.    I 
tried to keep to Richard Krueger’s advice that “familiarity tends to inhibit 
disclosure” (Krueger, 1994:18) and where possible avoided having 
people who knew each other very well in the same focus group.   
                                                 
17
 Interview with Alta Wessels on 12 March 2006. 
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2.2.3.5 Memory Errors 
 
Sudman and Bradburn (1974) distinguish between two types of memory 
errors.  They are (a) simply forgetting; and (b) forward telescoping.  An 
example of forward telescoping is reporting that something happened a 
month ago when it really happened two months ago.  As the focus 
groups were only conducted in May 2006, approximately 30 months 
after the closure of SARM, I tried to reduce memory errors through 
providing ‘landmark events’ cues in terms of time frames during the 
discussions.  Loftus and Marburger (1983) found that ‘landmarks’ help 
reduce forward telescoping.   
 
I also encouraged ‘cued recall’ by encouraging key informants to consult 
records to minimize memory errors wherever possible.   
 
2.2.4 Data Analysis 
 
The purpose of any study, including a qualitative study or evaluation, is 
to produce systematic knowledge.  This is derived primarily from the 
analysis of data gathered.  Kvale (1996) consolidates the many available 
analyzing methods into five main approaches: condensation, 
categorization, narrative, interpretation and ad hoc.   
I used mainly the interpretation method. 
 
2.3 Limitations 
 
This research was hampered by a widespread lack of data.  Difficulties 
were encountered with official data.  Data covering empowerment 
achievements and individual company employment equity plans were 
unobtainable.  Very limited assistance was forthcoming from the main 
role players: Harmony Gold Mining Company, the Matjhabeng District 
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Municipality, the liquidators, the Scorpions and National Prosecutor 
Authority, and the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
The research and evaluation was conducted in three main phases to 
answer the three main questions that guided this research: (i) whether 
the project adhered to the objectives of the NIPP; (ii) whether even as it 
failed, the project contributed something worthwhile to any of the NIPP 
objectives, and (iii) the reasons for its failure.  The data collection 
methods that were used included document analysis, key informant 
interviews and focus group discussions.  Key informants included the 
CEO of SARM; Harmony Gold Mining Company senior management; 
DTI staff members; and staff at BAE Systems/SAAB and Silplat.  Three 
focus group discussions were conducted with ex-SARM staff members. 
Unfortunately the scope and depth of the study was limited due to the 
widespread lack of access to data. 
 
In the next chapter the context in which SARM was founded, existed and 
folded will be discussed.  As the 1998 arms deal is the pivotal part of this 
context, the chapter sets the scene with a brief description of the history 
of the South African arms industry and the arms procurement processes 
followed by the South African Department of Defence; as well as 
providing a full overview of offsets as practiced both at present and 
historically by the South African government.  The chapter touches on 
the risks of corruption and coercion that is an inevitable part of such 
business deals. 
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3 THE SOUTH AFRICA SITUATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The establishment of the South African Royal Manufacturing (SARM) 
factory was the result of several factors within South Africa coming 
together.  The company was formed to answer the need for gold 
beneficiation, local economic development, good corporate citizenship, 
and offsets.   
 
This chapter looks at only one of these conspiring factors - that of the 
arms deal offsets.   In this chapter I endeavour to sketch  the historical 
context in terms of the South African arms industry and the related 
events leading up to the establishment of SARM.  The chapter looks 
specifically at the history of the South African arms industry, the events 
leading up to the 1998 arms deal and the introduction of the industrial 
participation policy.  It also briefly tells the story of the arms deal.  
 
3.2 A brief history of the South African arms industry 
3.2.1 Pre 1989 
 
The South Africa’s arms industry, although established primarily during 
the first part of the 1960s, has had a long history.  According to the 
Armscor website (www.armscor.co.za), South Africa had a viable 
indigenous defence industry already prior to World War II.  As early as 
the First Anglo-Boer War (1880-81), Marthinus Ras manufactured three 
artillery pieces for the Boer Forces and during the Second Anglo-Boer 
War (1899-1902) repairs were done to damaged artillery pieces by the 
Zuid-Afrikaanse Spoorwegmaatschappij. 
 
Throughout World War II (1939-1945) weapons were manufactured by 
South African companies under the auspices of Dr. H.J. van der Bijl, the 
 97
Director-General of War Supplies.  This defence industrial base started 
with six factories established with British help that produced or 
assembled ammunition, armoured vehicles, and electronic equipment 
(Gray, 1945; Beri, 2000; Burgess and Purkitt, 2001).  During World War 
II most of these factories were closed down, even though the Advisory 
Committee on Union Defence Equipment Requirements was established 
in October 1948.  In the 1950s the defence industry was reborn, and 
received new impetus in 1960 when the government focused on 
increasing defence production levels and importing foreign armaments 
and component systems (Beri, 2000). 
 
Prior to 1963, the country depended heavily on arms imports.  But the 
1963 voluntary UN anti-apartheid embargo indicated that it would have 
to become self-sufficient (Beri, 2000).  By 1964 the Armaments 
Production Board was established, followed in 1968 by the 
establishment of the state-owned Armament Development and 
Production Corporation.  In 1977, these two entities were merged to 
form Armscor.  In order to circumvent the 1963 embargo, South Africa 
imported dual-use equipment, technology, and manufacturing 
techniques and learned to incorporate those into armament systems via 
redesign, retrofit, and upgrade.  Prior to the embargo becoming 
mandatory in 1977, the country also received military technology by 
using licensing agreements with West Germany, Italy, Israel, France, 
Belgium and Canada, resulting in extensive licensed and co-production 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Beri, 2000; La Franchi, 1996).  It also 
invested in foreign strategic industries, recruited foreign specialists to 
help design, develop, and manufacture armaments, and resorted to 
covert practices to obtain needed capabilities18.  South Africa also 
developed substantial capability to modify existing equipment to be able 
to perform in the Southern African environment, allowing the defence 
industry to cannibalize older systems to upgrade to new systems (La 
Franchi, 1996).   
                                                 
18
 Telephonic interview, Dr. R. Williams, July 2002 
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In terms of selling arms during the years of its international isolation, the 
country had a clandestine network of suppliers for all the country’s 
strategic needs, in particular for arms acquisition and sales effort, which 
was used to reduce the pariah state situation and also to underwrite the 
cost of the country’s expensive military research and production 
programme.  Prior to 1980 South Africa’s only significant export market 
was Rhodesia (Batchelor, 1998).  During the early 1980s rising 
production costs, excess capacities, and a drop in domestic demand 
resulted in economic problems for the defence industry.  In order to 
address this, Armscor created a special division, called Nimrod, to 
concentrate on exports (Beri, 2000).  Nimrod began aggressive export 
marketing by participating in various major international arms shows.  
From 1982 up to the 1994 elections, the country’s principal military 
customers were Third World governments or rebel groups in other 
pariah states such as Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, the Pinochet regime 
in Chile, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, UNITA in Angola and Renamo 
in Mozambique.  Other customers included Peru, Morocco, Oman, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, South Korea, Israel and Rwanda (Batchelor, 1998).  
Although the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution 
asking all states to voluntarily refrain from purchasing South African 
arms (Batchelor, 1998), the start of constitutional negotiations in 1990 
improved the country’s image abroad and arms exports rose to 
approximately US$200 million by 1993 (Defense News, 1999).   
 
By the time that the final days of the Apartheid regime dawned, these 
arms-related linkages had expanded to include more than 130 foreign-
based front companies involved in the buying and selling of arms (Carr, 
2000:13).  The country’s arms industry became one of the largest in the 
developing countries (Navias, 1994), and Africa’s most significant arms 
producer.  It could however not design and produce advanced high-
performance combat aircraft, tanks, and defence electronics (La Franchi, 
1996; Beri, 2000; Crawford-Browne, 2007).  It also grew notoriously 
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corrupt and secretive as the Apartheid Government sought to maintain 
its regional dominance in spite of an international arms embargo.19 
  
By 1989 the industry had expanded considerably and South Africa had 
reached near self-sufficiency in terms of the needs of its defence force.  
The country had also reached the stage of independent military research 
and development capacity; as well as independent capacity in the 
process of production of less sophisticated weaponry, and limited 
research and development capacity in the production of advanced 
weaponry (Beri, 2000).  In 1989, Armscor was the 30th largest company 
in South Africa and had subcontracts with 2271 private sector firms 
(Armscor as quoted in Beri, 2000).  Navias (1994) found that during the 
years of political isolation, the South African defence industry also 
became one of the leading economic sectors within the country, 
contributing by the late 1980s, approximately 20% of total manufacturing 
output, with armaments the leading manufacturing export.  The industry 
also became the key repository of the country’s scientific and technical 
skills (Navias, 1994).   
3.2.2 1989-1996 
 
During 1989 the political environment, both internationally and in 
Southern Africa, changed dramatically with the break-up of the then 
Soviet Union; the ending of the Cold War; the movement towards 
political pluralism in Malawi and Zambia; and South Africa’s withdrawal 
from Namibia.  These developments, combined with a severe local 
economic recession, led the South African Government under the 
leadership of President de Klerk to introduce drastic cuts in the defence 
budget in 1989 (Beri, 2000; Batchelor and Dunne, 1998).   
The 1999 White Paper on the South African Defence Related Industry 
reports that “between 1989/90 and 1997/98, the defence budget 
declined by over 50% in real terms, while the acquisition budget (the 
                                                 
19
 Interview with Dr. R. Williams on 12 July 2002. 
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Special Defence Account) declined by over 80% in real terms during the 
same period.  In 1997/98 acquisition spending accounted for 20% of the 
defence budget, down from nearly 60% in 1989/90”.  By 1996 the 
defence budget had declined by more than 50% since 1989 (Batchelor 
and Dunne, 1998).   
The dramatic cuts in defence spending had a major impact on domestic 
defence related industries, which were forced to downsize and 
restructure as a result of the cancellation or postponement of defence 
contracts, resulting in the retrenchment of large numbers of workers in 
the decade since the late 1980's until 1999 (Republic of South Africa, 
1999a). 
In the early 1990s the government started the restructuring of the public 
sector defence industry.  As part of this process Armscor was separated 
into two organizations in April 1992: 
i) Denel, now situated under the auspices of the Department of 
Public Enterprises, dealing mostly in research, development 
and production; and 
ii) Armscor, which remained part of the Department of Defence, 
and retains responsibility for the procurement of armaments 
for the Department of Defence, as well as providing help in 
establishing export markets prior to 1999.  In the December 
1999 White Paper on Defence-Related Industries, Armscor 
relinquishes responsibility for marketing armaments abroad to 
the Marketing Support Board that includes both government 
representatives from several ministries and defence industry 
representatives (Batchelor, 1998; Beri, 2000). 
 
This split between Armscor and Denel was necessary to allow arms 
production facilities of Armscor to be used for commercial purposes, 
which otherwise would be illegal (Beri, 2000).   
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Armscor maintains offices in the United States, France, Russia, 
Switzerland, Israel, Malaysia, the UAE, and China.  It also helps fund the 
participation of South African defence firms in international arms 
exhibitions, while Department of Defence funds also support trade 
missions, government personnel attendance, and transportation costs 
for equipment at international exhibits (Batchelor, 1998).   
 
Most of the actual arms production in South Africa is done under the 
auspices of Denel (Republic of South Africa, 1996a).  Because of the 
difficulties of conversion to civilian markets, Denel has focused on arms 
export markets and especially concentrated on joint ventures and 
strategic alliances with global firms.  Strategic partnerships with major 
world players are viewed to be vital for rapid and cost-effective entry of 
the country’s defence industry into the world market (Carr, 2000).  The 
country’s defence industrial base is dominated by Denel, and three 
private sector companies: Reunert, Grinaker Electronics and Altech 
Defence Systems.  Together these companies account for 90% of the 
domestic industry’s capital expenditure (La Franchi, 1996, Heiman, 
1998, Shelton, 1998).  By 1997, arms had become the country’s second 
largest manufactured export, although it accounted for less than 1.2% of 
the GDP and only one percent of manufacturing jobs (Shelton, 1998).  In 
1997, South Africa’s arms export level was US$370 million, compared to 
only US$11 million in 1991 (Defense News, 1999), placing the country 
15th in the world in arms exports for 1997.   
 
Further changes were in line for the industry.  With its re-entry into the 
global arena in 1994, South Africa was exposed and influenced by 
globalization, and a move towards demilitarization and conversion.  
Demilitarization not only requires a country’s military to move away from 
traditional military activity and migrate towards peace keeping and 
humanitarian missions, but it also requires it to move away from 
weapons manufacturing (Cock and McKenzie, 1998; Lamb, 1997).  The 
defence budget cuts were accompanied by a variety of disarmament 
measures, such as the cancellation and postponement of major 
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weapons projects; the withdrawal and/or sale of surplus military 
equipment and the termination of the country’s nuclear weapons 
programme (Cock and McKenzie, 1998).  The country was also 
expected to adhere to global agreements, such as the discontinuance of 
the production of low-orbit satellites due to pressure from the Missile 
Technology Console Regime.20   
 
Conversion entails the process of converting the military towards non-
military uses.  This process expects the military to be supportive of 
stability and development within the country.  In general, areas of 
conversion would entail the re-allocation of military financial resources; 
the restructuring of military-related industry; the reorientation of military-
related research; demobilization; base closure, as well as the 
redevelopment and scraping of surplus weapons (Lamb, 1997).   
 
The South African military started the process of conversion and the 
integration of the armed forces in 1994.  The South African Defence 
Force (SADF) was rationalized and restructured to include the military 
components of the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan African 
Congress (PAC)21 and various other armed forces in the country22.   
 
In line with conversion, the integrated military was further used in the 
implementation of the national Reconstruction and Development 
                                                 
20
 Telephonic interview, Dr. R. Williams, July 2002 
21
 The PAC is a small radical leftwing nationalist party that broke away from the ANC in 
1959.  Patricia de Lille, the Member of Parliament who in 1999 first questioned the 
transparency of the arms deal and whether the negotiations for the arms contracts 
adhered to standards of good governance, was a PAC member.  De Lille broke away 
from the PAC in 2003 and formed the Independent Democrats which went on to win six 
seats in the 2004 elections.  
22
 The other armed forces also present in South Africa at the time and whose members 
needed to be absorbed into the SANDF were:  the Azanian People’s Liberation Army 
(APLA), the Transkei Defence Force (TDF), the Venda Defense Force (VDF) and the 
Bophuthaswana Defence Force (BDF) (Personal communication with Dr. R. Williams, 
02 August 2002). 
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Programme (RDP) projects.  The substantial reduction in military 
spending in part enabled the government to finance social development 
programmes, such as the RDP and GEAR.   
 
In its new role, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
supported the UN in Mozambique in 1994, and by March 1995 there was 
pressure from Britain, France and the USA that South Africa should play 
a key role in southern African peace-keeping.  The country started 
sending troops on peace-keeping missions to trouble-spots within Africa, 
such as Angola in 1995 and the Congo in 2001.23   
 
Humanitarian missions were also high on the SANDF’s agenda, such as 
assistance in Mozambique during the 2000 floods by the Air Force, and 
the supply of water to drought- and cholera-stricken areas within South 
Africa.   
 
The South African defence industry had become not only an 
embarrassment (the “Wazan Affair”) but also a financial liability.  Offsets 
however offered a way out: unprofitable arms companies could be sold 
to investors and foreigners, while profitable ones would be retained 
(February, 2004).  
 
3.3 The 1998 arms deal 
 
The focus on land-based warfare channelled Apartheid-era military 
budgets towards the army, neglecting the navy and air force 
(Engelbrecht, 2001), and this situation was worsened by the UN arms 
embargo against South Africa that largely prevented the defence force 
from modernising its navy and air force (Holden, 2008).  
 
By 1990, both were stocked with outdated equipment that was by and 
large facing ‘obsolescence’ (Holden, 2008: 3; Engelbrecht, 2001).   The 
                                                 
23
 Africa Confidential, March 03, 1995; Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 30, 1996 
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declining defence budget and the move towards demilitarization and 
conversion resulting in the sharp drop in military procurement in the 
1990s compounded these problems.  The existence of the navy was 
furthered threatened in 1993 by the Parliamentary Floor Committee 
investigating maritime policy.  The committee felt that the navy should be 
closed down and be replaced by the national coast guard, prompting the 
navy into high alert to save its existence.24  Holden (2008) describes 
how it announced in March 1993 that it was looking to buy four new 
corvettes and by September 1993, the media25 was reporting how both 
the navy and the air force were being courted by military weapon 
suppliers from both Europe and the Far East in anticipation of the lifting 
of the arms embargo which was still in place at that time.  In 1994 the 
Minister of Defence gave permission for the navy to call for tenders for 
new corvettes.  Corvettes are small ships (121 metres long) equipped 
with a helicopter pad and the capacity to sail in parts of the ‘blue’ ocean, 
i.e. far away from the shore.  Typically these ships are used for search-
and-rescue operations and maritime patrols.26 
 
Holden (2008) further describes how as the tenders flooded in by 1995, 
the opposition to the purchasing of arms became evident both in 
parliament, non-governmental groups and the media.  During the same 
period, hundreds of members of the South African Students Congress 
marched to the Union Buildings in Pretoria to petition the Education 
Minister arguing that the funds would be better used to establish student 
bursary and loan schemes.27   In Parliament both the Minister without 
Portfolio who was tasked with leading the RDP, Jay Naidoo, and the 
Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, questioned the deal.28  The media 
reported that Tony Yengeni, who was later convicted of taking bribes 
                                                 
24
 “’Don’t think the navy’ beg experts”, Weekend Argus, 20 February 1993 ; “Adrift on 
uncertain seas”, Pretoria News, 09 March 1993. 
25
 “Staying out in front”, The Argus, 10 September 1993 
26
  Interview with R. Williams, interview, 12 July 2002 
27
 “Students march to seek funding for education”,  The Argus, 23 February 1995 
28
 “Navy Corvettes sail into Cabinet storm”, Sunday Times, 14 May 1995 
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from arms dealers, said: ‘the levels of poverty in the country are so high 
that most victims of poverty cannot comprehend that a new democratic 
parliament can endorse spending a substantial amount on corvettes” 
(Weekend Star, 23 April 1995 as cited in Holden, 2008: 6).   
 
It would appear as if the outcry from within and outside of Parliament 
forced a temporary change of heart.  Even though a shortlist of two 
tenders, one from Spain, the other from Britain, was announced, 
government announced in June 1995 that the corvette tender deal would 
be scrapped and that the country would first embark on a Defence 
Review to outline its defence policy before considering buying arms.29  
Holden (2008:9) further indicates that these two initial corvette tenders 
included substantial offsets, which whetted the appetite for more of the 
same.  Articles in the media, particularly the Cape Times30 reported that 
offsets from such deals would amount between R3 billion and R7.5 
billion in new economic activity in the country.  But it would not only be 
promised economic activity that was the carrot, there were also 
promises of as many as 25,000 jobs, and a new fleet of hake fishing 
boats (Crawford-Browne, 2007: 129).  There was great emphasis on 
how these deals can assist with the government’s RDP obligations.  The 
Armscor Managing Director, Mr Tielman de Waal, was quoted in the 
media31 as saying: “... the counter trade aspect has added a new 
dimension to foreign acquisition... the acquisition of the corvettes meets 
convincingly the needs of both the RDP and defence”. 
 
It was also the start of significant changes in the legal landscape of the 
South African military trade.  The first significant step towards changing 
the legal landscape of the South African military was taken with the 
establishment of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee 
(NCACC) based on the recommendations of the Cameron Commission 
                                                 
29
 “Ships anchored”, Financial Mail, 16 June 1995 
30
 01 March 1995 
31
 Weekend Argus, 26 February 1995 
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of Inquiry into the role of Armscor in the “Wazan Affair”.  This step 
introduced and encouraged civilian control over defence matters.  The 
“Wazan Affair” contained nearly all the ingredients of a classic 
gray/black-market arms deal.  Clandestine meetings, intelligence 
community associations, Swiss banks, forged documents and corrupt 
officials were all facets.  The Cameron Commission found that that the 
“Wazan Affair” was quite typical of the clandestine arrangements that 
had involved the South African arms industry, particularly Armscor, 
under Apartheid.  The international scope of the operation was obvious, 
with a Lebanese arms dealer with Israeli intelligence connections, acting 
on behalf of a Saudi prince and a German citizen, inducing a South 
African official to sanction an illegal transfer of Chinese weapons to 
Yemen.  It was also found that at one time all of the major parties 
conspired to cheat each other over commissions or compensation 
(Cameron et al, 1995; Carr, 2000, Nathan et al, 1997).   
 
The Cameron Commission recommended that a cabinet committee on 
arms control be established to consider and approve arms export 
applications; South Africa's future arms export regime should be guided 
by human rights criteria; and arms exports should be subject to 
parliamentary (and consequently public) scrutiny (Cameron et al, 1995). 
In response a Cabinet Memorandum was compiled which made 
provision for the establishment of the NCACC. 
 
Although the 1996 White Paper on Defence outlines the scope and 
nature of the NCACC’s work, the legislation converting the NCACC into 
a statuary body was only promulgated in 2000, almost a year after the 
arms deal had been approved by Cabinet.  The NCACC has two 
functions – the first is to oversee the acquisition, procurement and export 
of all arms, while the second is to design arms acquisition policies for the 
SANDF.  The NCACC is also responsible for evaluating all applications 
for arms-related research, development, manufacturing, marketing, 
contracting, as well as granting permission for these activities (Republic 
of South Africa, 1996a; Republic of South Africa, 2002; Skosana 2002). 
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The NCACC's inconsistent approach is partly attributable to the 
government's overall defence industry policy. This requires that South 
Africa strives to be self-sufficient in arms and munitions, necessitating 
the existence of a domestic arms industry; and, if that industry is to be at 
all efficient and capable of developing technologically, it must compete in 
the international arena. As a result, two often irreconcilable imperatives 
must be satisfied: narrow economic and defence self-interest on the one 
hand, and respect for the broader demands of human rights, on the 
other (Pothier, 2000). 
 
A White Paper on Defence was tabled in May 1996, in which the 
Department of Defence made public its priorities.  The White Paper 
noted that “... in the South African context there is pressure to reduce 
defence spending substantially.  There is an urgent requirement to divert 
financial resources to the RDP in order to meet basic socio-economic 
needs.  A failure to meet those needs will generate conflict and 
instability.  There is no foreseeable conventional military threat in the 
short and medium term” (Chapter 7, Sections 2, 2.1, 2.2); that “the 
government has prioritized the daunting task of addressing poverty and 
the socio-economic inequalities resulting from the system of Apartheid” 
(Chapter 1, Section 6); and that “The non-military threats emanating 
from instability and underdevelopment in Southern Africa should be 
tackled primarily through political and socio-economic measures” 
(Chapter 7, Section 2.4).   
 
By 1997 there were media reports that both the military and Armscor 
were complaining about the state of military’s equipment (Daily 
Telegraph, June 20, 1997; Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 23, 
1997).   General Meiring32 was reported the same year as saying in a 
speech in London that “Parliament must decide what value it places on 
                                                 
32
 Chief of the SANDF from 1994-1998.  He resigned on 06 April 1998 (effective 31 
May 1998) over a report presented to then President Mandela implicating senior 
Umkhonto We Sizwe Officers in an alleged coup plot. 
 108
the insurance policy provided by an adequate defence machine” (Army 
Quarterly and Defence Journal, 127(97):261-270).   
 
3.3.1 The Defence Review 
 
In August 1997 the Cabinet and Parliament approved the need for 
modernization and improvement of its military equipment (Independent, 
August 22, 1997).  A Defence Review was launched a few months later.   
 
The documented findings of the Defence Review was tabled and 
approved in Parliament in April 1998.  The findings detailed the 
equipment needs of the SANDF if it is to retain an effective defence 
capability.  The Defence Review used both the 1996 White Paper on 
Defence’s framework and the National Industrial Participation 
Programme33 as a guideline in designing an arms acquisition process for 
the country and sets out the obligatory implementation of the Industrial 
Participation34 aspect of military procurement.   
 
Criticism of the Review included the emphasis by the Review on the 
SANDF maintaining the ability to mount offensive operations with the 
use of conventional forces in order to repel any external attack from a 
similar military power.  The Institute for Security Studies argued that the 
SANDF was more likely to be involved in its secondary missions such as 
peace operations and assisting the South African Police Service 
(Institute for Security Studies, 2004).    
 
In February 1998 Parliament was told that the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) could be re-equipped without strain on the 
defence budget and indeed with benefit to the economy (Jane’s Defence 
                                                 
33
 South Africa’s Industrial Participation became obligory on 01 September 1996 and 
the National Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP) was adopted by Cabinet in April 
1997.  
34
 Also commonly known as “offsets” or “offset arrangements”. 
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Weekly, February 18, 1998), and the government initiated a strategic 
rearmament programme (Hietman, 1998).   
 
Strategic arms acquisition differs from routine arms acquisition of military 
equipment.  It refers to very rare and very expensive acquisitions and 
when a series of arms acquisition programmes are packaged into one 
cardinal expenditure programme, it becomes a non-routine (or strategic) 
expenditure (Sylvester, 2006).  Unlike routine arms acquisition, which is 
usually the responsibility of the chief accounting officer of the 
Department of Defence and the Minister, strategic arms acquisitions 
rests with the country’s legislative branches and the President.   
 
Other players in the routine acquisition of arms include the South African 
Defence Secretariat, the Armament Acquisition Council; the Armament 
Acquisition Steering Board; the Armament Acquisition Control Board; 
and Armscor (Republic of South Africa, 2006a).  The South African 
Defence Secretariat is responsible for all acquisition activities.  Its main 
function is to ensure that the deal is the best value for money and that 
the expenditure falls within the financial objectives of the state (Republic 
of South Africa, 2006a:14).  Within the Defence Secretariat, the Defence 
Secretary position is held by the chief accounting officer for the 
Department of Defence and also the person responsible for formulating 
the department’s policy.  The Acquisitions Division, a unit within the 
Secretariat, is headed by the Chief of Acquisitions, who is responsible 
for industrial and procurement policy for the Department of Defence, and 
for coordinating research and technology.  The Chief of Acquisitions 
reports to the Defence Secretary (Republic of South Africa, 2006a:7).   
 
The Defence Secretary chairs the Armament Acquisition Steering Board, 
which includes members from the Secretariat and the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF).  The board approves non-cardinal 
projects and screens cardinal acquisition projects.  In the context of the 
arms deal, it should be noted here that the Secretariat only deals at the 
highest level of bids, thus it does not deal with sub-contracted suppliers 
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(Republic of South Africa, 1996a:8,15).  All suppliers of a single unit of 
military hardware, such as a corvette, were to be responsible for the 
sub-contracting of suppliers of the subsystems required (Zacarias, 
1998).  This places the burden on the domestic industry to compete with 
each other and convince the bidders that they can perform in 
accordance with the required quality, price and schedule conditions – a 
new experience for many South African companies who had previously 
worked either with the government or on international contracts obtained 
through Armscor (Campbell, 1999).   
 
The SANDF determines its own requirements, provided these are in line 
with the approved force structure, defence policies, programmes and 
budgets of the Ministry, the Secretariat, and Parliament; and it is also 
responsible for the overall management of armament acquisition 
projects.  Within the SANDF, the Chief of Logistics chairs the Armament 
Acquisition Control Board, which screens acquisition projects according 
to the stated requirements of the SANDF (Republic of South Africa, 
1996a: 7,8) 
 
The Department of Defence’s acquisition processes, including 
management of programmes, tenders, and the awarding of contracts, 
are all managed through Armscor.  Armscor also “ensures that the 
technical, legal, and financial integrity of companies supplying 
acquisitions are in accordance with Department of Defence 
requirements.  Additional tasks include offering marketing support for the 
industry, facilitating participation in international armaments shows, and 
the co-management of Industrial Participation Programmes with the 
Department of Trade and Industry” (Republic of South Africa, 1996a:5).   
 
In the case of strategic, non-routine, arms acquisitions, the Minister of 
Defence chairs the Armament Acquisition Council, whose members 
include the Defence Secretary, the Chief of the South African National 
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Defence Force35, and Armscor’s Executive General Manager.  The 
Council approves armament acquisition budgets and approves all 
cardinal projects (Republic of South Africa, 1996a). 
 
Such strategic acquisitions also require the political approval of the 
Cabinet and the President, and the approval of Parliament (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996a).  This approval is overseen by the Parliament’s 
Joint Standing Committee on Defence (Republic of South Africa, 
1996a:51), as well as the National Assembly’s Portfolio Standing 
Committee on Defence that is mandated to monitor, investigate and 
enquire into matters and decisions related to defence policy (Le Roux 
and Boshoff, 2005).  The Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD), 
which includes members of the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces, has the main oversight role though.  However, 
Mills (1999) and Frankel (2000) have found that the JSCD is curtailed in 
its efforts by limited expertise on defence issues, insufficient research 
support, and a high rate of turnover among members.   
 
In the case of the 1998 strategic arms acquisition, the Cabinet and 
Presidency were dominating participants.  The Cabinet Sub-committee 
on Acquisitions consisted of Thabo Mbeki (Deputy President), Alec 
Erwin (Minister of Trade and Industry), Trevor Manuel (Minister of 
Finance), Stella Sigcau (Minister of Public Enterprise, and Joe Modise 
(Minister of Defence) (Crawford-Browne, 2007).  Members of the 
Cabinet and Presidency were negotiating directly with European 
governments who are trade partners and sources of foreign direct 
investment.   
 
                                                 
35
 The person has executive command over the SANDF under the direction of the 
Minister of Defence in peacetime, and the President of the Republic during national 
emergencies.  It is the task of the Chief of the SANDF to implement defence policies, 
planning and administrative directives of the Minister of Defence (Frankel, 2000). 
 112
3.3.2 The Financial Cost of the Deal 
 
In order to evaluate the deal, four committees were established: a 
technical committee, a finance merit committee, a defence industrial 
participation (DIP) committee, and a national industrial participation 
(NIP) committee.  The findings from these committees were provided to 
the Strategic Offers Committee, who in turn submitted its views to the 
Armament Acquisition Steering Board.  This board then forwarded its 
recommendations to the Armaments Acquisition Council, who in turn 
reported to the Ministers’ committee, chaired by then Deputy President 
Thabo Mbeki.  Thabo Mbeki then reported the final recommendations to 
the Cabinet (February, 2004).  In November 1998, it was announced that 
government had selected its list of preferred suppliers.36 
 
Negotiations were started with these preferred bidders.  Four national 
government departments were involved in the arms deal negotiations:   
• Department of Finance (National Treasury) dealt with budgetary 
implications, financial affordability and macro fiscal and economic 
implications.   
• Department of Trade and Industry dealt with the non-defence part 
of the industrial participation and assisted with certain economic 
implications.   
• The Department of Public Enterprises dealt with aspects relating 
to state-owned corporations.   
• The Department of Defence dealt with the technical defence 
requirements, defence industrial participation and the specific 
budget of the Defence vote (ANC, 2003).   
 
The affordability of the contract was high on the Department of Finance’s 
agenda.  The Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, reiterated that the deals 
had to be ‘affordable’ (Financial Times, January 18, 1999).  An 
                                                 
36
 “Arms bonanza for SA”, Pretoria News, 19 November 1998; “Cabinet OK to huge 
Arms Deal”, The Star, 19 November 1998. 
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‘affordability team’ headed by Jayendra Naidoo was appointed to review 
the individual deals.   
 
Prior to the signing of agreements with suppliers, the Cabinet was 
presented by an Affordability Report compiled by the Department of 
Finance, which warned that it was not prudent to agree to the deal, and 
that “expenditures of this order will inevitably involve both a move away 
from government’s existing fiscal targets and a significant restructuring 
of the national budget towards defence expenditure.”  (South African 
Press Association, 2004).   “The proposed armaments procurements are 
distinguished from other government procurements by four key 
characteristics.  The sums involved are extremely large; they involve 
fixed contractual commitments extending over long periods with high 
breakage costs; they are heavily import-biased; and their costs are offset 
by a set of associated activities (the NIPs) which cannot be guaranteed.  
These characteristics create a set of important and unique risks for 
government.  The analysis of these risks suggests that as the 
expenditure level increases these risks escalate significantly.  In fact 
even expenditure of R16.5 billion may create a situation in which 
government could be confronted by mounting economic, fiscal and 
financial difficulties at some future point.  Ultimately the decision about 
expenditure levels really constitutes a decision about government’s 
appetite for risk.” (ECAAR, 2002 – as quoted in Holden, 2008: 27).  It 
should be noted that the original speculation in the media had been that 
the arms deal would cost between R12 billion and R15 billion – thus the 
reference in the Affordability Report to R16.5 billion.   
 
David Botha (2003a) writes that the quantities of the various systems 
procured as part of the arms deal were adjusted to remain within the 
budget during the tendering process.  This reduction process brought 
the expense to 1.62% of the country’s GDP, and below the 1.8% of the 
GDP stated in the 1998 Defence Review.  The table below demonstrates 
the lowered requirements of the arms deal. 
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Equipment Planned Actual 
Gripen 38 28 
Hawk 24 24 
Corvettes 5 4 
Submarines 4 3 
Helicopters 60 30 
Source: Botha (2003:100) 
 
On 03 December 1999, the government signed the final purchasing 
agreements and loan agreements that would pay for the equipment.  
The total cost at that time was R29,992,000 - just short of R30 million.   
The contracts were awarded to British, German, Italian, French and 
Swedish firms.  Those whose bids were not selected included firms from 
the Czech Republic, Spain, Canada, and some companies in Italy and 
Sweden.   
In the table below, Holden (2008) sets out clearly what was purchased, 
where the equipment came from and how much the initial costs were. 
 
Equipment Quantity Contractor/Supplier Price in millions of 
Rand (1999 value) 
Corvettes  
(Meko A200) 
4 German Frigate Consortium 
(Germany) providing the ship 
platform 
Thomson-CSF (France) and 
African Defence Systems (South 
Africa) providing the combat suite 
R6 917 
Submarines 
(Class 209 1400 
MOD) 
3 German Submarine Consortium 
(Germany) 
R5 354 
Advanced Light 
Fighter Aircraft 
(The Gripen) 
28 SAAB and British Aerospace as a 
joint British-Swedish Consortium 
(UK/Sweden) 
Part of R15 772 
Lead-in Fighter 
Trainer Aircraft  
(The Hawk) 
24 British Aerospace (UK) Part of R15 772 
Light Utility 
Helicopter 
(Agusta A109M) 
30 Agusta (Italy) R1 949 
Total Cost R29 992 
Source: Holden (2008:18) 
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The arms deal purchase was divided into two tranches.  The first tranche 
included:  
• three submarines and four corvettes from Germany  
• twelve jet trainers from Britain 
• nine light fighters from Britain and Sweden 
• thirty light utility helicopters from Italy 
The cost for this tranche is R21.3 billion. 
 
The second tranche includes: 
• twelve jet trainers from Britain 
• nineteen light fighters from Britain and Sweden 
The costs involved would be R8.6 billion (Crawford-Brown, 2002). 
 
The totals exclude finance charges, escalation clauses and foreign 
exchange fluctuations.  The foreign loans procured for the deals were 
pegged to the exchange rate and the costs of the deal changes as the 
value of the Rand fluctuates against the value of the foreign currency 
used.  February (2004) indicated that by 2004, the cost had risen to in 
excess of R60 billion.   
 
The choice of the military equipment purchased was criticized by military 
analysts.  Nathan (2001) argues that as the 1996 White Paper on 
Defence fully embraces a wide notion of security, in so accepting the 
view that security challenges are not primarily military by nature, or even 
interstate affairs, it does not condone that military spending should 
increase, but rather that spending on civilian priorities should increase.  
Engelbrecht (2001b) in turn points out that although the fighter jets will 
afford the Air Force some measure of power, the country is bordered to 
the north by economically dependent countries that have no incentive to 
threaten South Africa’s airspace by conventional means.  He further 
argues that as the only African countries that possess submarines are 
Algeria, Egypt, and Lybia, the submarines seem to be an unnecessary 
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extravagance.  Harris (2000) has argued that the Meko class corvettes, 
which were purchased to protect the coastal economic zone, was also 
unnecessary, as the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
has three inshore patrol vessels and one deep-see patrol vessel for 
guarding the country’s exclusive economic zone.  The cost of these four 
vessels totalled R500 million compared to the cost of the Meko class 
corvettes of R6,9 billion.   
 
Other analysts, most notably, David Botha (2003a), have accepted the 
necessity of the equipment purchased, and although arguing that the 
overall arms deal, as a percentage of the country’s GDP is well below 
international norms, and within the 1998 Defence Review’s accepted 
1.8% of the GDP, he has questioned the value-for-money of the 
individual contracts.  The purchase of the Lead In Fighter Trainers 
(LIFT), commonly known as the Hawk, has been heavily criticized, also 
in the Joint Report on the arms deal submitted by the Public Protector, 
the Auditor-General, and the Directorate Special Operations of the 
National Prosecuting Authority.  Concerns about irregularities in the 
decision-making process, particularly in a report by the Auditor General 
to the Select Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) in September 
2000, led to the instruction to these three agencies37 to undertake a 
comprehensive forensic investigation of all aspects of the arms deal, but 
also to particularly look at the negotiating and tendering process for the 
purchase of the Hawks.  SCOPA focuses solely on public expenditure by 
government, assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
management of state finances, and checking whether government 
departments’ expenditure is in line with their budgets.   The arms deal 
falls directly within the ambit of SCOPA’s financial oversight. 
 
                                                 
37
 SCOPA also recommended that the Heath Special Investigations Unit form part of 
the investigation, but the unit was not appointed despite much acrimony (Botha, 
2003a).  The exclusion of the Heath unit has cast a shadow of doubt over the whole 
investigation.  SCOPA’s reputation was also severely tarnished by the events around 
the arms deal (February, 2004). 
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In his 2007 book on his time as an MP and as a significant member of 
SCOPA during the initial stages of the committee’s investigation of the 
arms deal, Feinstein details how the original joint investigation report’s 
findings were altered.  He quotes at length from both the original draft of 
the joint report and the final draft submitted to the public: 
Original wording: 
‘5.13 CONCLUSION 
According to documentation the Minister could have influenced 
decisions made by certain role-players during the process to select 
BAE/SAAB as the preferred bidder for the Gripen and Hawk aircraft.  
Furthermore, during the investigation it became apparent that preference 
was given to BAE/SAAB by making changes to value systems midway 
through the process.  This caused the Hawk aircraft to be ranked first, 
followed by the MB339FD (the Aeromacchi jet).  The MB339FD could 
have been acquired much cheaper whilst also meeting the SAAF LIFT 
requirement adequately.   
1.8 OVERALL CONCLUSION 
1.8.1 The findings of the joint investigation support the majority of the 
key findings by the AG as contained in his Special Review dated 15 
September 2000.   
1.8.2 There were fundamental flaws in the selection of BAE/SAAB as the 
preferred bidder for the LIFT & ALFA38 programme.’ 
 
Adjusted wording after Executive intervention and as presented to 
Parliament: 
’14.1 KEY FINDINGS 
                                                 
38
 The ALFA refers to Advanced Light Fighter Aircraft.  In this context, it refers to the 
SANDF changing its requirements in early 1997from its traditional three-tier operation 
system for the Air Force to a two-tier system due to high costs.  This new system would 
see trainee pilots moving straight from the Astra planes, which had traditionally been 
used to train pilots, to a new midrange fighter, the ALFA.  This change would however 
negate the need for the Hawk (LIFT).  In late October 1997, the system was once again 
reverted back to a new, redesigned three-tier system that required the LIFT (Holden, 
2008).  For a detailed comparison of the three systems, please see Appendix D. 
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14.1.1. No evidence was found of any improper or unlawful conduct by 
the Government.  The irregularities and improprieties referred to in the 
findings as contained in this report, point to the conduct of certain 
officials of the government departments involved and cannot, in our 
view, be ascribed to the President or the Ministers involved in their 
capacity as members of the Ministers’ Committee or Cabinet.  There are 
therefore no grounds to suggest that the Government’s contracting 
position is flawed. 
14.1.6. The decision that the evaluation criteria in respect of the LIFT 
had to be expanded to include a non-costed option and which eventually 
resulted in a different bidder being selected, was taken by the Ministers’ 
Committee, a subcommittee of Cabinet.  Although unusual in terms of 
normal procurement practice, this decision was neither unlawful, nor 
irregular in terms of the procurement process as it evolved during the 
SDP acquisition.  As the ultimate decision-maker, Cabinet was entitled 
to select the preferred bidder, taking into account the recommendations 
of the evaluating bodies as well as other factors, such as strategic 
considerations.   
14.1.7. The decision to recommend the Hawk/Gripen combination to 
Cabinet as the preferred selection for the LIFT/ALFA was taken by the 
Ministers’ Committee for strategic reasons, including the total benefit to 
the country in terms of counter trade investment and the operational 
capabilities of the SANDF.’  (Feinstein, 2007: 214-215) 
 
An extensive and in-depth evaluation of both the British Hawk and the 
Italian-made Aermacchi MB339, found that the Aermacchi would be a 
better deal in terms of performance and price.  The Aermacchi MB 339 
is a highly rated plane, considered to be just as capable of the Hawk, but 
cost half the price of the Hawk.  What appears to have tipped the 
balance in favour of the Hawk, was the larger amount of offsets attached 
to the British Aerospace offer.  BAE offered US$1.2 billion in offsets, 
compared to the US$431 million on offer from the Italians (Botha, 
2003a).  Wrigley (2003) also points out that it was unlikely that the Hawk 
would be used in a combat role, and that it would ever only be used as a 
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trainer.  It was thus an unnecessary option, and that the less expensive 
Aermacchi was a better option as a trainer.  Wrigley further argues that 
because the Hawk and the Gripen were both connected to BAE, the 
South African government saw greater value in choosing their contract 
for reasons of foreign policy, despite the Italian, Czech and German 
tenders being less expensive.   
 
In replying to SCOPA questions in 2007, the Department of Defence’s 
Chief Director of Acquisitions confirmed that the equipment bought 
through the arms deal was not the most appropriate.  He was quoted in 
Business Day (12 March 2007) as saying that “the current need for 
combat aircraft and combat aircraft support for joint operations is very 
low because there is no real conventional threat.  For that reason, the air 
force is focusing mainly on transport capabilities as well as the train of 
new pilots to feed into the squadrons to prepare for future operations.  
Instead of 200 hours per aircraft, we may only achieve 100 hours per 
aircraft.  We will not use them as often because there is no need in the 
short term.  Until such time as the physical risk to national security 
escalates, where it requires a larger investment in combat systems, this 
is a wilful decision to reduce the investment in that environment”.  And 
the Cape Argus39 speculated that due to a lack of skilled staff to operate 
all the purchased submarines, two of the three would have to be 
mothballed.    
   
Payment for the arms was to be spread over 14 years and would be 
funded by low-interest loans totalling US$4.8 billion.  This amount 
equalled R29.3 billion in 1999.  By February 2002 it was estimated that 
the cost would be R52.7 billion (or an average of R3.7 billion per year 
over the life of the deal).  This sharp increase was linked to the adverse 
exchange rate and to some degree to inflation and interest payments.  
At the time that the deal was signed the US Dollar-South African Rand 
exchange rate stood at US$1 to R6.  By early 2002, the exchange rate 
                                                 
39
 05 December 2007 
 120
stood at US$1-R10.  The Finance Minister informed the public though 
that the loan contracts remained $4.8 billion in dollar terms.40  The rand 
strengthened during the latter part of 2002 and by late 2003, the 
exchange rate stood at US$1 to R6.5.  The exchange rate has hovered 
steadily for the most part around the US$1 to R6.50/R8 in recent years.   
 
Those in opposition to the procurement of the military equipment pointed 
out that South Africa desperately needs to spend money on the 
development of civil industry, water supplies, education, housing and 
health and that the arms deal diverted funds away from these 
development priorities (Wrigley, 2003; Crawford-Browne, 2002).  At the 
time of the signing of the arms deal contracts, the Minister of Health 
rejected the idea of providing anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) to pregnant 
mothers as the programme would be too expensive for the country 
(Feinstein, 2007; Holden, 2008).  As the 2003 Report of the Joint Health 
and Treasury Task Team found, distributing ARVs to those who needed 
them, would cost R5.7 billion per annum, which was a mere 10% of the 
cost of the arms deal at the time (Republic of South Africa, 2003; 
Feinstein, 2007; Holden, 2008).  In his 2008 comprehensive book on the 
arms deal, Holden extrapolates the actual costs of the arms deal 
compared to the funds spent on other social expenditure between the 
1999/2000 financial year and the 2007/2008 financial year.  He used the 
‘National Estimates of Expenditure’ for the Departments of Housing, 
Defence, Health and Education for the years 1999, 2004 and 2008. 
                                                 
40
 Business Report, November 16, 2001 
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1999/ 
2000 
2000/ 
2001 
2001/ 
2002 
2002/ 
2003 
2003/ 
2004 
2004/ 
2005 
2005/ 
2006 
2006/ 
2007 
2007/ 
2008 
Total 
Arms 
deal 
2.901* 4.223 6.342 5.864 4.502 6.331 4.537 4.515 3.882 43.097 
HIV/AIDS zero 0.181 0.265 0.459 0.7662 1.107 1.511 1.953 2.473 8.7152 
National 
student 
financial 
aid 
scheme 
 
0.390 
 
0.443 
 
0.449 
 
0.500 
 
0.545 
 
0.583 
 
0.864 
 
0.926 
 
1.332 
 
6.032 
Housing 
grants 
2.970 2.997 3.225 3.800 4.246 4.473 4.843 6.677 8.342 41.573 
Source: Holden (2008:29)   * all values in R billion 
 
 
The original value of the offsets that would result from the arms deal was 
touted to be as much as R110 billion.41  Subsequently a lower figure of 
R70 billion was agreed upon.   
 
An Affordability Committee headed by Jayendra Naidoo was appointed 
to review the individual deals.  The team reported that the amounts 
claimed for offsets were inflated.  This finding was not unusual, as it is 
common in arms deals that have offsets attached to the deal.  Brauer 
and Dunne (2004) found that offsets are often more costly than straight 
‘off-the-shelf’ arms purchases and according to Hawley (2003:18) offsets 
“have a reputation for raising the cost of a deal by around one-fifth”.   
The Affordability Committee also indicated that the offset arrangements 
could not be strictly enforced (February, 2004). 
 
According to Ms Chandrika Jogessar of DTI42, for civilian contracts the 
value of the offsets should comprise a minimum 30% of a bid’s imported 
component, while for defence contracts the offsets should comprise 50% 
of a bid’s imported components. 
 
                                                 
41
 Business Day, August, 28, 1999 
42
 Ms Chandrika Jogessar, DTI, interviewed 19 September 2002 
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The offsets of the South African arms deal were reported to be as 
follows in 1999: 
 
Table 2  The offsets of the South African 1998 arms deal 
 
Investments 
in billions of 
Rand 
Technological 
Transfers in billions of 
Rand 
Purchases in 
billions of Rand 
 
Total 
Military 4 8 7 14.5 
Non-military 24 31.5  55.5 
Total 
   70 
Source: DTI 
 
One of the earliest DIP offsets was the selection of Denel by BAE 
Systems to be a strategic supply partner for the design, development, 
and production of NATO-standard stores pylons for the Grippen fighter 
(Defense News, 10 April 2000).  By 2006, more progress has been 
made on the DIP offsets than with the NIP offsets (Haines, 2006). 
 
It should be noted that despite the open post-apartheid era, the 
extensive public scrutiny of, and the debate around the arms deal was 
met with opposition and secrecy by government. Government opposed 
any publication of contract and other related details (Epps, 2004:9).   
This was repeatedly highlighted by Terry Crawford-Browne, including in 
front of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence at Parliament on 29 
November 2001: “The public was (and is) expressly forbidden details of 
the offset programmes in terms of ‘commercial confidentiality clauses’, 
which violates Section 217 of the Constitution’ (Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa, 2001).  Conflicting information was released 
into the public domain and no independent audit of the process was 
allowed.  Indeed some details were only revealed as a result of a legal 
challenge by ECAAR-SA against the South African government 
(Crawford-Browne, 2007).   
 
In-depth details pertaining to the implementation and progress of offset 
projects are still nearly impossible to obtain.  The majority of the 
information is from government sources and documentation, which as I 
pointed out earlier, are often erratic, and sometimes just completely false 
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and inaccurate.  Very often it was left for the press to sniff out the truth.  
Holden (2008:25) lists a few of these.  He quotes the Business Day43 in 
relating that when the first ‘offsets milestone’, or point at which the arms 
companies were supposed to have achieved certain targets, was 
reached in 2003-2004, three of the arms contractors had defaulted on 
their offset commitments.  These were Ferrostaal by R4 billion; the 
BAE/SAAB consortium by R840 million, and Thales by R262 million.  
This was in spite of Armscor reporting in its 2007 Annual Report that 
most of the contractors were actually ahead of schedule in meeting their 
offset targets and that offsets had contributed R11.4 billion in the 
returned investments (Holden, 2008; Armscor, 2007:13).  
 
How do offsets function within the South African legislative system? 
 
3.4 Industrial Participation 
3.4.1 General background to offsets  
 
Industrial participation agreements, also known as “offsets”, are 
contracts that require the seller to transfer extra economic benefits to the 
buyer as a condition for the sale of goods and services (Brauer & 
Dunne, 2004).   
 
By implementing the industrial participation programme as part of the 
arms deal, South Africa joined the many countries that are not just 
buying arms, but are buying complex bundles of goods and services and 
wish to minimize associated transaction costs (Hall & Markowski, 1994).  
The use of offsets is not restricted to the field of arms trade, but is also 
used when governments purchase telecommunications equipment, 
computers and other electronic and mechanical equipment (Brauer & 
Dunne, 2004).   
 
                                                 
43
 20 September 2006 
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Although the arms deal is the most widely known of the sales 
agreements entered by the South African Government, mainly due to the 
media frenzy around it, there are several significant NIPP projects 
currently ongoing arising from purchases made by South African 
Airways and some other State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) such as 
Eskom, Transnet, and PetroSA.  As this evaluation is on one of the NIPP 
projects resulting from the arms deal, discussion here will focus on the 
Strategic Defence Procurement package and its NIP projects. 
 
3.4.2 The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 
 
The use of offsets has become a common practice in the international 
arms trade.  According to Wood (1992) at least 130 countries, in all 
regions of the world, and irrespective of being industrialized or not, 
maintain some sort of offset programme.  This is the consequence of 
reduced military budgets since the end of the Cold War.  These reduced 
military budgets led to lower volumes of arms sales, which changed 
supplier-buyer relationships on the international arms market.  These 
changes led to arms producing companies out-bidding each other in 
offering attractive offset packages (Wood, 1992; Courtney, 2002; Brauer 
& Dunne, 2003).   
 
Offset agreements are thus entered into as a matter of course even 
though Article XVI of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Government Procurement explicitly forbids the use of offsets in 
government procurement.  This agreement, which came into effect 
January 01, 1996, covers the use of offsets and South Africa, as a 
member, is bound to it.   
 
The exception to Article XVI of the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement is listed in Articles V and XXIII of the Agreement.  Article V 
states that developing countries may negotiate conditions for the use of 
offsets as long as offsets are used in order to qualify for participation in 
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the procurement process, and not as criteria for awarding contracts.  
Article XXIII allows exemptions in the case of protecting national security 
interests and public morals amongst others (www.wto.org44).  Most 
countries use the exceptions that are granted in Article XXIII, which 
effectively excludes all military trade from its provisions (Control Arms 
Campaign, 2003; Thomas, 2006). 
   
South Africa, which is a developing country, uses both Articles V and 
XXIII in order to use offsets.  It is also adhering to its own government 
procurement policies that mandates that all government purchases in 
excess of, or equivalent to, US$10 million include offsets. 
   
3.4.3 South Africa’s offsets history 
 
It is generally assumed that offset arrangements is a new component to 
the South African arms procurement process, and that it was introduced 
post 1996.  However, neither the Defence Review, nor the Department 
of Trade and Industry’s policy documents on Industrial Participation, 
refers to it as a new practice in South African Government’s 
procurement, but at the same time they also do not refer to similar 
practices in the previous era.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
A literary review conducted in 2001 indicated that limited research and 
documentation on the Apartheid era procurement, in particular on arms 
procurement and industrial participation, exists (Wellmann, 2004).  
Nevertheless newspaper reports and anecdotal evidence indicate that 
industrial participation was practiced prior to 1994.  An example is the 
newspaper article on the role of Swiss arms manufacturer, Dieter Buhrle, 
in South African arms procurement during the Apartheid era indicates 
that the covert deal with Buhrle led to the “granting of production 
licences to South Africa and supporting the build-up of the South African 
                                                 
44
 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gpa_02_e.htm 
(accessed on 12 April 2005) 
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arms industry”45.  It is not clear how formalized these arrangements 
were, but it can safely be assumed that these early arrangements 
influenced and informed post-1996 policy. 
 
Armscor has reportedly been enforcing offsets since 1989.  These 
offsets had various forms of benefits such as stimulating economic 
growth, developing industrial projects and securing industrial projects 
and securing foreign investment.  These obligations were monitored and 
carried penalties ranging between 5-15% of the unfulfilled portion of the 
obligation for non-performance.46   
 
According to its website47, Armscor’s policy is that a Defence Industrial 
Participation (DIP) obligation of up to 100% of the contract value applies 
to all purchases with an imported value above US$2 million, and focuses 
on strategic business within the defence industry. 
 
3.4.4 Current South African Industrial Participation 
 
In the government’s move towards addressing the past through 
economic policies such as the RDP and GEAR, policies related to 
changing the government procurement system were introduced.  South 
Africa’s Industrial Participation (IP) became obligory on 01 September 
1996 and the National Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP) was 
adopted by Cabinet in April 1997.   
 
This policy makes it mandatory for all government purchases in excess 
of, or equivalent to, US$ 10 million to include the foreign supplier’s 
implementation of business projects in South Africa.  These business 
projects should equal or exceed 30% of the value of the deal.  The 
purpose of this policy is to create further socio-economic empowerment 
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 Weekly Mail and Guardian, 22 November 2001 
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 Star, 23 August 2001 
47
 www.armscor.co.za/Dip/WhatISDIP.asp; accessed 07 July 2007 
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in terms of jobs and economic investment – these are goals that are 
implicitly part of the RDP and GEAR policies.  Apart from any single 
contract exceeding US$10 million, it also applies to multiple contracts for 
the same products, or services, each exceeding US$3 million awarded 
to one seller over a 2-year period which in total exceeds US$10 million.  
It also applies to a contract with a renewable option clause where the 
total value will exceed US$10 million (DTI, 2001, 2002).  During their 
investigation on the arms deal on behalf of SCOPA, the joint task team 
surveyed counter-trade practice in 13 other countries, and found that the 
South African policy compares favourably with international practice, 
although most countries have a somewhat lower threshold, in some 
cases as low as US$1million (Botha, 2003b). 
 
The obligation of any deal that has offsets is to create economic activity 
generating credits equal to or exceeding 30% of the contract value over 
a fulfilment period of seven years for most of the suppliers.  In the 1998 
arms deal, there is an exception to this rule in that the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium has to fulfil its offset obligation over a period 
of 11 years.  This exception is due to the size of the contract with the 
company.  Thus offset projects tend to be relatively long term, and 
credits are only earned as the economic activity actually occurs, and not 
at the time of making the commitment.  A penalty of 5% of the IP 
obligation can be levied for non-performance and a performance bond is 
required.  SCOPA queried the enforceability of these offset agreements 
and indicated that the value of the penalties was too small in comparison 
to the value of the offsets (February, 2004).  As pointed out in earlier 
chapters, research has shown that most supplying companies would 
include this 5% penalty in their costing of the product (Eisenhour, 1989; 
Batchelor and Dunne, 2002; Skőns 2004).   
 
There are two different types of offsets: direct and indirect offsets.  Direct 
offsets include goods and services directly related to the equipment 
purchased.  Indirect purchases are services and goods that are 
unrelated to the specific defence equipment purchased.   
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The South African government has divided the IP into two categories:  
• the Defence Industrial Participation (DIP), which requires the 
foreign company to buy directly from or procure business for SA 
defence companies – thus a direct offset; and  
• the National Industrial Participation (NIP), which requires a 
separate set of contracts and investments in the civilian market – 
thus an indirect offset.   
 
For DIP a further distinction is drawn between direct and indirect DIP.  
Direct DIP refers to projects that form part of the planned procurement in 
the form of subcontracting.  Indirect DIP refers to other, indirectly related 
projects, in the defence industry.  Direct DIP is required to make up 20% 
and indirect DIP 70% obligation at a minimum (Armscor DIP Guidelines).  
The DIP obligations (whether direct or indirect) must meet the following 
requirements: 
• products - more than 45% of the DIP commitment, excluding any 
exports 
• technology: as defined in the DIP agreement, not more than 10% 
• exports: greater than 25% 
• investment: up to 15% (Equity or Capital Equipment) 
• loans: up to 2.5%, and 
• marketing support of up to a maximum of 2.5% of export value 
(Armscor DIP Guidelines, paragraph 6.2.2.2). 
While DIP is administered by the Department of Defence and Armscor, 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) administers the NIP 
Programme (DTI, 1997).  
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Thus in the case of the arms deal, three contracts were prepared for 
each supplier, three different contracts are prepared: the systems 
contract, the NIP contract and the DIP contract (Campbell, 1998).   
 
A National Industrial Participation Secretariat, which is headed by a 
Chief Director, was created within the Department of Trade and Industry 
to oversee the NIP.  This IP Secretariat keeps track of all relevant 
transactions in South Africa which have IP potential; assists, guides and 
advises sellers in the fulfilment of their obligations; makes 
recommendations to the Industrial Participation Control Committee 
(IPCC) for its approval; concludes IP contracts; administers, reviews and 
audits performance of all ongoing projects; prepares reports for the 
IPCC supporting/not supporting allocation of credits or penalties; and 
prepares periodic status reports (Botha, 2003b). 
 
The Industrial Participation Control Committee (IPCC) is made up of 
representatives of the Departments of Trade and Industry, Finance, 
Foreign Affairs, Defence, and the purchaser, if not one of the above.  
The IPCC provides strategic guidance and approves guidelines for the 
NIPP; ensures that all government departments and parastatals comply 
with the policy; reviews recommendations made by the Industrial 
Participation Secretary for acceptance of proposals, awarding of credits, 
or application of penalties; and reviews the performance of the IP 
Secretariat (Botha, 2003b). 
 
The process that is followed to assess the Industrial Participation 
(offsets) contribution of a tender is that after a tender is issued potential 
tendering companies liaise with the Industrial Participation Secretariat 
and submit their business concepts.  Once a tender is awarded, a full 
business plan is submitted to and negotiated with the Secretariat.  Once 
the Secretariat is satisfied that the proposal meets the requirements, it is 
submitted to the IPCC for approval.  On approval, a contract is 
concluded between the seller and the government (Telephonic interview, 
Mr. Zikode, DTI, 06 August 2003; Botha, 2003b).  Botha (2003b) found 
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that the time-pressured process result in business plans being 
developed in haste and without sufficient planning, and thus 
subsequently require revision once the contract has been signed.  In 
terms of the awards of the tenders, industrial participation (offsets) is a 
precondition but not a deciding factor, unless all bids are relatively 
close.48   
 
The Defence Industrial Participation (DIP) Programme follows principles 
similar to that of the NIPP, but “the objectives of all DIP programmes 
are... [to] address specific defence industry objectives such as the 
retention, and where possible, the creation of jobs, abilities and 
capabilities; the establishment of a sustainable defence industrial and 
economic basis, with strategic logistic support capabilities; the promotion 
of defence exports of value-added goods; the promotion of like-for-like 
technology transfer and joint ventures; the maintenance of skilled 
indigenous design, development and manufacturing capabilities; and the 
provision for a sustainable local defence industry capacity” (Armscor DIP 
Guidelines, paragraph 3.1).  As is the case for the NIP, offset proposals 
are requested along with the tenders.  These proposals are routed 
through the Armscor Defence Industrial Participation Secretariat, who 
together with the programme manager and the Defence Secretariat 
evaluate the tenders and engage with the successful tendering 
companies in negotiations.  In cases where the purchase would be in 
excess of US$10 million, as in the case of the arms deal, the NIP and 
DIP secretariats evaluate the tenders separately and only once both the 
DIP and NIP agreements are concluded, is the purchase contract signed 
between government and seller (Botha, 2003b).   
 
The assessment of DIP proposals is based on the extent to which they 
support the capabilities required in the defence industry to provide for a 
strategic design, development, manufacturing, logistical support, and 
upgrade capability for a technologically advanced and modern defence 
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 Telephonic interview, Mr. Zikode, DTI, 06 August 2003 
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force, its doctrine and posture.  The offset element in defence 
procurement is not only a precondition, but also forms one of the key 
evaluation factors and plays a major role in the final adjudication of the 
tender (Botha, 2003b).   
 
3.4.4.1   Industrial Participation Objectives 
 
There are various objectives of the IP programme.  These include: 
• sustainable economic growth 
• establishment of new trading partners 
• foreign investment into South Africa 
• exports of South African “value-added” goods and services 
• job creation 
• human resource development 
• technology transfer 
• economic advantages for previously disadvantaged 
communities (www.the-alliance.org49; Department of Trade 
and Industry, 2001). 
 
Apart from working to fulfil the above objectives, the NIPP programme 
further endeavours to support the development of South African industry 
(DTI, 2001). 
Botha (2003b) lists a number of principles further apply to the offsets: 
• No increase in prices - the economic activity must be truly 
economic and must not increase the cost of doing business; 
• There must be mutual benefit for the seller as well as national 
economic objectives; 
• Additionality:  all proposals must generate new business.  In order 
to qualify for credits, investments may be in new facilities or the 
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 www.the-alliance.org : Government Procurement document, accessed August 2002  
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expansion of existing facilities, but the additional benefit must be 
shown beyond doubt, besides the mere increase in output. 
Exports must be for new products or for new markets. 
• The projects must be economically and operationally sustainable. 
The objective is to create businesses that will survive, and 
changes to the business plan may be required to adapt to 
changing circumstances. 
• Causality: The proposal must result from the purchase contract. 
The IP proposal would not have been initiated had it not been a 
condition of the purchase contract.  Furthermore it means that 
each project submitted, resulted from an action by the seller as a 
result of an IP obligation, or that the seller’s involvement 
influenced the project to occur within a shorter time frame than 
would otherwise have been the case. 
• The fulfilment of any obligation is the sole responsibility of the 
seller. When other parties are involved in the execution, the 
responsibility remains with the seller. 
The stated tender requirements for offsets set for the arms deal were 
that DIP and NIP should at least equal the value of the purchase 
contract.  The interest among tendering companies was so high that IP 
became a key differentiating issue, and the agreements that were 
eventually signed were for DIP of $2.4 billion (60% of the contract value) 
and NIP of $14 billion (350% of the contract value), totalling more than 
four times the value of the signed contracts (Botha, 2003b, Holden, 
2008).  This went against the rules of the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement, of which South Africa is a signatory, and 
which states clearly that: “... a developing country may at the time of 
accession negotiate conditions for the use of offsets, such as 
requirements for the incorporation of domestic content.  Such 
requirements shall be used only for qualification to participate in the 
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procurement process and not as criteria for awarding contracts”  (World 
Trade Organization, 2004).   
 
Although cheaper alternatives were available to those specific contracts 
that were signed for this arms deal, the only issues separating those 
from the ones that were chosen were the promise of more attractive 
offset arrangements and the South African government’s preference for 
European suppliers (Wrigley, 2003).  
 
Whether offsets are welfare enhancing depends on whether the offsets 
are an efficient means of pursuing government’s multiple objectives.   
The IP objectives linked to the arms deal correspond to a large degree 
with the RDP’s central goal to meet social and economic needs of the 
South African community.  There is also a definite attempt to use the 
arms deal to drive substantial investment into the non-defence sectors of 
the economy, and to ensure a good geographic spread among the 
provinces. 
The nature and spatial implementation of the NIP and the DIP offsets 
confirms rather than challenge existing spatial patterns and inequalities 
in the South African economy (Haines, 2004).  Haines (2004) also found 
that the allocation and integration of the various offsets projects and 
offsets-related investments to specific regions and centres has not been 
prescriptive or systematic, even though government has acknowledged 
‘that it needs to do more to improve the coherence of existing strategies 
to promote a more equitable geographic spread of investment and 
economic activities’ (DTI, 2002c:28).  The allocation of specific offset 
projects almost inevitably involved a degree of horse-trading, rather than 
systematic targeting or keeping in mind the need for geographic spread 
(Haines, 2004). 
 
There are nine provinces in post-Apartheid South Africa, each with a 
provincial government with certain budgetary powers and funds 
allocated by central government.  Gauteng remains the dominant 
province in terms of economic activity and incorporates Johannesburg 
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and Pretoria.  The Johannesburg-Pretoria axis is the largest 
concentration of manufacturing industry in the country.  Only seven of 
the nine provinces have the Strategic Defence Programme offset 
projects allocated to them (DTI, 2003b). 
 
Table 3 Provincial spread of the Strategic Defence Programme 
 
Provinces Projected value (in 
US$)  of offset 
projects  – 
investments, 
exports and local 
sales 
Anticipated number 
of direct jobs 
created up to 2011 
Percentage (%) 
allocation of 
performance per 
region 
Western Cape  4,141,415,920 3,314 37,20 
KwaZulu-Natal  4,886,190,048 1,201 4,51 
Eastern Cape  3,177,770,461 2,435 1,60 
Free State  1,651,400,000 2,100 1,33 
Gauteng  5,621,256,713 3,216 42,59 
Mpumalanga      762,500,000 230 6,76 
Limpopo      909,990,000 880 6,01 
TOTAL 21,150,523,142 13,376 100 
Source:  Department of Trade and Industry, 2003b. 
 
So given what we know, how are the offsets projects faring overall?  
Haines (2006) found that although the arms deal offsets projects 
included some small-scale successes in the bio-tech industries, there 
has been insufficient involvement in emerging high-tech industrial 
sectors and emerging export-oriented industries, with an overall 
tendency to opt rather for brownfields rather than greenfields projects.  
He further found that more progress has been made on DIP offsets than 
with NIP offsets.  Even though Denel have had added opportunities of 
participating in the international defence production, and there had been 
some specific and modest achievements particularly for Denel Aviation; 
the actual DIP offsets experience does not match the expectations 
created.  Some of Haines’ (2006) findings include that there has been a 
failure of certain obligors to fulfil their targets in helping to stimulate 
output and exports for Denel; there has been a significant shortfall 
between the promised DIP contracts and the contracts actually received; 
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and that those projects that did materialize were often on a smaller scale 
than envisaged.   
3.4.4.2 Industrial Participation Obligations 
 
The IP guidelines and criteria obligate the seller that incurs an IP 
obligation to actively participate in the South African economy.  Business 
proposals linked to the offsets obligations must be made on the 
principles of mutual benefit and good business sense. (DTI, 2001)   
 
All bidders, except the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium, must fulfil their 
obligations within a seven-year period from the time of implementation of 
the agreement and must provide a performance guarantee equal to 5% 
of the offset component.  Due to the size of its order, the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium must fulfil its obligations within an eleven-
year period.  These criteria appear to be equal or even above 
international norms, and within international practice.  The idea behind 
the 5% guarantee is that it should not be measured against the size of 
the NIP obligation but rather against the loss the obligor may suffer 
should the NIP not be fulfilled. 
 
The contractors also face a penalty to the value of 10% of their 
unrealized IP obligation should they fail to meet their IP requirements.50   
 
The IP obligation also has a credit system, which values the methods 
used to meet the IP obligations.  Each credit is valued as an equivalent 
to one US dollar of the obligation amount.  Certain types of projects are 
awarded greater credits, for example: new investment, research and 
development, as well as links with previously disadvantaged persons or 
groups (either as shareholders or contractors) earn double credits.   
 
In order to be considered for IP credits, all Industrial Participation 
proposals must reflect incremental or new business ventures (www.the-
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alliance.org).  The credits are accumulated over a 7-year period (11 
years for the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium offsets) and are awarded 
based on actual successful performance and not on projections.  A 
combination of various methods can be used to meet the IP obligation 
and credits are calculated cumulatively and concurrently among all 
methods used.  Excess credits can be banked for a period of four years 
after the obligation is discharged (www.the-alliance.org51).  
 
The evaluation of IP proposals and the awarding of IP credits are based 
on the following methodology: 
 
Table 4  Methodology of IP credits 
Objective Methodology Factor 
Sustainable Economic Growth Revenues accumulated over the 
fulfilment period 
$1 = 1 credit 
Export Promotion Export revenues = additional credits $1 = 1 credit + 
local content 
Job Creation Salaries and Wage costs accumulated 
over the fulfilment period 
$1 = 1 credit 
Training and Development Training and Development Costs 
accumulated over the fulfilment period 
$1 = 1 credit 
SMME Promotion Outsourcing to SMMEs $1 = 1 credit 
Previously Disadvantaged 
Individuals 
Outsourcing to PDI SMMEs PDI 
Ownership % x Revenues 
$1 = 2 credits 
$ x % = credits 
Investment Capital outlay or capital injections $1 = 2 credits 
R&D Expenses All costs $1 = 2 credits 
Technology Transfer  On a case by case basis linked to 
revenues 
$1 = 1 credit 
Source: National Industrial Participation Policy for South Africa, Department of Trade and 
Industry, Pretoria, April 1997 
 Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Provided that the use of procurement as a policy tool, as is used here 
through IP, has measurable targets; the processes used are verifyable, 
auditable, and transparent; and takes place within a competitive 
environment, procurement can to a large extent contribute to the 
development of growing enterprises that are able to participate equitably 
in the global economy (Watermeyer, 2000, Shezi, 1998).  It is therefore 
appropriate that the procurement contracts be regulated and monitored. 
Studies have however shown that the current lack of data collection and 
records by the government prevents the effective monitoring of targeted 
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procurement such as the NIPP, and further hampers the transparency of 
the tendering processes (Sharp et al, 1999).   
 
Once the contract is awarded the supplier must provide bi-annual 
progress reports to the DTI.  DTI initiates audits if and when required.  
Independent audit reports are required from the obligor annually.52   
 
Questions regarding the ability and capacity of the government, 
specifically the DTI, and Armscor, to fully monitor the implementation of 
NIP and DIP have been asked.  Although it is relatively easy to monitor 
formal fulfilment of offsets in terms of actual contracts signed, it is nearly 
impossible to establish whether these transactions are the direct results 
of the offset arrangement.   
 
Basic monitoring and evaluation of the NIPP appears not to be 
implemented.  According to Mr. Dion Haroldt of the DTI, there is no 
monitoring and evaluation system in place for any of the offset projects, 
and monitoring occurs, at best, on an ad hoc basis.53  There is also no 
evidence of any independent audits of any aspect of the NIPP. 
 
3.4.5 Corruption 
 
Various studies such as the ones by Heymans and Lipiez (1999), 
Robinson (2002) and Le Billon (2003), found that corruption has a 
negative impact on a country or region’s economic growth, and because 
corruption is so frequently linked to political corruption, it can also 
destroy the legitimacy of governing institutions.  Szeftel (2000:298) 
described political corruption to involve “the abuse or misuse of public 
office, public resources or some public obligation or duty for the 
purposes of private gain”.  Lambsdorff (2003) estimates that single point 
improvement in a country’s Transparency International corruption score 
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increases productivity by 4% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
increases net annual capital inflows by 0.5% of the GDP.   
 
Corrupt practices in the arms trade are widespread and commonplace.  
According to Transparency International, its 1999 ‘Bribe Payers Index’ 
found that the arms industry was considered the second most likely to 
pay bribes compared to all other industries ranked (Transparency 
International, 2002).  Courtney (2002) notes that Transparency 
International further found that despite the industry accounting for less 
than one per cent of world trade in 1999, 50% of all bribes during this 
period were paid for defence contracts54.  Transparency International 
also suggests that a conservative estimate of the value of bribes is 10% 
of the total value of the trade, which translates to billions of US Dollars 
every year (Courtney, 2002; Transparency International UK, 2002).   
 
That bribery is the norm in the arms trade was confirmed by Denis 
Healey, the United Kingdom’s Labour Defence Secretary from 1964-70.   
Mr Healy launched an official arms sales department at Whitehall in 
1965, at a time when the United Kingdom was in the midst of an 
economic crisis.  According to the British Guardian newspaper, the remit 
of this arms sales department was to pay bribes (www.guardian.co.uk) – 
in the least the United Kingdom government has for a 40-year period 
secretly tolerated, and more often than not deliberately colluded with 
arms production companies in the country, such as BAE Systems, to 
continue corrupt practices.  On 07 June 2007, in an interview with the 
Guardian after the British Serious Fraud Office were politically forced to 
stop all investigations into BAE System’s Saudi deals in 2006, Mr Healy 
said: “Bribery has always played a role in the sale of weapons – I think 
almost no role in the sale we made to the Americans or the Germans or 
our Western allies.  But in the Middle East people couldn’t buy weapons 
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 These estimates were provided by the General Accounting Office, a USA Congress-
funded watchdog agency. 
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unless you bribed them to do so, and that was particularly true in Saudi 
Arabia”. 
 
It is thus not surprising, considering the nature of the international arms 
trade that by late 1999 allegations appeared in the South African public 
domain that certain government officials who had been responsible for 
deciding who the successful bidders for the arm deal would be, received 
bribes from bidders.  These rumours of kickbacks and underhand deals 
remained innuendo until in September 1999, a Pan Africanist Congress 
MP, Patricia de Lille (now leader of the Independent Democrats), 
proposed a motion calling of a commission of inquiry into the arms deal 
and named senior ANC officials who had received money in exchange 
for influencing the arms deal tendering process.  Ms de Lille’s 
information was made available to her by Bheki Jacobs, an agent in the 
ANC’s Department of Intelligence and Security.  It appears as if Mr 
Jacobs became disillusioned with the level of corruption in the upper 
echelons of the ANC.  Apart from approaching Ms de Lille, Jacobs also 
approached Terry Crawford-Browne, who had been actively 
campaigning against the arms deal for several years.  Crawford-Browne 
later told the Mail and Guardian: “He told me: ‘We’ll tell you where the 
real corruption is – around Joe Modise and the leadershop of Umkhonto 
we Sizwe, who see themselves as the new financial elite in post-
apartheid South Africa.’ Jacobs said that he and his ANC intelligence 
colleagues had seen the disastrous consequences in Russia of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, when communists suddenly became super-
capitalists.  Such a gangster society, said Jacobs, was not why he had 
gone into exile to fight for liberation from Apartheid.  Something had to 
be done.” (du Preez, 2008:203).  
 
Jacobs’ revelations had far-reaching reverberations across the South 
African political landscape.  The corruption allegations against the 
government officials resulted in a series of investigations into the 
decision-making process of the arms deal.  The most significant of these 
investigations is the joint investigation by the offices of the Auditor 
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General, the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions and the Public 
Protector.  The report of this investigation stated that approximately 50 
instances of non-compliance to procurement processes in that “proper 
evaluation procedures were not consistently and diligently applied and a 
proper audit trail was not established throughout the procurement 
process” and that “the time allocated for each evaluation and execution 
was insufficient to ensure that it was done properly and efficiently”.  The 
report continued to say that “various key documents had not been 
finalised and/or duly approved before the final contracts were 
concluded”.  Overall the report stated that “no evidence was found that 
any improper or unlawful conduct by Government” (Republic of South 
Africa, 2001b).  It did note though that certain government officials had 
acted in an improper and irregular manner, in particular the Chief of 
Acquisitions in the Department of Defence (DoD) at the time, Mr. 
Shamin “Chippy” Shaik.  In 2002, Chippy Shaik resigned after being 
found in possession of classified government documents.   
 
Feinstein (2007) writes that the report avoided the key questions posed 
by SCOPA of whether Cabinet was upfront with the South African public 
about the actual costs to the taxpayer of the deal, and that the 
investigators did not investigate any subcontracts that formed part of the 
deal.  He further chronicles changes to the original joint report by 
political leaders (and Mr. Chippy Shaik) indicating a cover up and white-
washing of issues, particularly those pertaining to corruption. 
 
Mr. Chippy Shaik’s brother, Mr. Schabir Shaik, owned a company, 
African Defence Systems, which is engaged in direct links with the 
Thomson Group (now Thales), one of the successful arms deal bidders.  
African Defence Systems together with Thales, are now providing the 
combat suite for the corvettes (Holden, 2008).  Mr. Schabir Shaik’s 
company directly benefitted from contracts awarded to the group.  Mr. 
“Chippy” Shaik was suspended from the Department of Defence in 2002 
and resigned shortly thereafter.  His brother was charged with fraud and 
was found guilty on 09 June 2005.  After his initial appeal processes 
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failed, he was jailed on 09 November 2006 and his legal team lodged 
papers with the Constitutional Court in December 2006 appealing his 
corruption and fraud conviction and jail sentence.  Subsequently Mr. 
Schabir Shaik, who had spent lengthy periods of his jail time in hospital, 
was released from jail on medical parole due to a terminal affliction.   
 
During the early days of the arms deal, evidence of improper practices 
suggested that Mr. Joe Modise, who was Minister of Defence at the 
time, had several conflicts of interests pertaining to the decisions made 
during the deals.  Mr. Modise died in November 2001 and no charges 
were ever brought against him. 
 
In March 2001, it was revealed that the ANC Parliamentary Chief Whip, 
Mr. Toni Yengeni had received a massive discount on his luxury four-
wheel drive vehicle from DaimlerChrysler Aerospace.   During 2002, Mr. 
Toni Yengeni, was arrested on fraud and corruption charges stemming 
from this bribe.  He had also actively lied to Parliament about the 
vehicle.  In February 2003 he pleaded guilty to the fraud charges in the 
Pretoria Commercial Crime Court and sentenced to four years in prison, 
but was acquitted on corruption charges.  After years of appealing his 
sentence, he started serving his four year prison sentence on August 24, 
2006.  He was released on parole in December 2006.  The Star (02 July 
2001) published a list of 33 prominent South Africans who had received 
special deals on similar luxury four-wheel drive vehicles from 
DaimlerChrysler Aerospace, indicating that Toni Yengeni was not the 
only person who had received such a bribe.  The list of the names 
included the Chief of the Defence Force, senior Denel personnel and a 
member of the offsets negotiating team (Feinstein, 2007).   
 
The fall-out of the corruption around the arms deal also negatively 
affected those who had no part of the corruption.  In August 2001, 
Andrew Feinstein, a senior ANC MP and a member of parliament’s 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), resigned over the 
way the government had handled the controversial arms deal and the 
 142
probe into alleged bribes.  A few months later, Gavin Woods, an IFP MP, 
and who was the head of SCOPA at the time of reviewing the arms deal, 
also resigned because of the unwillingness on behalf of government to 
tolerate any thorough investigation into the arms deal (Feinstein, 2007).   
3.4.5.1 Jacob Zuma 
 
Mr. Jacob Zuma, President of the country since late April 2009, had, to 
date, the biggest fall-out of the arms deal scandals.  Even though the 
Director of Public Prosecutions announced in August 2003 that no legal 
action would be taken against Mr. Zuma for allegations that he 
attempted to solicit bribes from the Thomson Group (now Thales) on the 
grounds that even though “there is a prima facie case of corruption 
against the deputy president, our prospects of success are not strong 
enough”, Mr. Zuma became the key figure mentioned in the corruption 
trial of Schabir Shaik.   Schaik was Zuma’s financial advisor, both in Mr. 
Zuma’s private capacity and as deputy president, particularly in the case 
of South Africa’s purchase of corvettes (Sunday Times, August 24, 
2003).  In 2005, Mr. Shaik was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years in 
prison (Transcript of The State versus Schabir Shaik and 11 others55).  
 
Mr. Zuma was dismissed from his post as vice president to the country 
on June 14, 2005 as a result of suggestions of corruption and his close 
links to the convicted Shaik.  President Mbeki told a joint sitting in 
Parliament on June 14, 2005 that “in the interest of the Honourable 
Deputy President, the government, our young democratic system and 
our country, it would be best to release the Honourable Jacob Zuma for 
his responsibilities as deputy president of the republic and member of 
the Cabinet”.  Shortly thereafter the National Prosecuting Authority 
charged Mr. Zuma with two counts of corruption.56  On September 20, 
2006 Judge Herbert Qedusizi Msimang of the Pietermaritzburg High 
Court struck the case off the roll on the basis that the prosecution did not 
                                                 
55
 www.news24.com, accessed June 09, 2005 
56
 Mail and Guardian; Mail and Guardian online; www.anc.org.za 
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follow proper procedure.57  On November 08, 2007, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal overturned the earlier High Court rulings on the Scorpions 
search and seizure operations, and declared the seizures legal.58  This 
led to Mr. Zuma being charged again with two counts of corruption and 
12 counts of fraud in December 2007, only a few days after he is elected 
as President of the ANC in Polokwane.   
 
According to the 2007 charge sheet, Mr. Zuma was to appear before 
court on August 14, 2008.  Mr. Zuma launched a series of legal 
challenges relating to evidentiary and procedural matters and finally the 
trial date to hear the merits of the corruption charge was set for August 
25, 2009.  At that time, Mr. Zuma was also expected to apply for a 
permanent stay of prosecution. 
 
On April 7, 2009, Acting National Director of the NPA announced that 
charges would be dropped against Mr. Zuma because of alleged political 
interference leading to an abuse of the legal process evident from 
transcripts of telephone calls between the ex-head of the Scorpions, and 
the ex-head of the National Prosecution Agency.  By all accounts the 
tapes allegedly contained conversations in which the charges against 
Mr. Zuma and the timing of the announcement to reinstate the charges, 
were discussed.  The NPA’s Acting National Director concluded that it 
would be unfair and unjust to continue with prosecution against Mr. 
Zuma and that the decision was based on (i) the merits of the case 
against Mr. Zuma; (ii) any legal defences Mr. Zuma may have 
concerning the fairness of any trial; (iii) the practical implications and 
considerations of a continued prosecution of Mr. Zuma; and (iv) the 
policy aspects militating against prosecution (IDASA, undated). 
 
                                                 
57
 Mail and Guardian online, September 20, 2006; iol online, September 21, 2006 
58
 Mail and Guardian online, November 08 and 09, 2007 
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All charges against Mr. Zuma were formally withdrawn by the 
Pietermaritzburg High Court on April, 7, 2009 and he will no longer be 
required to stand trial on this matter. 
3.4.5.2 The BAE Systems fraud investigation 
 
The London-based The Guardian newspaper reported on 11 September 
2003 that BAE Systems had a £20 million slush fund to finance 
prostitutes, gambling trips, yachts, sports cars and more for the Saudi 
Royal family so that they might favourably influence its chances of 
winning the “Al Yahamah” deal.59  As a result the United Kingdom’s 
Serious Fraud Office started an investigation of BAE Systems, in which 
they were assisted by the United Kingdom Department of Defence’s 
fraud squad.  Together these two offices launched wide-reaching 
international investigations into BAE System’s operations.  But in 
December 2006, their investigations into the Saudi Arabia deals was 
stopped after threats from the Saudi ruling family and the interventions 
of Toni Blair, the then British Prime Minister, who claimed it was 
necessary as national security was at stake (www.guardian.co.uk60).  
The investigating team has however carried on pursuing BAE Systems 
dealings in other countries. 
 
Transparency International found that the widespread and legal use of 
commissions and agents in the arms trade is more often than not a way 
of hiding corrupt and/or illegal practices (Courtney, 2002).  This was 
largely the case in the South African arms deal.  The United Kingdom’s 
Serious Fraud Office, believing that BAE Systems would use the same 
method of doing business that it had in Saudi Arabia – i.e. the use of 
slush funds to pay ‘commissions’ and bribes – unearthed a web of 
companies which were used by BAE Systems to pay £75 million (an 
approximate R1 billion) in commissions to six entities for provision of 
consulting services during the South African arms deal process.  One of 
                                                 
59
 The Guardian, 11 September 2003 
60
 Accessed on 07 January 2009 
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the entities identified is Hlongwane Consulting, owned by Fana 
Hlongwane, who was the advisor to Mr. Joe Modise while he was the 
Minister of Defence.  The other entities named are: Brookland 
Management, Huderfield Enterprises, Osprey Aerospace, Kayswell 
Services and FTNSA Consulting.61  Fana Hlongwane allegedly received 
£3 million, while Richard Charter, owner of Osprey Aerospace, allegedly 
received almost £27 million, and Jules Pelissier received an alleged £34 
million, in payment for services rendered to BAE Systems (Feinstein, 
2007).  The investigation into BAE Systems role in the arms deal is 
ongoing. 
 
Sweden’s public prosecutor launched an investigation into whether there 
had been corruption in the joint marketing by BAE Systems and SAAB of 
the Gripen fighter (www.guardian.co.uk62).  A TV documentary in 
Sweden revealed allegations in 2007 of corruption in arms deals 
between the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium and the Czech Republic 
and Hungary.  The programme suggested that SAAB might have used 
similar tactics in the South African arms deal (Feinstein, 2007).   
 
There is evidence that it was not only the BAE Systems/SAAB 
consortium that was involved in bribery and other illegal practices in the 
arms deal.  Der Spiegel (05 February 2007) revealed that Mr. Chippy 
Shaik had solicited US$3 million from ThyssenKrupp, the leading 
member of the German Frigate Consortium that is supplying the four 
corvettes.  In true German professionalism, the company had minutes 
taken of the meeting with Mr. Shaik when he requested the bribe and the 
journalist was able to substantiate his claims.  I will however not dwell 
here on the German role in the arms deal primarily as SARM (and most 
of the six precious metal beneficiation offsets projects discussed in this 
thesis) are projects initiated by the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium. 
  
                                                 
61
 Mail & Guardian, January 12-18, 2007 
62
 Accessed 07 January 2009 
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The British Guardian newspaper’s website63 reports that the United 
Kingdom Serious Fraud Office continues to investigate BAE Systems in 
various countries.  Frequently the authorities in those countries are also 
involved in the process: 
• In Switzerland an official inquiry into possible BAE Systems 
money laundering was declared.  This followed attempts by the 
United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office to access Swiss bank 
accounts linked to two Saudi Arabia intermediaries. 
• In Chile, a combined effort between Chilean, British and United 
States authorities are probing payments allegedly made to the 
now deceased Augusto Pinochet. 
 
The company is also being investigated for suspected corruption in a 
deal with Tanzania, in which commissions of more than 29% has been 
paid (The Guardian, 13 November 2006).  Investigations of BAE 
Systems’ deals in Romania, Chile and the Czech Republic, as well as 
South Africa are ongoing (The Guardian, 15 December 2006).    
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In its aim to illustrate one of the factors in the context in which SARM 
was founded, existed and folded - the 1998 arms deal offsets – this 
chapter briefly described the history of the South African arms industry 
and the arms procurement processes followed by the South African 
Department of Defence.  The risks of corruption and coercion was also 
highlighted in a description of the 1998 arms deal, its main characters, 
events and the political fall-out as a result of it.   
 
SARM was also founded in the context of South Africa’s reassessment 
of the mining industry and mining legislation and the resulting drive for 
the local beneficiation of (in particular) precious metals mined in the 
country.  The next chapter discusses that context.  The chapter defines 
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and discusses beneficiation and the need for beneficiation, before 
describing each of the six of the other beneficiation-related NIP projects 
in the country.  These projects are: The Musuku Beneficiation Systems, 
which was located in Virginia, Free State Province; the Harmony 
Jewellery School, located in Virginia, Free State Province, owned by 
Harmony Gold Mining Company; the Oro-Maska jewellery manufacturing 
plant, which was established in October 2001 in Virginia, Free State 
Province; the Silplat platinum jewellery factory, which is located in Cape 
Town and was established in 2004 as a result of collaboration between 
Implats64 and Silmar SpA, a leading Italian Jewellery manufacturer; the 
Gold Advance Scheme, which has recently come into play (and which 
was withdrawn after performing poorly in its pilot form), is a collaborative 
effort between Gold Fields, AngloGold Ashanti and Standard Bank to 
provide a gold advance scheme to gold jewellery manufacturers in South 
Africa; and the Filk Gold Chains of South Africa, which forms part of the 
OroAfrica jewellery manufacturer based in Cape Town, has received 
funding from Augusta Westland as part of Augusta’s IP obligations.   
 
These other projects are discussed in their role as a ‘control’ group to 
the SARM evaluation.  All these projects are NIPP (offsets) projects and 
they are also precious metal beneficiation projects.  The reasons why 
some of these projects would succeed and others would fail is important 
to the process of learning more about how offsets can be made 
successful, even if just in a limited form.   
                                                 
64
 Impala Platinum Holdings Limited 
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4 GOLD BENEFICIATION AND NIPP 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In official documents and press releases, SARM was primarily identified 
as a NIP project, and secondly as a gold beneficiation project.  In the 
previous chapter, SARM was described in the context of its geographical 
location and the socio-economic conditions of the local area where it 
was established.  It also described the company’s main founders and 
investors and the background to its failure.  This chapter will look at its 
dimension as a NIP gold beneficiation project. 
 
4.2 Why beneficiation? 
 
History shows us that where the right legislation, policies and institutions 
have emerged in resource-rich countries, mining and beneficiation has 
translated into long-term economic progress and development.  
Resource wealth, in theory at least, should provide an economy with 
enormous benefits (Heeks, 1998) 
 
The export of these resources generates foreign exchange, while 
resource-based operations and the associated profits can be taxed, 
which in turn will generate revenue for the country’s fiscus.  In order to 
avoid the “Dutch disease65”, it is imperative to diversify (Heeks, 1998).   
Three of the main reasons to diversify in the mineral sector are: 
• the cyclical and frequently volatile metal prices, 
• it is a non-renewable industry, and 
• it is environmentally unfriendly and unpopular (Davis, 1999). 
 
                                                 
65
 This phrase refers to Holland’s experience of the loss in manufacturing sector 
competitiveness in the wake of a currency appreciation driven by exports of newly 
discovered gas fields.  In recent years this situation has become known as the ‘natural 
resource curse’.   
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Beneficiation provides South Africa the opportunity to diversify its 
mineral sector.  The country’s comparative advantage in its mining 
activities that provides for proximity to mineral stocks, along with 
additional factors such as the relatively inexpensive electricity costs, 
allows it the opportunity to be competitive in downstream value addition 
(Jourdan, undated; Barcza, undated).   
 
South Africa has dominated the global gold mining industry for the past 
120 years since the discovery of the Witwatersrand goldfields in 1886.  
At peak production in 1970, the country was producing 1000 metric tons 
(t), which was equivalent to two-thirds of global supply at the time.  
Today the industry is in a mature and declining phase with production 
having declined to 342t in 2004.  Many mines are exploiting increasingly 
marginal ore deposits.  Nevertheless, South Africa is currently66 still the 
world’s largest gold producer with three of the largest gold mining 
companies, AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields and Harmony Gold Mining 
Company, being South African.67 
 
As is illustrated in the table below, there is a huge margin between the 
gold produced in South Africa and its closest competitor, the United 
States of America.    The margins of production are smaller between the 
USA, Australia and China.   
                                                 
66
 At the time of writing in 2006.  In 2007, China overtook South Africa. 
67
 www.southafrica.info/business/economy/sectors/mining.htm (accessed on 12 
February 2007) 
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Table 5  Global Gold Production in 2004 
Country Metric tons (t) 
South Africa 342 
USA 260 
Australia 253 
China 220 
Peru 173 
Russia 159 
Canada 129 
Indonesia 100 
Uzbekistan 90 
Papua New Guinea 71 
Ghana 60 
Tanzania 48 
Mali 40 
Chile 39 
Brazil 34 
Colombia 30 
Argentina 27 
Mexico 24 
Kazakstan 22 
Kyrgyztan 22 
Source: Raw Materials Group, March 2005 
 
Mining continues to be the single most important earner of foreign 
exchange in the South African economy.   
 
The minerals sector has been impacted on by the dual effects of the 
Rand exchange rate and rising input costs since 2004.  A major 
contributor to the rising cost of production is increasing input costs, 
mainly related to goods and services provided by monopolistic or 
parastatal organisations.  Bulk commodity exporters are not only highly 
sensitive to input costs, but also incur additional costs through 
infrastructure inefficiency.  Water, transport and steel costs have been 
rising steadily, while transport efficiency in particular, has declined 68. 
4.2.1 Legislation 
The myriad of new policies and legislation that came into effect in South 
Africa post-1994, also affected the mining sector.  Key legislation that 
affects the South African gold industry within the post-1994 context, 
particularly within the requirements of beneficiation, poverty alleviation, 
                                                 
68
 Interview with Roger Baxter, Chief Economist, Chamber of Mines, South Africa on 06 
July 2005. 
 151
black economic empowerment, local economic development and skills 
development are: 
• The Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 
2002; 
• The Precious Metals Act No 35 of 2005; 
• The Mineral and Petroleum Royalty Bill; and  
• The Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the 
Mining Industry, generally referred to as the ‘Mining Charter’ 
 
Other legislation that has significant impact on the gold industry does 
exist, but not relevant to this study, and therefore not listed nor 
considered here.   The legislation that pertains the most to this 
evaluation is the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act.   
4.2.1.1 The Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA) 
 
In 1994 it was recognised that the country’s mineral and mining policies 
required review as the majority of the population had largely been 
excluded from participating in the ownership and management of the 
mining industry.   A review of the policies was initiated in April 1995 
resulting in the release of a White Paper: ‘A Minerals and Mining Policy 
of South Africa’ in October 1998.  The contents of the White Paper were 
then incorporated in the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA), which came into effect on 01 
May 2004.   
 
MPRDA deals with the issuing, renewal and administration of 
development rights in the mining sector, while also making provision for 
secondary laws and regulations that will assist in successful 
implementation of the new policies.   
 
The main features of the MPRDA are: 
• A need to transform mineral rights ownership that will allow the 
state to have custodianship thereof, affecting the regulation of 
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access to mineral properties.  Property rights in South Africa 
historically developed from Roman-Dutch law resulting in 
landowners also owning the rights to all minerals in the ground.  
Mineral and surface rights were separable resulting in a situation 
where rights to different minerals on one property were often split 
by multiple inheritances and separate sales.  The intent of the Act 
is to change the situation so that all mineral rights are under state 
custodianship.   
 
• The introduction of the principles of sustainable development in 
an attempt to balance the social, economic and environmental 
spheres of mining within the framework of good governance. 
 
• Ensuring compliance with the legal instruments aimed at 
engineering social change.  
 
The Mining Charter 
 
Section 100(2)(a) of the MPRDA requires the Minister to develop a 
‘Broad-Based Socio-economic Empowerment Charter’69 aimed at 
addressing historical, social and economic inequalities in the South 
African extractive industry.  The Mining Charter stipulates targets for 
transforming the mining industry.  The vision of the Charter is “the 
creation of a globally competitive mining industry that draws on the 
human and financial resources of all South Africa’s people and offers 
real benefits to all South Africans.  The goal of the empowerment charter 
is to create an industry that will proudly reflect the promise of a non-
racial South Africa.”     
 
While the Mining Charter arises from the MPRDA, it also draws on 
several other pieces of legislation to achieve this goal.  These 
legislations are: 
                                                 
69
 In this paper it is referred to as “The Mining Charter”. 
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• The Preferential Procurement Framework Act (Act No. 5 of 2000) 
• The Employment Equity Act (Act No. 55 of 1998) 
• The Competition Act (Act No. 89 of 1998)  
• The Skills Development Act (Act No. 97 of 1998)  
 
The principles contained in the Mining Charter relate to the transfer, over 
a 10-year period, of 26% of South Africa’s mining assets to historically 
disadvantaged South Africans. 
 
The Mining Charter sets out targets and a timetable for, amongst 
others70, the: 
• broad-based black economic empowerment in the areas of 
human resources, skills development, employment equality, 
procurement and beneficiation;  
• community upliftment and other socio-economic issues such as 
migrant labour, housing and living conditions71; and  
• the promotion of value-added production, such as jewellery 
making and other gold fabrication.   
 
Under the Mining Charter, the South African mining industry has 
committed to securing financing to fund participation of historically 
                                                 
70
 There are nine areas of activity: 
• Human resource development 
• Employment equity 
• Migrant labour 
• Mine community and rural development 
• Housing and living conditions 
• Procurement 
• Ownership and joint ventures 
• Beneficiation  
• Reporting. 
71
 Community upliftment issues affecting the industry include contribution towards skills 
development within communities, local development, developing physical infrastructure 
and to share these with communities and providing business opportunities to 
communities through procurement.   
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disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs) in an amount of R100 billion 
within the first five years of the Mining Charter’s tenure.  The Mining 
Charter provides for the review of the participation process after five 
years to determine what further steps, if any, are needed to achieve the 
26% target participation of HDSAs. 
The Mining Scorecard 
 
The requirements of the MPRDA and the Mining Charter are monitored 
via the Mining Scorecard.72  The Scorecard is a formulated standardised 
mechanism for monitoring the empowerment progress of a company.  
The risk of not converting, or of non-compliance, is to forfeit the right to 
mine.   
 
The nine elements of the Mining Scorecard are listed below. Each 
element has a number of sub-requirements: 
1. Human resource development 
2. Employment equity 
3. Migrant labour 
4. Mine community and rural development 
5. Housing and living conditions 
6. Procurement 
7. Ownership and Joint Ventures 
8. Beneficiation 
9. Reporting 
 
For the purposes of this evaluation, beneficiation is the most important 
element. 
 
                                                 
72
 As described in the General Notice GNR 1639, GG 26661 of 13 August 2004. 
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4.3 What is Beneficiation? 
4.3.1 Definition 
4.3.1.1 Industry Definition 
 
Beneficiation of metals is a process which eliminates the first layers of 
waste material in raw ore after it has been mined, delivering an 
upgraded product with higher mineral content to widen its processing 
options.  There are four stages of progressive value addition within the 
beneficiation process from mining to finished products.  The stages are: 
 
• Mining and concentration 
• Processing 
• Refining 
• Primary manufacturing.73 
 
The above is the definition used by industry internationally but it has a 
slightly different meaning in the South African legislation. 
4.3.1.2 South African legislative definition 
 
In the South African legislative sense beneficiation means conversion of 
the extracted minerals and metals into value-added products all the way 
down the value chain (Jourdan, 1993; MPRDA, 2002).  In terms of 
precious metals and minerals, jewellery is the most common, although 
not the only, end product.  
4.3.2 Historical background to beneficiation in South Africa 
 
Gold industry projects in Southern Africa, in particular gold beneficiation 
projects, have been practiced on a small scale some centuries ago.    
 
                                                 
73
 Personal communication with Mr. Tim Buchanan, mining engineer 
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The mining and processing of gold in Southern Africa and even its 
beneficiation and export can be traced to Great Zimbabwe74, 
Mapungubwe75 and Thula Mela76 between AD1000 and AD1640.  
Prospecting and mining were crude but effective, but were to be totally 
overshadowed by the development of large-scale industrial mining from 
the late 19th Century.77  This move to industrial mining also led to 
legislation that prevented the direct beneficiation of gold.  Specifically 
during the last century, the Mining Rights Act No 20 of 1967 has had a 
significant impact on the way the South African gold business has 
developed.  Chapter XVI of this Act prohibits private individuals and 
institutions from holding gold in any form other than bullion (gold) coins78 
or jewellery.  This provision has been revised and changed significantly 
                                                 
74
 Great Zimbabwe was built by late Iron Age African farmers.  It is estimated that 
between 15 and 25 million ounces of gold were mined in the area that is now known as 
Zimbabwe, but little gold has been found in the region’s archaeological sites, 
suggesting that most of it was traded for other goods such as copper, salt, soapstone, 
grain and slaves.  It was abandoned around 1450 AD. 
75
 Mapungubwe is situated near the intersection of the borders of South Africa, 
Botswana and Zimbabwe.  The Mapungubwe Kingdom served as a gold-trading centre 
in southern Africa and had international trading links.  Ivory was traded for gold, salt, 
glass and cloth from Arab lands, India, China and East Africa.  Although gold was not 
mined at Mapungubwe, there were goldsmiths working at the city, producing goods 
from gold imported from Great Zimbabwe.  When Mapungubwe was abandoned in 
approximately 1270 AD, Great Zimbabwe became the new centre of gold trading for 
the next two centuries.   
76
 Thula Mela was located in what is now the Kruger National Park, 17km from the 
confluence of the Limpopo and Levubu Rivers. This was near one of the major trade 
routes of the time which linked the interior to the coast.  It was inhabited from mid 13th 
century to the mid 17th century AD.  Evidence at this site indicates that gold was 
definitely melted and worked, even though there is no evidence of mining in the area, 
leading to the conclusion that this gold also came from Great Zimbabwe and/or from 
trade with regions further north in Africa.   
77
 Telephonic interview with Lebo Mogotsi, Anglogold Ashanti, 12 October 2004 
78
 These gold coins are usually 22 or 24 carat.  All gold coins minted in South Africa are 
legal tender.  They include Kruger Rands, the Natura coin series, Protea coins and the 
R1 and R2 coin series.   
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in the post-1994 legislation.  In 2005 the Mining Rights Act No 20 of 
1967 was replaced with the Precious Metals Act No 35 of 2005.  
 
The development of gold beneficiation projects has been planned since 
the 1980s by the South African government, but it is only since the mid 
1990s that there has been a strong movement to establish them.79     
 
4.3.3 Current gold beneficiation 
 
The gold beneficiation debate is based on the argument that the South 
African beneficiation of gold is currently less than 2% of current mine 
production.   
 
The table below verifies this for the gold industry and further indicates 
that a very small proportion of most precious metals are beneficiated 
through to the last stage of manufacturing.   
 
Table 6  Beneficiation stages of precious metals 
Commodity Ores/Concentrates 
(Stage 1) 
Processed/refined 
ore (stage 2) 
Primary 
manufacture 
Finished 
manufacture 
Gold 100% 100% 5% 2% 
Diamonds 100% 100% 6% - 
Platinum 100% 100% - 6% 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, as quoted in Baxter, 2005. 
 
No diamonds are being beneficiated to the last stages in South Africa, 
and only 6% of completed platinum end-products produced.  The 
platinum end-products would primarily service the demand from the 
automotive industry.  This is due to the growth in new vehicle sales, a 
higher demand for diesel vehicles in the light of the ever-increasing oil 
prices and tighter emissions legislation world-wide.   
End-uses of gold in South Africa include jewellery, coins, dental alloys 
and electronic components.80 
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 Telephonic interview with Dr. P. Jourdan, erstwhile Research Director, DTI; CEO of 
Mintek until October 2007; face-to-face interviews with Dr. Jourdan on 08 July 2005 
and 07 February 2006 
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The figure below, sourced from Genesis Analytics, demonstrates the 
South African gold value chain.  The figures are that of fiscal year 2006. 
Figure 3 South Africa Gold Value Chain 
 
Source: Genesis Analytics 
 
As the table below demonstrates, the non-jewellery end-use sectors for 
gold are small, accounting collectively for 0.87% of South African gold 
mine output in 2004 and 0.49% of global consumption in these sectors 
(Virtual Metals, 2005).   
 
Table 7  Fine gold usage in SA in 2004 
Fine gold usage in SA  
(non-jewellery applications) 
Metric tons (t) % of global 
fabrication 
Coin/medal fabrication 2.93 1.98 
Dental alloys 0.04 0.07 
Electronics 0.01 0.004 
Total 2.98 0.49 
Source: Virtual Metals, 2005:102 
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 Personal communication with Mr. Denzel Young, CEO of Musuku Refinery, 12 July 
2005 
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4.3.3.1 Beneficiation in terms of the Mining Charter 
 
Mining companies’ core competencies lie in stages one and two of the 
beneficiation process: 
• mining and concentration, and 
• processing. 
 
Mining companies operating within South Africa are however now legally 
required in terms of the MPRDA to be involved with downstream 
processes and to report their activities.  Section 2(f) of MPRDA states 
that one of the fundamental objectives of the Act is to “promote 
employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all South 
Africans”. It is argued that value-adding to South African minerals can 
increase employment opportunities for the wider population.  The Act 
further states in Section 26 that “the Minister may initiate or prescribe 
incentives to promote the beneficiation of minerals within the Republic”.  
 
In terms of all the provisions captured in the Mining Charter, which was 
drawn primarily from the requirements of the MPRDA, the provision on 
beneficiation is unique in that: 
• it is the only provision that does not have to be met in full in order 
for mining companies to qualify for conversion to new-order81 
mining rights.  
• It is also the only provision which can be used by companies to 
offset commitments on historically disadvantaged South African 
ownership.  The Charter allows companies to offset a proportion 
of this requirement82 against their beneficiation activities.   
 
                                                 
81
 In line with the new legislation that gives the state control over the access to minerals 
in South Africa. 
82
 This relates to the transfer, over a 10-year period, of 26% of South Africa’s mining 
assets to historically disadvantaged South Africans. 
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Mining companies are required to “identify their current levels of 
beneficiation” and to “indicate to what extent they can grow the baseline 
level of beneficiation.”   At the time of writing neither the extent of 
beneficiation nor the beneficiation levels to be achieved in order to 
qualify for offset of historically disadvantaged South African ownership, 
had been determined.   
 
Amongst the weaknesses within the MPRDA and the Mining Charter 
related to beneficiation, it is however the lack of a definitive definition of 
beneficiation captured within the Act or the Mining Charter, that is 
highlighted the most.  It is currently open to interpretation.  This 
vagueness leaves this particular aspect of the Mining Charter open to 
misuse.  There is also an absence of a mechanism to detect “fronting” 
by the mining companies. 
 
The intention of the MPRDA is that the possibility of offsetting historically 
disadvantaged South African ownership against beneficiating initiatives, 
combined with the provisions of Section 2683, will lead to a situation 
where mining companies who traditionally exported raw products, will 
consider local value-addition first.  There is also a possibility that multi-
nationals might consider taking advantage of the situation and invest in 
new, or perhaps relocate their existing, value-adding facilities to South 
Africa.   
 
One of the main objectives of the NIPP is to encourage direct foreign 
investment into South Africa.  The main catalyst of this investment 
should be the NIPP obligors and the vehicle for such investment would 
be a business venture that would be beneficial for the country.  DTI 
guidelines indicate that business proposals linked with NIPP and offsets 
should be made on the principles of mutual benefit and good business 
sense (DTI, 2001). 
                                                 
83
 This section states that “the Minister may initiate or prescribe incentives to promote 
the beneficiation of minerals with the Republic.” 
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4.4 NIPP Beneficiation Projects 
4.4.1 Background 
This section looks at the various NIP projects located nationally that are 
also beneficiation projects.   
 
In general, NIP projects are located throughout all, but one province, 
with the Gauteng Province being the most popular location for these 
projects.84  This is understandable as Gauteng Province is the most 
dominant province in the country in terms of economic activity.  The 
Northern Cape Province has reportedly no NIP projects as the vastness 
of the area and its relative remoteness from the rest of South Africa is 
considered to be negative aspects.  At only a gross geographic product 
of R10.9 billion during the 2002/2003 fiscal year, it might have been to 
the province’s advantage to receive foreign direct investment through a 
NIP project. 
 
In 2004 the geographic spread of the NIP projects was as follows: 
Table 8 Geographic spread of NIP projects in 2004 
Province Number of NIP projects 
Western Cape 22 
Eastern Cape 19 
Limpopo  6 
Mpumalanga  3 
KwaZulu-Natal 15 
North West  3 
Free State  3 
Gauteng 55 
Source:  Mr. Zikode, DTI, Interview 08 December 2004 
 
Earlier NIPP reports indicated that there were three NIP projects in the 
Free State, but the NIPP 2005 Annual Report only two projects were 
listed for the Free State.  The two projects were described as a gold 
beneficiation project and a machine tool manufacturing project.  
However, neither of these projects was named or contributed to any 
specific obligor.  There are various possibilities as to which gold 
beneficiation project the report refers to.  It could be the Musuku 
                                                 
84
 Telephonic interview with Mr. Zikode, DTI, 08 December 2004 
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Beneficiation Systems, even though by all accounts the NIPP obligor, 
BAE Systems/SAAB, stopped being involved directly with Musuku 
Beneficiation Systems in 2001, another possibility could be the US$400 
000 made available to Harmony Jewellery School in 2002/2003 as part 
of its offset obligations; or then of course SARM.  
 
The table below indicates the projected values as listed in the October 
2003 Portfolio Committee Report.  Although only eight of the nine 
provinces would benefit from NIPP, only seven are listed in the table.  
The North West Province is not listed at all.   
 
Table 9  Regional Data of the IP programme: the projected values from the Portfolio 
Committee Report, 2003 
Province Projected Value up 
to 2011 -investments, 
exports, local sales 
(US$ value) 
Direct jobs up to 
2011 
Percentage 
allocation of 
performance per 
region 
Western Cape 4,141,415,920 3,314 37.20% 
KwaZulu-Natal 4,886,190,048 1,201 4.51% 
Eastern Cape 3,177,770,461 2,435 1.60% 
Free State 1,651,400,000 2,100 1.33% 
Gauteng 5,621,256,713 3,216 42.59% 
Mpumalanga    762,500,000    230 6.76% 
Limpopo    909,990,000    880 6.01% 
Total 21,150,523,142 13,376 100% 
Source: www.dti.gov.za/parlimentary/2003 ; accessed on 12 June 2005 
 
It is also interesting to note that there appears to be no direct correlation 
between the amount of money invested in a project and the direct 
permanent jobs it would create by 2011.  A reason for this could be that 
while some of the projects require high capital costs in terms of having to 
purchase complex plants and machinery, these projects are not 
necessarily high in employment creation.    In terms of metal production 
projects, it is the down-stream processing that is labour intensive. 
 
There are five discrete phases in the beneficiation value chain from 
primary production to finished product.  These are: 
• Extraction of raw material  
• Refining and processing of raw materials  
• Component manufacture 
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• Sub-assembly 
• Original equipment manufacture 
 
Each of these phases has a different level of employment intensity, for 
example: the extraction (mining) phase provides for high employment, 
while the refining and processing phase consists of complex plants with 
low employment intensity:  
The South African gold mining industry employs substantially more 
people than other gold mining countries because it engages in deep-
level, hard rock, underground mining, which is labour intensive.  Despite 
declining employment levels, gold mining still accounts for the largest 
proportion (95.33%) of employees by far in the gold value chain (Virtual 
Metals, 2005). 
   
Refiners process raw material to separate the impurities and create the 
fine gold in the form of gold bars or semi-fabricated products, such as 
gold grain, sheet and wire used in jewellery and coin manufacture or for 
dental and industrial use.  The refining processes are largely 
mechanized and provide fewer employment opportunities. 
 
The third phase, component manufacture, is labour intensive.  Jewellery 
manufacturing falls into this category because it is the end process for 
specific processed parts of the metal.  Some of the precious metals that 
will not find its way to jewellery manufacturing will be used to 
manufacture parts, such as catalytic converters, that will be used as 
parts of original equipment (cars).   
 
Thus it would make sense that jewellery manufacturing requires less 
capital input than for example a ferrochrome beneficiation project85.  Yet, 
                                                 
85
 BAE/SAAB’s Ferrochrome beneficiation project located at Buffelsfontein mine, North 
West Province, required an investment of R2.1 billion, plus technology, but will only 
create approximately 960 full-time jobs.  (DTI, 2007) 
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the jewellery manufacturer will employ more people than the 
ferrochrome beneficiation plant, which is mostly mechanized. 
 
There are eight precious metal beneficiation projects nationally that were 
initiated under the NIPP programme:   
• Two of these projects were research and development projects 
through Mintek and the Musuku Beneficiation System and were 
linked to BAE Systems/SAAB.   
• A small grant to the Harmony Jewellery School was a third 
project, also linked to BAE Systems/SAAB.   
• Four of these projects are precious metal jewellery factories, of 
which two no longer exist.  SARM, a gold beneficiation NIP 
project, was one of these failed projects.  The two that are still 
operational were founded on factories that already existed prior to 
the changes in mining legislation and/or the NIPP, and have solid 
business principles behind them.   The NIPP obligors for these 
two projects are respectively Agusta Westland and BAE 
Systems/SAAB. 
• The eighth project is the Gold Advance Scheme which has 
completed its pilot phase, but has not moved on to full 
implementation. 
4.4.2 Musuku Beneficiation Systems 
Musuku86 Benefician Systems started operations in 2002 and was 
closed in December 2006.  The refinery was based in Virginia, Free 
State Province.  The company consisted of a gold refinery and a gold 
processing factory focused exclusively on value addition.  It was a 
subsidiary of the Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited, the third 
largest gold mining company in South Africa and the sixth largest in the 
world.  Harmony Gold Mining Company is to date the only87 gold 
                                                 
86
 Musuku is a Venda word meaning ‘gold’. 
87
 Rand Refinery, the primary refinery in South Africa, has been in existence since 
1921 and is a collaborative effort of AnglogoldAshanti (53%), Gold Fields (33%), 
DRDGold (10%), AvGold (2%) and Western Areas (2%).  Gold that is refined here are 
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producer in South Africa that had refined and marketed their own gold 
exclusively.   
4.4.2.1 Funding and Ownership 
 
At the time of its closure, Harmony Gold Mining Company was the sole 
owner of the Musuku.  Since the establishment of Musuku, a 20% equity 
share had been reserved for an empowerment partner, but up to the 
time of the company’s closure, no empowerment partner had been 
identified. 
Mintek 
 
Initially newspaper reports lauded Musuku as South Africa’s first gold 
public-private partnership (PPP) between Mintek, South Africa’s state-
owned mineral and metallurgical services organization, and Harmony 
Gold Mining Company.88  However, within the first year of operations, 
Mintek had withdrawn from the business.  The main reason for this was 
the difference in approach by the two entities.  Harmony Gold Mining 
Company preferred to run Musuku as a utility, while Mintek wanted it to 
be a profit centre.  From that point onwards its involvement with Musuku 
was limited to collaboration on specific projects with Musuku.89  Indeed 
Harmony Gold Mining Company never commercialized Musuku by 
refining for other mining companies.  Hundred percent of its raw material 
was locally sourced from the company’s mines.  In contrast, Rand 
Refinery also sources raw material from other African countries, 
primarily Ghana, Mali, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. 
                                                                                                                                  
sourced from all South African gold mines as well as from mines in other countries, 
such as Ghana, Mali, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
88
 Mining Weekly, April 28, 2003 
89
 Interview with Dr. P. Jourdan, Mintek, on 08 July 2005. This was confirmed in an 
interview with Mr. Young, Musuku, on 12 July 2005 
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BAE Systems/SAAB Consortium 
 
As part of their offset obligations, the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium 
funded Harmony Gold Mining Company with US$9 million in 2001 to 
upgrade the machinery and plant in the planned refinery to enable it to 
refine gold to a purity of 99.99%.  The funding also provided the financial 
backing for the gold in its downstream journey into gold wire, strip, alloys 
and associated products for supply to gold jewellery manufacturers.   
 
It would appear as if not all of this specific funding from the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium was used and there were reports that 
Musuku would repay the unspent portion of the money to the funders.90  
I asked Messrs. Young, CEO of Musuku, and Dippenaar, director of 
Harmony Gold Mining Company until 2005, about the reported 
remaining funds which reportedly would be repaid to BAE 
Systems/SAAB, and it appeared as if they were unaware of either the 
remaining funds or the repayment commitment.  Even though feedback 
on the issue was promised, none was forthcoming despite frequent 
reminders of the request for this information.    
 
A query sent to Mr. Linden Birns, South Africa spokesperson for BAE 
Systems/SAAB, about the issue of this unspent funding remained 
unanswered, but he did comment that “Musuku, which came before 
SARM, is recognized by the DTI as a NIP project as it was financed by 
BAE Systems/SAAB.  Musuku remains the core of our beneficiation 
strategy successfully producing a range of gold beneficiated projects” 
(E-mail from Linden Birns, 15 September 2005). 
 
If the Mining Weekly’s report was accurate, I suspect that some of this 
money was earmarked for the Oro-Maska project (discussed below) that 
followed VDO in 2001 and which was a complete failure.  It is of course 
also a possibility that Oro-Maska received its own individual NIPP 
                                                 
90
 The Mining Weekly, April 16-22, 2004 
 167
funding, and that even if any monies were paid back to the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium by Musuku, the NIPP obligor would still 
receive its full complement of credits based on the original amount of 
funding made available to Musuku. 
 
The NIPP credit system awards credits accumulatively over the NIP 
obligation period and based upon successful performance.  It measures 
each credit as equal to one US dollar of the NIP obligation amount.  
Thus irrespective of whether the full amount was used for Musuku or 
not, or whether the project was successful or not, the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium is credited for the initial full amount made 
available to the project.   
 
In the 2004 NIPP annual report reported that the BAE Systems/SAAB 
consortium achieved 149% of its investment milestone.  This milestone 
included amongst other, Musuku Beneficiation Systems.   
The 2005/2006 NIPP annual report also reported that the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium had met their first milestone of US$2.3 billion 
worth of credits.  Gold beneficiation is listed as one of the main types of 
contributing projects that allowed them to achieve the milestone (DTI, 
2007:24). 
Production 
  
At its production peak the refinery could produce in excess of 100 metric 
tons (mt) of refined gold per annum.  During its lifespan, it also 
developed 15 product lines in four sectors: 
• Gold bullion bars – large, small and granules 
• Jewellery alloy, including plate, strip, grain and wire manufactured 
in 9ct to 18ct yellow, white and red gold for casting or bench work, 
fine silver granules and crystals, sterling silver and low-tarnish 
sterling silver, solders as poste or blocks in gold, silver and 
platinum, bangles, wedding and blank coins, semi-manufactured 
and custom-made orders; 
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• Industrial gold and silver, including silver anodes for the electro-
plating industry as well as 99.99% gold for high-purity 
applications, gold fuse wire and connections; 
• Dental alloys, including an extensive range of casting and 
bonding alloys, solders and wire meeting restoration 
requirements. (Harmony, 2006) 
 
During 2005 it produced 62.82 mt of fine gold but production dropped to 
its 2006 production level of only 29.17mt fine gold.  This drop in 
production was due to Musuku stopping its production in the second half 
of the year.  The main reason for this was Harmony Gold Mining 
Company’s continued losses since late 2005, despite a buoyant gold 
price and a relatively stable Rand.  The company was forced to close 
down some shafts and this caused its production to decline, which in 
turn lowered refinery throughput at Musuku.   
 
In 2006, 93.59% of the refinery’s raw material was sourced from 
Harmony Gold Mining Company’s South African mines and 6.41% from 
processing scrap from the mining company’s jewellery school and other 
concerns.  Ninety-seven percent of the gold was used to produce 400oz 
gold bars, all of which were exported, while the rest of the gold went into: 
• coin blanks – 0.04% 
• jewellery semis – 0.69% 
• dental products – 1.50%, and 
• industrial alloys – 0.01%.91 
 
During the last months of 2006 Harmony Gold Mining Company started 
using the services of Rand Refinery and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future.92   
                                                 
91
 Interview with Michael Wightman, erstwhile Manager, Musuku Beneficiation Systems, 
on 26 March 2007 
92
 Interview with De Wet Schutte, Executive Manager New Business, Harmony Gold 
Mining Company, on 03 April 2007 
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At the time of its closure, Musuku employed 64 people.93 
Hydrometallurgical technology and production 
 
South Africa is emerging as a world leader in hydrometallurgical 
technology.  
 
Mintek, the state-owned mineral and metallurgical services organization, 
develops cost-effective methods for mineral extraction, upgrading and 
optimization, which includes leaching, precipitation, extraction, electro-
winning and gold-recovery processes.94  In its refining process, Musuku 
used the Mintek-developed Minataur technology.  Minataur technology 
eliminates the smelting process that usually results in doré95 and 
converts sludge to what is known as four-nines (99.99% pure gold) in a 
24-hour period using four machines for casting, stamping and then 
weighing the refined bullion.96 
 
During the 2002/2003 fiscal year, the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium 
funded a research and development project aimed at producing new 
gold processing technologies.  The research was done by Mintek in co-
operation with Harmony Gold Mining Company and Musuku.  The new 
technologies would include new alloys and powder metallurgy.  The 
funding totalled US$1 million and formed part of BAE Systems/SAAB’s 
offset obligations.  The products of this project would be commercialized 
by Harmony Gold Mining Company (DTI, 2003; Harmony, 2003).   
                                                 
93
 Interview with Michael Wightman, erstwhile Manager, Musuku Beneficiation 
Systems, on 26 March 2007 
94
 Telephonic interview with Dr. P. Jourdan, erstwhile Research Director, DTI; CEO of 
Mintek in 2004 
95
 Conventionally gold arrives from the mine site in doré form.  Doré is impure alloy of 
gold and silver produced at a mine to be refined to a higher purity, usually consisting of 
an average of 85% gold. 
96
 Personal communication with Denzel Young while visiting Musuku Beneficiation 
Systems, 12 July 2005 
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It was anticipated that Harmony Gold Mining Company would market the 
technology through Musuku Beneficiation Systems.  It was impossible to 
establish whether these technologies were produced, whether they were 
successful and whether all three of the collaborators would benefit from 
the sale of these products.  Critics of the offset package have raised 
questions regarding the beneficial access that the BAE Systems/SAAB 
consortium has to Mintek technology, the potential technology credits it 
could claim, as well as the long-term intellectual property implications 
(Haines, 2004). 
 
As certain types of projects, such as research and development are 
awarded double credits, the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium would have 
benefited through double credits from any initiative it funded through 
Mintek, whether the technologies were produced or not.   
4.4.3 Harmony Jewellery School 
Harmony Gold Mining Company established a jewellery school on its 
premises in Virginia in September 2000 with 20 pupils, with the first 12 
students graduating in December 2003.   
 
The BAE Systems/SAAB consortium provided funding of US$400 000 to 
the jewellery school in 2002/2003 as part of its offset obligations.  The 
money was made available to purchase capital equipment and to fund a 
bursary scheme (DTI, 2003).  Apart from Harmony Gold Mining 
Company97 and the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium funding, the school 
received additional funding from the Italian government through the 
United Nations Office for project services.98  
 
                                                 
97
 According to Alta Wessels, Project Manager of the Harmony Jewellery School, 
Harmony’s total investment in jewellery design and manufacturing is estimated to be in 
the region of R4 million between 2000 and 2006.  Interviewed on 16 March 2006. 
98
 Interview with Alta Wessels, Project Manager, Harmony Jewellery School, on 16 
March 2006 
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By 2004 the Central University of Technology99 (CUT) received 
permission from the Department of Education to offer the National 
Diploma in Jewellery Design at the premises of the Harmony Jewellery 
School.  The school now operates as a satellite campus of the University 
(Harmony, 2004). 
4.4.5 Oro-Maska 
Oro-Maska, a jewellery manufacturing plant, was established in October 
2001 in Virginia, Free State Province.  
4.4.5.1 Investors 
 
The partners in this venture included Harmony Gold Mining Company, 
the IDC, the Free State Development Corporation (FDC) and BAE 
Systems.  The fifth partner, who had a 51% stake in the company, 
appears to have been the Bhagwanji Group from Dubai.  Although the 
media named this fifth partner to be a London-based gold retail 
company, G5 (International Mail and Guardian, October 04, 2002; The 
Tribune Chandigarh India, October 06, 2002);  official reports named the 
main partner to be the Bhagwanji Group from Dubai (The Harmony Gold 
Mining Company 2001 and 2002 annual reports; the “2002/2003-
2004/2005 Medium Term Expenditure Framework Budget for 
Department of Tourism, Environmental Economic Affairs to the Free 
State Legislature delivered in April 2002; 
http://www.bulletinonline.co.za/archives/specfeat/aprfeat02.php).   
 
It is not known what amount the main partner invested in the venture, 
but it is reported that the IDC invested R4.5 million and the FDC R15 
million, while Harmony Gold Mining Company provided the buildings and 
would provide the gold via the Musuku Beneficiation Systems’ refinery.  
The BAE Systems/SAAB consortium invested US$4.5 million as part of 
their offset obligations.    
                                                 
99
 Previously known as the Free State Technikon. 
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4.4.5.2 Operations 
 
From October 2001 to February 2002 the company recruited 110 Indian 
goldsmiths and designers who were brought to Virginia with the intention 
that they would impart knowledge and train local goldsmiths and factory 
workers as part of the skills transfer aspect of the offset.  They were 
housed by Harmony Gold Mining Company. 
 
In February 2002 the factory started operations to test the machinery 
employing the Indian expatriates.  It is not clear whether any local 
people were employed to work in the factory with the Indian expatriates 
during this time.  By May the same year the factory ground to a halt.  It is 
not clear why this happened.  Mr. Max Makhubalo, Managing Director of 
FDC, was quoted in the Mail and Guardian as saying that the failure of 
the factory was due to an “unfortunate coincidence”.  Mr Ferdi 
Dippenaar, Marketing Director of Harmony Gold Mining Company, was 
quoted as saying that there was a debacle with the major shareholder.100  
At some stage during the months following the stopping of productions in 
May and September 2002, the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium 
cancelled its loan to the company.  It is unclear what happens in a 
situation like this one when an obligor cancels a loan.  It appears as if 
the obligor is credited whether the initiative is successful or not, but it is 
unclear what happens to the money.  Would the funds return to the 
obligor’s obligation in order to be invested in another venture, or does 
the money just revert back into BAE Systems/SAAB’s coffers as the 
offset credits had already been earned? 
 
The Indian goldsmiths and designers were sent home in stages, either 
being deported by the State or through funding made available by FDC.   
 
I was not able to find any information on G5 International or the 
Bhagwanji Group on the internet, nor were my phone calls to Mr. 
Makhubalo returned.  Mr. Dippenaar only referred to it as an incident of 
                                                 
100
 Mail and Guardian, 04 October 2002 
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choosing a bad partner to initiate a project, and that Harmony Gold 
Mining Company stopped the project in 2002 and put their energies into 
planning their new project, South African Royal Manufacturers 
(SARM).101   
 
Oro-Masaka was not mentioned in the 2002 NIPP Annual Report, nor in 
the 2002 Harmony Gold Mining Company annual report.   
4.4.6 Silplat 
Another mineral beneficiation project forming part of the NIPP and 
involving a mining company was established in Cape Town in early 
2004.   
 
The 2004 DTI NIPP report describes this project as follows: 
 
Table 10   Silmar Platinum Jewellery NIP project 
Silmar102 Platinum Jewellery 
Product: Platinum jewellery 
Sector: Value-added beneficiation 
Benefits: Investment in equity to ensure adequate capitalization. 
Increased local production of platinum jewellery for export. 
Technology transfer 
Local company involved: Implats 
SA Link 
Silplat 
Total investment: US$ 47 million 
Projected sales: US$ 591 million 
Location: Cape Town, Western Cape 
Other benefits: 120 jobs created/sustained 
Source: DTI 2004 report, p. 26 
 
The NIPP obligor is BAE Systems/SAAB. 
 
                                                 
101
 Mr. Ferdi Dippenaar, Harmony Gold Mining Company, telephone conversation, 15 
March 2005 
102
 According to Implats’ website, the new company is called “Silplat (Pty) Ltd”, and that 
Silmar is an already existing Italian-based company. 
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4.4.6.1 Ownership 
 
This project is a gold and platinum beneficiation project and is a result of 
collaboration between Impala Platinum Holdings Limited (Implats) and a 
leading Italian jewellery manufacturer, Silmar SpA.  Other shareholders 
include a local jewellery producer, SA Link Company, and the specialist 
corporate finance house, Microfin Corporate Services.  The BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium provides the equity and further loans as part 
of their NIPP offset obligations.  It is interesting to note that although the 
venture is said to have received a combined foreign and local 
investments worth US$25 million103, the DTI 2004 NIPP Annual Report 
list the project as receiving investment worth US$ 47 million from the 
BAE Systems/SAAB consortium alone, excluding local investment. 
Silmar SpA 
 
Silmar SpA is Italian-based and was established in 1977.  The company 
reports to have an annual turnover exceeding US$100 million.  Apart 
from selling platinum products, the company also ranks among the 
world’s top five producers of gold chain products, with the USA and Asia 
among its main markets.  The company also specializes in jewellery 
manufacturing processes and technologies (www.silmar.it104).   
 
Silmar SpA provides the Silplat venture with the specialized equipment, 
technology and skill training required by the factory.  It is further 
expected that Silmar SpA will support the Silplat project by not only 
sharing their knowledge and technology, but also by sharing its global 
network of wholesale and retail partners, thus providing Silplat access to 
platinum and gold jewellery markets.105 
                                                 
103
 Implats Press Release, April 07, 2004 
104
 Accessed on May, 12, 2007 
105
 Implats Press Release, April 07, 2004 
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Implats 
 
Impala Platinum Holdings Limited (Implats) is the world’s largest 
platinum producing company.  In Financial Year 2007 the company 
produced 2.03million ounces of platinum and 3.86million ounces of 
platinum group metals.106  
 
Platinum is considered to be the most precious of all metals and 
platinum jewellery currently accounts for 38% of global demand of the 
metal.  South Africa has 70% of the world’s platinum reserves, but 
produces less than 0.5% of its platinum jewellery.107  Currently the most 
important markets for platinum jewellery are China, Japan, Europe and 
the USA.  Previously the platinum jewellery industry in South Africa was 
constrained by limited access to the raw material combined by the high 
cost of the working capital (www.implats.co.za108). 
 
Implats holds an equity interest of 17.5% in Silplat and provides a 
platinum loan.  The provision of the loan ensures that there is a sufficient 
supply of raw platinum to the factory. 
SA Link 
 
SA Link, a small business owned and managed by the Marine family, 
was established in 1977 in Cape Town.  It specialized in gold cast rings, 
earrings and pendants that were exported to the USA and the UK.  The 
company was operating from the same premises109 that now houses 
Silplat.  
 
At the time of the formation of Silplat, SA Link had 120 permanent staff 
members.  The new venture absorbed all the SA Link employees 
                                                 
106
 Mr. Johan Smit, CEO, Silplat, interviewed on 31 August 2007 
107
 Engineering News, November 05, 2004 
108
 Accessed on May 12, 2007 
109
 79 Roeland Street, Cape Town. 
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(Implats, 2004; Interview with Mr Johan Smit, CEO of Silplat, on 31 
August 2007).   
4.4.6.2 Management 
 
During the first few months of Silplat’s operation it was managed by SA 
Link’s existing management.  However, the larger company started to 
flounder under this team, who only had the experience of managing a 
small, family-owned company and not a large, multifaceted company.  
By February 2005 a new management team was introduced and the old 
team remained on for a few more months to assist with training and 
knowledge-sharing.  This change in management turned around the 
down-ward spiral which the company experienced in its first few months 
of operation.110 
 
4.4.7 Gold Advance Scheme111 
4.4.7.1 Background 
 
The South African jewellery manufacturing industry is constrained, inter 
alia, by the absence of cost-competitive credit facilities for the affordable, 
secure financing of gold.  South Africa’s high interest rate environment 
and the fact that gold cannot be "leased" because of legislation, 
compounds the problem.  Instead, local jewellers must buy gold stock, 
forcing them to also carry the gold price risk.  The high cost and volatile 
price of gold does not make it viable for gold jewellery manufacturers to 
own the gold used in the jewellery manufacturing process or to have it 
tied up in jewellery stock.  The cost of the raw materials is estimated at 
around 90% of the cost of the finished product (Virtual Metals, 2005; 
                                                 
110
 Interview with Mr. Johan Smit, CEO Silplat, on 31 August 2007.  This was confirmed 
by Mr. Derek Engelbrecht, Marketing Manager, Implats, telephone conversation on 12 
September 2007 
111
 Commonly referred to as the ‘gold loan scheme’. 
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Interview with Mr Johan Smit, CEO of Silplat, on 31 August 2007).  This 
is illustrated in the diagram below.    
Figure 4  Value-add along the gold value chain 
 
  Source: Genesis Analytics, 2008, pg.13 
 
All these factors put local jewellery manufacturers at a disadvantage to 
their foreign competitors. 
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In an effort to address this situation and also to participate in a gold 
beneficiation project as they are legally obligated to, two South African 
mining companies, Gold Fields and AngloGold Ashanti, entered an 
agreement to provide a gold advance scheme to gold jewellery 
manufacturers in South Africa.  Their partners in this initiative are 
Standard Bank of South Africa and BAE Systems/SAAB. The gold 
advance scheme is supposed to facilitate the provision of secure and 
cost effective advances of gold to the gold jewellery industry.   
4.4.7.2 Collateral 
 
Although Gold Fields, AngloGold Ashanti and the BAE Systems/SAAB 
consortium will provide the collateral support in the form of two-thirds of 
the guarantees, the jewellers is required to cover the remaining one-third 
guarantee.  The jeweller thus essentially needs to have 120% collateral 
for the gold they want to borrow in addition to paying interest on the 
loan.  The maximum aggregate amount that any one of the three main 
guarantors could be liable in respect of such guarantees is R17 
million.112    
 
The jeweller is also required to provide a business plan, financial 
information spanning at least three years and a general notary bond113 
with a perfection clause stipulating that the bond holder will be entitled to 
obtain possession of the movable asset (the gold) in the occurrence of 
pre-defined events of default.   
 
The scheme will initially cover up to 1 000kg of gold available at interest 
rates below prime, to be advanced to participating manufacturers.  The 
minimum amount of gold that can be borrowed through the scheme at 
any one time is 50kg.  This minimum amount of 50kg makes it 
                                                 
112
 Personal communication with Mr. Tim Buchanan, Gold Fields, 12 May 2006; 
supplemented with information in NIPP 2005 report 
113
  This would be the only legal way for the lenders to secure and attach the gold if 
there was a default in payment. 
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impractical and too expensive for smaller manufacturers to participate.  
They would thus automatically be excluded from participating in the 
scheme.  Yet it would not be economically viable for the lenders to make 
amounts of less than 50kg available, especially if the gold is provided at 
below prime interest rates.  Essentially the scheme is flawed. 
 
In South Africa gold is sourced either from Rand Refinery or from one of 
the seven legal recyclers.   While refiners process raw material to 
separate the impurities and create the fine gold in the form of gold bars 
or semi-fabricated products, recyclers process existing product like old 
jewellery, cut-offs and other scrap containing recoverable precious 
metals, recycling these back in to useable semi-fabricated products.  
Large jewellery manufacturers buy approximately 80-100% of the gold 
they need from Rand Refinery, while smaller jewellery manufacturers 
obtain up to 95% of their gold from recyclers.114 
 
Local jewellery manufacturers have to buy their working metal outright 
and they calculate their margins on a basis of a price paid for the gold 
from their suppliers.  They either have to borrow to fund working capital 
or finance the purchase of the gold from their working capital.  Thus 
many jewellers are already heavily in debt and the conditions of the gold 
advance loan too daunting to fulfil.  Added to this is the very high cost of 
security services and insurance in South Africa, which every jeweller is 
obliged to purchase.   
 
The high costs involved in refining scrap has motivated OroAfrica to 
invest in its own small refinery to be used at its premises to recycle their 
scraps left over from processing.  As so many of the larger 
manufacturers, OroAfrica use to send their scraps to Rand Refinery in 
Gauteng for recycling and refining.  In 2006 alone they sent 731kg to 
Rand Refinery.  The transport costs from Cape Town to Johannesburg 
and back to Cape Town combined with the costs of security and 
                                                 
114
 Interview with Bernard Stern, Metal Concentrators, on 01 November 2007 
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insurance became too exorbitant forcing them to spend the money on a 
small refinery for their own use.115  However, very few jewellers would 
be able to do this.   
 
The conditions attached to using the scheme have made the gold 
advance scheme unpopular amongst the jewellery manufacturers. 
4.4.7.3 The end of the pilot phase and the way forward 
 
The project is at the end of its pilot phase and has not as yet awarded a 
single loan.   
 
According to Ms Joanne Jones of AngloGold Ashanti116, the scheme has 
only received two applications during its pilot phase.  Although 
confirming that Silplat is the one applicant, she was not willing to say 
which manufacturer was the second applicant117, citing confidentiality.  
What is clear is that the process is a long and complicated one.  Silplat 
had applied for a loan during October 2006 and it was still being 
processed in December 2007.118 
 
At the 01 November 2007 annual meeting of the Western Cape 
Jewellers Association119 many of the delegates felt that participating in 
the gold advance scheme was too arduous and that the application 
process was too complicated.  They felt that it was primarily aimed at the 
bigger manufacturers and excluded the smaller ones from participating 
due to the conditions attached.  It was clear that there was a lot of 
negativity towards this initiative. 
                                                 
115
 Interview with Gary Nathan, OroAfrica, on 31 August 2007 
116
 Interviewed on 05 and 07 December 2007 
117
 There are rumours that the second applicant is Alan Mair Manufacturing Jewellers, 
but this could not be confirmed. 
118
 Mr. Johan Smit, CEO of Silplat, interviewed on 31 August 2007 
119
 I was kindly invited to attend by Mr. Smit, Chair of the Association.  This provided 
me the opportunity to interact with many of the smaller jewellery manufacturers 
operating in the Western Cape (primarily Cape Town environs).  
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That the right implementation formula for the scheme has not yet been 
found is clear, according to Ms. Jones of AngloGold Ashanti, speaking 
on behalf of the lenders.120  During the last quarter of 2007 the lenders 
had returned to the drawing board in anticipation of finding a product that 
is simplified and more marketable.  They have also approached the IDC 
to come on board in the form of possibly another underwriter.  The 
reasons why the IDC was approached to join the scheme were listed as 
their experience in conducting due diligence, their past interaction and 
work with the jewellery sector and their interest in promoting precious 
metal beneficiation121.       
 
Discussions with the IDC is still ongoing and there is a possibility that 
Silplat’s loan will be made available under this first pilot phase, although 
there is the possibility that it will be carried over to the second pilot 
phase when that is initiated.  No date has been announced. 
 
Updated information gained from the 2008 DTI annual report on NIPP 
indicates that this NIP project has been withdrawn (p.37).  No reasons 
were provided in the report.  Enquiries to the various companies that 
were involved indicated that the companies felt that due to the poor 
performance of the pilot phase of this initiative, it was unlikely that the 
project would be successful. 
 
4.4.8 Filk Gold Chains of South Africa 
 
Filk Gold Chains of South Africa, a gold chain manufacturer, formed part 
of the OroAfrica company. 
 
                                                 
120
 Interviewed on 07 December 2007 
121
 The interview with Ms. Jones was discussed with her counterpart at Gold Fields, Mr. 
Rudi Jordaan, on 11 December 2007.  He confirmed that her statements are accurate. 
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OroAfrica is an unlisted company owned by several parties:  the Nathan 
family, Global Capital/Investec, AngloGold Ashanti, management and 
staff.  The company has a 6000 square meter facility in the old Nationale 
Pers Building in Buitengracht Street in the centre of Cape Town.  The 
complex includes manufacturing space, retail space and offices to house 
local and international buyers.   
4.4.8.1 Background 
 
The company was founded in 1945 in Johannesburg and traded under 
the name: “Efune Brothers”.  It manufactured cast jewellery, in particular 
diamond rings, which were distributed locally.  By 1990 the business’ 
turn-over was approximately R13 million per annum, which had 
escalated to an approximate R120 million per annum in 1997 when a 
management buy-out resulted in the name change from “Efune 
Brothers” to “OroAfrica”.   
 
After the management buy-out, the company raised funding through the 
sale of 25% of the company to Global Capital, a private equity fund 
owning 50% of Investec.  This funding allowed the company to relocate 
to Cape Town.   
 
In late 1998 OroAfrica entered a joint venture with Gruppo Industriale 
Filk Spa of Vincenza, Italy, to form the company called “Filk Gold Chains 
of South Africa”.  This venture forms part of the Agusta Westland NIPP 
offset obligation.  Gruppo Industriale Filk is located in the Vicenza 
province in northeast Italy, where they have three manufacturing plants.  
According to the World Gold Council, it is regarded the world’s largest 
and most technologically advanced manufacturer of gold chains, 
producing 42 tons of gold chain annually.  This was their first (and only 
one so far) venture into Africa.   
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In July 2000, Anglo Gold122, the world’s largest gold producer, 
announced the acquisition of a 25% stake in OroAfrica for R55 million, 
describing the deal as a strategic investment towards their goal to “add 
value to gold through encouraging and driving the development of gold 
product that are of an internationally acceptable standard in terms of 
design, quality, marketing and sales support, to complete successfully in 
international markets, resulting in sustainable growth” (AngloGold 
Ashanti website123). 
 
Filk Gold Chains of South Africa forms only one part of the OroAfrica 
business.   OroAfrica also owns another company, which is located on 
the same premises and which produces jewellery through casting (which 
was the original Efune Brothers business) called Trigold.  The two 
companies together were trading as OroAfrica until mid 2007.  During 
2007 Trigold stopped existing and a new venture, Cinere124, was 
established.125   
 
The Filk Gold Chains of South Africa NIPP obligations also came to an 
end in March 2007. 
 
4.4.8.2 Agusta Westland 
 
Agusta Westland is a merger between Finmeccanica SpA126 of Italy 
(Agusta) and GKN Westland Helicopters, United Kingdom.  The 
companies each own 50% of the newly formed company.  The merger 
                                                 
122
 Now known as AngloGold Ashanti. 
123
 Accessed on 12 February 2006 
124
 The name is bound to change, but at the time of writing, the name change was not 
certain yet. 
125
 Interview with Mr. Gary Nathan, OroAfrica, on 31 August 2007 
126
 Finmeccanica SpA and BAE Systems have also been involved in the merger of 
some subsidiaries and subsequently conducting business together.  No obvious direct 
link between the mergers and the two companies’ South African arms deal contracts 
could be established. 
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became final on 12 February 2001, after a merging agreement was 
drawn up on 26 July 2000.  In 2004 Finmeccanica SpA bought out GKN 
Westland’s 50% stake for one billion Euros.  Finmeccanica SpA of Italy 
(Agusta) is reported to be 32.4% Italian Government-owned.   
DIP 
 
As part of the country’s 1998 weapons purchase, Agusta Westland 
signed an agreement with the South African government to provide thirty 
A109 Light Utility Helicopters (LUH).  The table below details the 
different deals within the arms deal.   
 
Table 11   Arms Deal details 
Programme Sales -local 
& export 
(R million)* 
Technology 
Transfer 
(R million) 
Investments 
(R million) 
Other 
(R million) 
Total 
(R million) 
Corvettes 1,036.9 175.2 5.6 7.8 1224.5 
Submarines 422.6 - - - 422.6 
Helicopters 141.2 85.4 3.9 0.8 231.5 
Hawk 588.3 193.3 1 88.2 870.9 
Gripen 282 457.4 .9 228.7 969 
Total 2,470.1 911.3 11.5 325.6 3,718.5 
* Exchange rates used: US$: 6.25; Euro: 6.4 
Source:  Armscor Annual Report 2002-2003 
 
Agusta Westland’s deal and its offset programme were hardly mentioned 
in the media frenzy that ensued after the announcement of the deal and 
which has continued over the past eight years.  The reason for this could 
be the size of the deal.  It is the smallest deal of the purchase.   
 
Agusta Westland’s Industrial Participation (IP) obligations are about US$ 
1billion.  As part of the agreement five of the LUH was produced and 
assembled in Italy, while the rest of the helicopters are to be produced in 
South Africa by Denel Aviation.  This would be a DIP offset project and 
Denel Aviation will serve as a subcontractor of Agusta Westland.   
 
As part of another DIP project, Augusta Westland has also contracted 
Denel Aviation to build a Swedish order of twenty A 109 helicopters in 
2001. Further the company has contracted Turbomeca Africa, of which 
Denel Aviation owns 49%, for the repair and maintenance of Makila 
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engines, which traditionally powered the Rooivalk attack helicopter and 
which is used in several other aircraft internationally.127   
NIPP obligation 
 
Agusta Westland’s NIP obligations amount to approximately US$50 
million.   
 
As one of its NIPP obligations, Agusta Westland enabled a deal between 
Gruppo Industriale Filk, an Italian jewellery manufacturer, and OroAfrica, 
a South African jewellery manufacturer.  This deal led to the 
establishment of the Filk Gold Chains of South Africa.  The project 
became one of the first NIPP precious metal beneficiation projects in 
South Africa.  The mining company buy-in was from AngloGold Ashanti.  
The project entailed a cash investment by Agusta Westland into the 
business as part of their NIPP obligations, while Gruppo Industriale Filk 
provided machinery and technology, training and access to foreign 
markets.  AngloGold Ashanti would benefit as it could claim the venture 
as a beneficiation project and could earn points for it on the Mining 
Charter.128  
 
According to Mr. Mark Tarlie of OroAfrica129 the deal with Gruppo 
Industriale Filk was clinched with the help of the Department of Trade 
and Industry, Agusta and Mediotrade, which is an Italian Government 
export agency.  When I approached the department and Mediotrade, I 
was told that the information was “confidential” and that I should get all 
information from OroAfrica.   
 
No direct link between Finmeccanica SpA of Italy and Gruppo Industriale 
Filk could be found.  All information available on the Internet was 
checked and during a trip to Italy in October 2003, telephone calls to 
                                                 
127
 Star newspaper, 28 June 2001 
128
 Interview with Mr. Gary Nathan, OroAfrica, on 31 August 2007 
129
 Interviewed 09 July 2003 
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both businesses affirmed that there was no obvious formal link.  
Requests for interviews were denied by both companies.  Gruppo 
Industiale Filk referred me back to Mr. Nathan of OroAfrica in South 
Africa, where none of my questions about this specific question were 
answered130. 
 
Overall the Filk Gold Chains of South Africa venture was a success.  
The business continues to grow and although there has been a 
fluctuation of number of employees over the years due to fluctuations in 
the volumes produced, the venture has never employed less than 120 
persons on a permanent basis.  The 2002 and 2003/2004 NIPP annual 
reports expected the joint venture to create employment for 115 persons 
by the end of the obligation period.  
Completion of NIPP obligation 
 
Agusta Westland’s NIPP obligations are supposed to be completed by 
2007.  According to Mr. Anton Meinesz, Director of Finance at 
OroAfrica131, the final report regarding Filk Gold Chains of South Africa 
was submitted to DTI in March 2007.     From that point onwards Gruppo 
Industriale Filk became less hands-on and became a silent partner in the 
business.  The part of OroAfrica that was called ‘Filk Gold Chains of 
South Africa’ is now called ‘OroChains’ and Gruppo Industriale Filk 
traded its 50% share in Filk Gold Chains in South Africa for 6% of the 
OroAfrica group as a whole.  OroAfrica now consists of four distinct 
companies:  OroChains, OroTrading, OroDesign and Cinere.  The 
ownership of the company was at 31 August 2007 as follows: 
• 25% AngloGold Ashanti 
• 6% Gruppo Industriale Filk 
                                                 
130
  I had to heed Cooper and Schindler’s (2001) warning about the “don’t know” 
response and ascertain whether Mr. Nathan really did not know the answer or whether 
he knew the answer but chose not to respond.  In this case it was clear that the 
respondent was unwilling to answer this question as opposed to not knowing the 
answer. 
131
 Interviewed on 31 August 2007 
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• 69% management.132 
 
Gruppo Industriale Filk remains a supplier of spool-stock to OroAfrica.  
Spool-stock is raw spool chain that is refined and sorted by OroAfrica.  
All Gruppo Industriale Filk staff members, who had been seconded to 
Filk Gold Chains of South Africa for training purposes, have returned to 
Italy.  The cordial and cooperative relationship between the companies 
is further enhanced by the marriage in recent years of Steven Nathan to 
a Filk.133 
 
Even though it is uncertain how Gruppo Industiale Filk initially became 
involved in the deal, it is clear that the company would have conducted, 
as an obligation to their shareholders, a thorough due diligence study of 
OroAfrica and the feasibility of a joint venture before they would have 
invested money, technology and their brand name.  They would thus 
continue to ensure that their initial investment continues to pay 
dividends.   
 
It is clear that OroAfrica benefited greatly from this deal even though in 
the last two fiscal years their production volumes have fallen.  This was 
due to a lesser demand for gold jewellery internationally, combined with 
a growing aversion for risk in the USA.  OroAfrica has found that the 
appetite for credit risks internationally, but particularly in the USA, has 
slowed and that companies have become less risk-intense and more 
cautious.  This in turn rationalized their international client base.134   
   
The lesser demand for gold jewellery internationally is linked to the high 
gold price and a tendency of consumers to move more towards the less 
expensive costume jewellery and non-precious metals, such as silver.   
                                                 
132
 Mr. Gary Nathan, Managing Director, OroAfrica, interviewed on 31 August 2007 
133
 Mr. Anton Meinesz, Finance Director, OroAfrica, interviewed on 31 August 2007 
134
 Mr. Anton Meinesz, Finance Director, OroAfrica, interviewed on 31 August 2007 
 188
The graph below illustrates the drop in the international demand for gold 
jewellery in 2006.  
 
 Figure 5  Gold Jewellery sales from 2004-2006 
 
  Source: Genesis Analytics, 2008, pg. 45 
 
Irrespective of the reduction in the production volumes, the 2006-2007135 
fiscal year was one of the most profitable years for OroAfrica.136 
 
4.4.8.3 Cinere - Another Agusta Westland NIP project  
 
During the second half of 2007, OroAfrica entered an agreement with a 
small, little known, family-owned and run Italian company, Cinere, which 
produces handmade gold jewellery.   
 
According to Mr. Gary Nathan the Italian factory closed down in Italy and 
moved all its concerns, except for its marketing division, to South 
Africa.137  It brought with it all its machinery and main staff members, 
with whom OroAfrica has signed a three year contract.  It is expected 
that the Italian employees will train their South African counterparts and 
also train employees from other OroAfrica divisions.   
 
                                                 
135
 March 2006- February 2007 
136
 Mr. Anton Meinesz, Finance Director, OroAfrica, interviewed on 31 August 2007 
137
 Mr. Gary Nathan, OroAfrica, interviewed on 31 August 2007 
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As part of OroAfrica, Cinera138 will produce handmade, hollow, gold 
chain, which is at the moment still more of an exclusive product that 
requires less gold in terms of volume.  The production is labour intensive 
and it is expected that at least 15 South Africans will be employed 
initially in this venture.  The work-force will increase as the demand for 
the product increases.  The marketing division in Italy will be used to 
market the product in the overseas markets. 
 
Cinera is the second Agusta Westland NIP project.  According to Mr. 
Anton Meinesz, OroAfrica is required to submit regular reports to DTI 
concerning Cinera’s progress.139  These reports are submitted via 
Stemcor Trade Finance, which represents Precision Aviation, the local 
Agusta Westland representative.  Neither Mr. Nathan nor Mr. Meinesz 
could provide me with further details such as the amount of money 
invested by Agusta Westland linked with this specific NIP project.  They 
referred me to Stemcor Trade Finance and Precision Aviation for more 
information.  My phone calls to these businesses were not returned, and 
I was unable to secure any meeting with representatives.  I also 
approached DTI for more information and my request was received with 
confusion and my repeated phone calls and visits to DTI to find more 
information were fruitless.   
 
4.5 The South African Jewellery Industry 
4.5.1 Background 
The World Gold Council reports that in 1999, about 85% of the world-
wide demand of gold (3280 metric tons), was converted into jewellery.  
Of this, India is the world leader producing 596 tons, followed by Italy 
with 500 tons, China with 231 tons, Turkey with 168 tons and the USA 
with 159 tons.   In South Africa the gold downstream industries are 
largely dominated by the gold jewellery manufacturing industry.  Even so 
                                                 
138
 There is a possibility that this name will change, but at the time of writing the new 
name could not be confirmed. 
139
 Mr. Meinesz, interviewed on 31 August 2007 
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the country contributed less than half a percent to the world’s fabricated 
jewellery industry, even though it provided approximately a quarter of all 
raw materials used in the world-wide production of jewellery.  
 
In recent years, spurred on by pressure from government and 
legislation, mining houses have expanded their support of the jewellery 
sector.  Currently gold is the precious metal predominantly used in South 
African jewellery manufacture.  During 2004, 12.6t of fine gold was 
supplied to the local gold manufacturing sector.  As is demonstrated in 
the table below, of the 12.6t of fine gold, 76.6% was destined for the 
manufacturing of jewellery.   
 
Table 12   Gold Usage in Fabrication 
 
Metric tons Percentage 
Jewellery fabrication 9.64 76.6 
Coin fabrication 2.90 23 
Other fabrication (including dentistry and 
electronics) 
 
0.05 
 
0.4 
Total 12.59 100 
Source: Genesis Analytics, 2008, pg.45 
 
 
There are approximately 500 gold jewellery manufacturers in the 
country.  Only approximately 13 firms use a sizable amount of gold in 
production.  Three of these 13 firms account for 65% of the fine gold 
consumed in the industry while the 13 as a group account for 84% of the 
fine gold consumed.  The three firms are OroAfrica, Silplat and Alan 
Mair. 
 
The diagram below demonstrates the amounts of gold used in jewellery 
fabrication in 2006. 
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Figure 6 Gold Usage in jewellery fabrication and retail 
 
Source: Genesis Analytics, 2008, pg. 7 
 
The perception that South Africa has a comparative advantage to its 
non-gold producing industry, due to the location of its mining industry, is 
false.  The location of the gold mining industry does not in itself render 
the country competitive in terms of its downstream industries.  Unlike 
other locally produced minerals, the extremely high unit value of gold 
means that a local jeweller has no transport advantage over his/her 
international competitors.  Even though exports of gold bars totaled 421t 
in 2004, up from 408t in 2003, there is also very little to no profit margin 
on gold bars exported.140    
 
Only the first two phases of gold beneficiation, smelting and refining, 
have an advantage in international competitiveness because of the local 
availability of the bullion and the advanced local technology (Jourdan, 
1993).   
                                                 
140
 Personal communication with Dr. Paul Jourdan, Mintek and Dr. Jessica Cross, 
Virtual Metals 
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Nevertheless the industry enjoys some advantages.   
 
The advantages:  
• Local refinery services: Rand Refinery offers localized refining 
services and capacity to refine gold competitively.     The refinery 
has London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) accreditation, was 
the world’s first refinery to receive the Dubai Good Delivery 
accreditation in September 2004 and it serves as a referee in 
international quality control for the LBMA.  The country also 
possesses a good technological base in gold refining and the 
production of gold alloys.   
 
• AGOA: The USA “African Growth and Opportunity Act” (Public 
Law 106-200 – May 18, 2000), commonly referred to as AGOA, 
that allows for the duty-free export of the mainly energy-related 
products, transportation equipment, minerals and metals, 
agricultural products and textiles and apparel from qualifying Sub-
Saharan countries, which includes South Africa, to the United 
States of America.  On July 12, 2004, the USA extended the 
whole AGOA Programme to 2015.   
 
South African total exports, including both AGOA and non-AGOA 
exports, to the USA declined from US$4.4 billion in 2001 to 
US$4.2 billion in 2002.   Despite this decline, the AGOA-affected 
export categories such as jewellery and textiles, actually 
increased fairly dramatically, from US$ 923.3 million in 2001 to 
US$ 1 342.6 million in 2002.  By 2002 this sector covered 31.7% 
of total (both AGOA and non-AGOA) RSA exports to the USA.  In 
2004 South Africa’s AGOA exports were valued at US$1.78 billion 
only, indicating only a small increase, but it still constituted 30% of 
total exports to the USA (US Trade Commission).  These exports 
include gold jewellery exports to the USA.  Although the AGOA 
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exports in the last year of SARM’s existence might only have 
indicated a small increase, 62% of gold jewellery produced in 
South Africa during 2004 was exported to the USA.   
 
Figure 7  South African jewellery exports in 2004 
 
 
• Tourism: Inbound tourists frequently buy quality jewellery, which 
benefit gold jewellery sales.  This has been demonstrated in other 
countries with a gold jewellery industry, such as Italy.  A large 
proportion of Italy’s gold jewellery is sold to visiting tourists who 
are aware of the large industry, the world class design and the 
competitive prices (Jourdan, 1993).   
 
Tourism in South Africa increases on an annual basis.  
Information released in 2006 that compared the tourist arrival 
statistics for April 2005 to those of April 2006, indicate that 
tourism from tourists originating from continents other than Africa 
increased by 13.8%.  The total number of tourists (including those 
from African countries and islands) visiting South Africa during 
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that timeframe increased by 27.7% 
(http://www.kzn.org.za/invest/April2006.pdf141). 
 
• The emerging middle class among the previously 
disadvantaged South Africans has prompted jewellery 
manufacturers to adapt their product range to suit this new 
market.142 
   
• The South African/European Trade Development and Co-
operation Fund (TDCS) provides for the creation of a free trade 
agreement between the European Union and South Africa by no 
later than December 31, 2012, by which time 90% of all trade 
between the two partners will be free of customs duties.  This 
means that the European Union will gradually become a free 
trade zone in the way the USA is under AGOA.  This can 
however, backfire on local jewellery producers, as  reciprocally 
European manufacturers will be able to export to South Africa 
free of import duties, which could make it difficult for the local 
industry to survive. 
 
The challenges: 
 
• Lack of access to affordable finance, the high cost of working 
capital, and the periodic volatile nature of the gold price that 
renders it particularly expensive, are some of the main challenges 
faced by jewellery manufacturers in South Africa.   
 
Unlike South Africa, other gold jewellery production countries, for 
example Italy, have an active bullion lending business with long-
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 Accessed 12 August 2007 
142
 Interview with Alta Wessels, Project Manager, Harmony Jewellery School, 
interviewed 16 March 2006.  This was confirmed by both Gary Nathan of OroAfrica, 
interviewed on 31 August 2007; and Johan Smit of Silplat, interviewed on 31 August 
2007 
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standing relationships existing between local banks and the 
jewellery industry.    The local commercial bank will complete a 
credit rating of the local jewellery manufacturer and based on 
these results, will issue a letter of credit or guarantee against the 
metal loan.  The bullion bank, or the local commercial bank, will 
then lend the gold to the manufacturer.  Such schemes allow 
manufacturing jewelers to benefit from gold lending rates based 
on the gold lease rate, which is typically lower than monetary 
interest rates.143 
 
In the early 1990s a concessionary gold loan scheme for jewellery 
manufacture was introduced by the state whereby state gold 
reserves are loaned to the fabricator at a low interest rate and 
returned when the product is sold (Jourdan, 1993).  This however 
was still too expensive for most South African fabricators.  The 
recently introduced Gold Advance Scheme faces similar 
problems.   
 
South African manufacturers have to rely on the high interest rate 
environment of the standard bank loan agreements for financing 
working gold inventory. The table and chart below clearly 
demonstrates the difference in lending rates. 
 
Table 13  Comparative look at costs of loans for gold jewellery finance as of mid-
2005 
 
Dubai Italy South Africa 
Loan type Gold (lease) Gold (lease) Rand (prime rate) 
Interest 2% 3% 10.5% 
Risk premium 0,70% 0,07% 2% - 3% 
Letter of credit Local bank Local bank None 
Cost of letter of credit 1% 1% Not applicable 
Collateral (other than letter 
of credit) 
 
None 
 
None 
 
120% 
Total cost of loan 3.7% 4.75% 12.5% - 13.5% 
Insurance needed for metal 
on loan 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Source: Virtual Metals, 2006  
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 Personal communication with Denzel Young, CEO of Musuku Beneficiation 
Systems, 21 September 2005 
 196
 
 
 
South African manufacturers are thus at a disadvantage in terms 
of accessing affordable finance.  Access to affordable gold loans 
and other financing incentives would render the local jewellery 
manufacturers more competitive internationally.    
 
• The high start-up costs associated with gold jewellery 
manufacturing plants:  these plants are capital intensive because 
all capital equipment must be imported.  South African 
manufacturers are also behind in the latest developments and 
fabricating techniques, which detract from local manufacturers’ 
ability to compete internationally.144  
 
• The performance of the Rand:  When the Rand is strong 
against the other main international currencies, as it was in much 
of 2003 and 2004, it is a threat to the survival of the gold jewellery 
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 Personal communication with Mr. Tarlie, OroAfrica, 2003 
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industry.  The reason for this is that finished jewellery could be 
imported at a cost less than the manufacturing cost incurred by 
local manufacturers for the same or a similar product.  As 
demonstrated by the chart below, the Rand exchange rate 
against the US Dollar depreciated by 20% annually between 
January 1999 and December 2001 before appreciating by 24% 
annually between January 2002 and December 2004.   
 
 
 
The stronger Rand also makes South African gold jewellery 
exports more expensive.  Mr. Tarlie of OroAfrica145 confirmed that 
in recent years the strong Rand had negatively affected the 
companies’ export rates due to the costs of the final product.  
 
• South African manufacturers are unable to compete with low 
labour costs in jewellery manufacturing in countries such as 
China and India, where there is no minimum wage or labour 
unionization.  Imports from these countries are popular, even 
though of lower quality, because of the low price.146  
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 Personal communication with Mr. Tarlie, OroAfrica, October 2005 
146
 Personal communication with Jessica Cross, Virtual Metals, 2006 
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• The country’s low skills pool:  Even though students continue 
to graduate every year from universities after completing jewellery 
courses, there is a reported lack of skills in this sector.  A reason 
for this could be a mismatch between the training provided by the 
institutions and the needs of the jewellery manufacturers.147 
 
• Declining jewellery sales: Statistics SA has found that local 
jewellery sales, as a percentage of total retail sales, have been 
falling steadily since 1996, as it loses market share to other 
lifestyle products, such as cell phones.   
 
• No brand recognition: South African has no reputation as a 
jewellery producer either locally or internationally, thus the 
country’s jewellery, unlike jewellery from other countries, has no 
brand recognition as being South African or unique.   
 
• Jewellery is not viewed as a craft: Compared to West African 
countries, such as Ghana and Mali, and other gold producing 
countries of the world, such as Peru and Bolivia, South Africa 
lacks a tradition of viewing gold jewellery as a craft, and generally 
veers towards seeing the process as purely manufacturing 
through casting.  This could be attributed to the lack of culture of 
precious metal jewellery adornment, a culture which is common in 
other parts of Africa.  It is important that this view of gold jewellery 
be changed as the jewellery sub-sector not only falls under the 
manufacturing sector, but also under the craft sector.148   
                                                 
147
 Personal communication with Dieter Rowe-Setz, Lecturer, Wits Technikon, 12 
February 2005 
148
 Personal communication with Dieter Rowe-Setz, Lecturer, Wits Technikon, 12 
February 2005 
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4.5.2 South African Jewellery Exports 
 
There has been a steady increase in the export of South Africa’s 
jewellery since 1994.   
 
The largest increase in exports to date was an increase of 68% over a 
two year period from US$11.8 million in 1997 to US$19.8 million in 1999. 
(Wesgro; DTI)  Despite the strong Rand, exports of South African 
manufactured jewellery have increased in the five years from 1999 to 
2004, growing at an estimated average rate of 23% per annum per 
volume as demonstrated below:   
 
 
The majority (62%) of the gold jewellery exports in 2004 were to the 
USA, with 11% to the UK and 3% to Italy (Virtual Metals, 2006). 
4.5.3 Employment in the Jewellery Manufacturing Sector 
 
A 2005 research study commissioned by the DTI, AngloGold Ashanti, 
IDC and the World Gold Council and conducted by Virtual Metals, found 
that although there were 2 456 valid jewellery permits in issue in 2004, 
the jewellery manufacturers sector employed only an estimated 2 680 
persons.  This is in stark contradiction with figures published by DTI that 
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claims that the jewellery industry employs approximately 4 500 persons 
in more than 350 manufacturing concerns located in Gauteng, Western 
Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Free State 
(http://www.dti.gov.za/downloads/investjewellerysector.pdf (undated)149). 
 
The discrepancy between the number of valid permits issued and the 
number of persons employed can be explained.  Permits are issued not 
only to manufacturers who are in business, but also to hobbyist 
goldsmiths.  The goldsmiths who work alone, or only use the gold as 
part of a hobby, would not employ staff.   
 
Another factor that influences the number of jobs created in gold 
jewellery manufacturing is the type of manufacturing engaged in.  The 
Virtual Metals study found that in 2005 only five percent of the jewellery 
manufactured in South Africa was hand-made, while 63% were created 
by using machine and 32% were cast.  Those manufacturers who 
primarily use machinery require fewer employees to manufacture 
jewellery than those manufacturers who use cast methods.  Hand-made 
jewellery is labour-intensive and requires more staff than either of the 
other two methods.  As 63% of the manufacturers use machinery that 
require fewer employees and 32% use cast methods and only 5% are 
engaged in the labour-intensive hand production, it is understandable 
that the employment levels would be less than anticipated for this 
manufacturing sector. 
 
 
                                                 
149
 Accessed on 10 March 2007 
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Of the estimated 2680 persons employed in the sector, 85% are 
involved in production, 10% in administrative, sales and marketing roles, 
and 5% in management roles.  The total amount of employees is 
approximately 1.76% of those employed in the complete gold value 
chain (Virtual Metals, 2006). 
 
A regional analysis of valid jeweller’s licences for 2003 and 2004, found 
that gold jewellery manufacturing is concentrated in Johannesburg and 
Cape Town, and that Gauteng and the Western Cape provinces are 
home to approximately 70% of the manufacturers. 
 
Table 14   Valid Jewellery Permits in South Africa in 2003 and 2004 
Number of valid jewellery permits 2003 2004 Region as % of 
2004 total 
Gauteng 838 982 40 
Western Cape 710 733 29.8 
KwaZulu-Natal 351 385 15.7 
Eastern Cape 76 95 3.9 
Free State 71 84 3.4 
Northern Cape 59 63 2.6 
Mpumulanga 50 52 2.1 
Limpopo 33 34 1.4 
North West 27 28 1.1 
Total 2 215 2 456 100 
Source: Virtual Metals’ analysis of South African Police Service data (2006) 
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According to the Virtual Metals study, permit holders in the Free State 
Province increased by 18.3% from 2003 to 2004.  As there are no 
factories, except for the Harmony Jewellery School and Emthutwini 
casting factory in the Free State, it must assumed that these licenses 
were issued to hobbyist goldsmiths.  Jewellery manufacturing is 
generally not the primary source of income for hobbyist goldsmiths and 
as such they would generally not employ staff.   
 
The more than 100 jewellery manufacturing firms in the Western Cape 
provide approximately 700 formal jobs.150   
 
In 2004 the Cape Jewellery Manufacturers Association had 99 
members.  The Association is represented by approximately a third of all 
Western Cape jewellery manufacturing concerns.  Of the 99 members, 
86 are gold jewellery producers.151    More recent information on 
membership was not available. 
 
These firms are generally the more established, older and often family-
owned factories, that primarily produce gold jewellery and to some 
extent use mass-production techniques.  These firms are finding it hard 
to survive in the new marketplace.   
 
Although gold is the precious metal used predominantly in South African 
jewellery manufacture, the newer firms are mostly smaller and tend 
towards high value-added handcrafting using metals other than gold, 
such as silver and platinum.   The price of gold plays a large role in this 
decision.152 
 
                                                 
150
 Telephonic interview, Mr. Peter Cloete, Secretary of the Jewellers and Goldsmiths 
Union - Cape 
151
 Telephonic interview, Ms Martin, Cape Jewellery Manufacturers Association, 
October 2004 
152
 Interview with Mr. Johan Smit, Chair of Cape Jewellery Manufacturers Association, 
01 November 2007 
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4.5.4 Jewellery Manufacturing and the Mining Scorecard 
 
While the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) 
and the Mining Charter and Scorecard call for greater beneficiation 
efforts, the Precious Metals Act No 35 of 2005, aims to reduce the 
administrative procedures relating to the possession and trade of gold as 
a raw material.   
 
The legislation introduces a new definition of unwrought precious metals, 
which makes it easier to hold precious metals, including gold, for use in 
industry and for jewellery manufacturing.  It further introduces a more 
streamlined regulatory institution for the sector.  The South African 
Diamonds and Precious Metals Regulator replaces the multi-institutional 
regulatory framework that had been in place since 1967 and which 
included the Department of Minerals and Energy, the South African 
Reserve Bank, the South African Revenue Services and the South 
African Police Force.  The streamlined institution will allow for a 
smoother licensing and monitoring process.   
 
Government officials have further assured mining companies that they 
will not be forced to go into jewellery production as part of their 
beneficiation obligations, but that they could link up with specialists in 
jewellery manufacturing through funding of beneficiation projects.   
AngloGold Ashanti followed this route when it purchased 25% of 
OroAfrica.  Since 2000, other mining companies have also ventured into 
the beneficiation business.  The most prominent of these companies are 
Harmony Gold Mining Company and Impala Platinum Holdings 
(Implats).  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has illustrated the background to the NIPP precious metal 
and research and development beneficiation projects.  It has shown how 
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these projects can attract direct foreign investment, create new trading 
partners for the country not only by building up international linkages, but 
also because of the conducive climate for beneficiation projects, in 
particular jewellery manufacturing.   
 
This information is important as we move into the next chapter which 
focuses on SARM.  The jewellery manufacturing projects discussed in 
this chapter will, together with the NIPP objectives, be the objectives and 
goals against which SARM is evaluated.  
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5. SOUTH AFRICAN ROYAL MANUFACTURERS  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The context in which a project operates has an impact on its 
performance.  Thus, in order to conduct a good evaluation of a project, it 
is important to know and understand its context.  
 
The first layer of the context is the physical and geographical location; 
the second layer is that of political governance both locally and 
provincially; the third layer is reasons why it was established; the fourth 
layer refers to how it was funded, and the fifth, and last, layer refers to 
how it was managed.   
 
In this chapter the context in which SARM was established, operated 
and closed down, is described.  The description begins from a wider 
angle and looks at the Free State Province.  It then focuses in on the 
district and local municipalities, ending with a description of Virginia, 
before moving on to describe SARM’s owners and investors.  The 
chapter ends with a description of SARM, its background, functioning 
and its demise.     
 
5.2 Provincial Context 
 
South African Royal Manufacturers (SARM) was established in the 
goldfields of the Free State Province.   
 
The Free State Province is the third largest province in South Africa.  It 
comprises approximately 10.6% of the country’s land mass - 129 480 
square kilometres.   
 
 
 206
 
 
Table 15  Free State Basic Facts 
 
Free State Compared to South Africa 
Land area  128 480 km² 10.6% 
Main language Sesotho Zulu (23%) 
Population Census (2001): 2.71 million 44.82 million 
% African 88% 79% 
% Coloured 3.1% 8.9% 
% Indian 0.1% 2.5% 
% White 8.8% 9.6% 
Population (2002 estimate) 2.95 million 6.4% 
Population growth per annum (1996-2001) 0.6% 2% 
Population growth estimated 2001-2006 0.72% 1.18% 
Population density (2003) 21.1 per km² 30.0 per km² 
Urbanization level (2002) 71,7% 55,4% 
Urban population as % of total population 
(2003) 
69.2%  
Age dependency ratio 55.4% 63% 
Total fertility rate (1994-1996) 2.3 2.7 
Child mortality 24% 13% 
Life expectancy at birth  
(1994-1996) 
62 63 
% population under 15 years (2003) 30.7%  
% population aged 65 and over (2001) 5%  
Functional literacy 68,6% 72,4% 
HDI (2002) 0,55 0,62 
People living in poverty (2002) 54.7% 48.9% 
Annual per capita income R11 854 R17 164 
Unemployment (2002) 38,9% 40,8% 
Equitable share in national budget 
allocation (1999-2002) 
 
6.8% 
 
GDP 2002 R49,1 billion 4,9% 
 Sources: Census 2001; SAIRR: South Africa survey 1999/2000,2000/2001,2003/2004; DBSA, 
2003 
 
In the late 1990s the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) 
identified four functional regions in the Free State:   
• Bloemfontein,  
• the Goldfields,  
• Eastern, and  
• Northern Free State.   
 
Although the 1999/2000 national demarcation process left the outer 
boundaries for the Free State virtually unchanged from what was 
previously called the Orange Free State, and what is still referred to as 
the “heartland” of the country, the province’s regions were again re-
grouped, this time into five district councils, namely: 
• Xhariep,  
 207
• Motheo,  
• Lejweleputswa, 
•  Thabo Mofutsanyane , and  
• Northern Free State.    
 
Virginia, where SARM was located, is situated within the Lejweleputswa 
District Municipality. 
 
5.2.1 Economy 
 
The Free State Province flourished for several decades due to the riches 
of the goldfields and its importance in the production of a South African 
staple food, maize.  It also has Sasol, the Orange River Dam, the vast 
Lesotho Highlands Project at the Free State-Lesotho border; and found 
itself on the Cape Town-Witwatersrand, Port Elizabeth-Witwatersrand 
and the Durban-Johannesburg transport axes.   
 
However, recent economic data for the province suggests that it is a 
poor province with a gross annual household income of R42 500 per 
annum as opposed to a national average of R56 740.  The per capita 
annual income is R11 854 (Du Toit, 2001:14).  
5.2.1.1 Dominant industries 
 
The dominant influences in the province’s economy are still agriculture 
and mining, even though both are slowly declining.   
 
Mining in the Free State is declining faster than it is nationally.  In 1981 
the industry was at 37.4% by far the largest contributor to the Free 
State’s Gross Geographic Product153 (GGP).  By 1991 this had dropped 
to 20.6% and by 2001 it was down to 14.3%.  At the same time the 
                                                 
153
 GGP equals the remuneration received by the production factors, such as land, 
labour, capital, entrepreneurship, for their participation in production in a given 
geographic area. 
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sector experienced negative annual growth rates of -1,25% between 
1991 and 1996; and -7,6% between 1996 and 2001(Chamber of Mines; 
Mbendi). 
 
The contribution of agriculture to the province’s economy has declined 
steadily between 1981 and 2001, primarily because of the rationalization 
of the grain industry.  The sector showed negative growth rates between 
1991 and 1996, and again between 1996 and 2001. 
 
Gross Geographic Product (GGP) of a particular area amounts to the 
total income produced through production in that area.  The table below 
compares the Free State Province’s GGP with that of the other 
provinces and South Africa as a whole.  It also lists the GGP per head 
per province. 
 
Table 16  Gross Geographic Product per Province and per Head 
Province Gross Geographic Product * 
(Rand billion) 
GGP per Head 
(Rand) 
Eastern Cape 40.4 8 917 
Free State 29.5 15 196 
Gauteng 221.9 39 089 
KwaZulu-Natal 75.7 11 924 
Limpopo 22.9 6 869 
Mpumalanga 47.1 21 331 
North West 31.9 15 508 
Northern Cape 10.9 18 242 
Western Cape 102.9 34 986 
South Africa 583.4 19 508 
* Figures should add up vertically but may not, owing to rounding 
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations 2002/3 Survey. 
 
The 2002/2003 GGP for the Free State Province is R29.5 billion, while 
its GGP per head is R15 196.  Compared to the other eight provinces, 
the Free State could be characterized as falling into the provinces with 
the lowest GGP in the country.   Only Limpopo and the Northern Cape 
have a lower GGP.  Gauteng Province has by far the highest GGP at 
R221.9 billion, with the Western Cape lagging behind at R102.9 billion.   
 
In terms of GGP per head, the Free State Province has the fourth lowest 
score, indicating lower employment figures and/or lower production 
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output than that of other provinces.  As can be seen in Table 6, in 1999 
37.2% of the province’s population earned R500 or less per month.     
 
The table below compares the Free State values of various economic 
indicators with that of the country as a whole. 
 
Table 17  Free State Province economy compared to that of South Africa nationally 
Indicator Free State South Africa 
% contributor to national GDP (2001) 5.5% 100% 
GGP/head (2001) R15 196 R19 508 
Manufacturing as % of GGP (2001) 13.2% 18.6% 
% of working age population 
economically active (2003) 
60.4% 56.7% 
% of population earning R500 per 
month or less (1999) 
37.2% 25.05% 
% of population earning R4 500 per 
month or more (1999) 
6.7% 10.3% 
Source: SAIRR, 2003; DBSA, 1998; DBSA, 2003 
 
In 2001 the province contributed R33.5 billion to the national economy 
which represented only 5.5% of the national GDP.  Thus within the 
national context, the overall economic and more specifically the 
manufacturing importance of the Free State Province, remains minor.   
5.2.1.2 Manufacturing 
 
The province can be regarded as a ‘lagging region’ in terms of 
manufacturing (Ilberty et al, 2004; Cabus, 2001).   
 
Table 7 demonstrates the growth trends in the Free State as from 1970 
to 2002 in measures of five-year intervals.   A 5% growth occurred 
during the 1970-1975 period, with a further growth of 3.9% during the 
following five years. 
 
Table 18 Growth trends in the manufacturing industry of the Free State, 1970 – 
2002 
Period Manufacturing growth for period 
1970-1975 5% 
1975-1980 3.9% 
1980-1985 0.6% 
1985-1990 2.6% 
1996-2002 -1.2% 
Source: Urban-econ, 2003. 
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Although considerable growth in manufacturing took place between 
1970 and 1980, it declined sharply between 1980 and 1990.  In 1990 
manufacturing contributed only some 18% of the provincial Gross 
Geographic Product (GGP), and by 2002 it had fallen to 16% (Urban-
econ, 2003).  In 1993, the province had 851 manufacturing 
establishments in operation, employing some 46 500 people and 
generating a gross output of R8 170 million (Urban-econ, 2000).   
 
A negative growth rate continued for the period 1996-2002, as is 
demonstrated in the table below. 
 Jewellery Manufacturing 
 
There is a strong push for jewellery manufacturing and precious mineral 
beneficiation in the province.  In a speech by Premier Winkie Direko, at 
the opening of the fourth session of the second Free State Legislature 
on the 14th February 2002, she stated that the province’s overall 
development strategy must of necessity, ensure a strong focus on: 
- Beneficiation of value-addition to Free State products: 
- The enhancement of exiting national and international competitive 
advantages of the province. 
- Empowering and capacitating small, medium and micro 
enterprises (SMME’s) to ensure their progressive mainstreaming 
into the formal manufacturing sector. She also reported on the 
establishment of the jewellery hub zones with foreign investment 
of R120 million with the potential of creating 2000 jobs referring in 
part to the now failed SARM initiative. 
 
The Free State MEC for finance expenditure and economic affairs with 
reference to Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), stated in 
2001 that the main focus areas of this development over the MTEF 
period will, inter alia, be the facilitation of sustainable provincial 
economic growth and development through the promotion of the 
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province as an ideal investment location for jewellery manufacturing 
amongst other opportunities.   
 
However, to date none of the larger and more ambitious initiatives have 
been successful and indeed in terms of jewellery manufacturing, the 
Free State Province does not have a very good track record.  Two of the 
factories started in Virginia since 2001 have shut down.  The Harmony 
Jewellery School and Harmony Gold Mining Company’s small 
Emthuthini Jewellery Manufacturers154 appear to be the only 
manufacturers operating.  The output is however negligible.   
5.2.2 Employment statistics 
 
The decline in the various economic sectors within the province had a 
direct effect on the province’s employment figures.   
 
Although mining nationally employed 163 000 in 1980, and 236 000 by 
1990 the next decade saw a loss of 191 700 jobs in this sector alone.  
The national agriculture sector recorded a loss of 55 000 jobs between 
1980 and 2001.  A negative growth rate in the manufacturing sector has 
also resulted in a drop of 7.5% in the employment figures in this sector 
between 1996 and 2002 (Urban-econ, 2003).   
 
                                                 
154
 The Emthuthwini Jewellery Manufacturer was first mentioned in the 2002 Harmony 
Gold annual report.  It is not clear whether this factory is part of Musuku or separate 
from it.  No information about Emthuthwini Jewellery Manufacturer is available on the 
Internet.  Enquiries about the factory directed to Harmony Gold Mining Company, 
Musuku Beneficiation Systems, the Harmony Jewellery School and the Mathjabeng 
Municipality have not been responded to at the time of writing.  In November 2002 Mr. 
S. Zikode, Chief Director, Industrial Participation Secretariat, DTI in an interview with 
Richard Haines, indicated that there were moves to expand beneficiation to other 
precious metals such as silver on a home production basis to the poor sections of the 
population of Virginia.  It is not clear if Emthuthwini is one of these projects.  It does not 
appear to be a NIPP project. 
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The following table, sourced from the South African Institute of Race 
Relations 2002/3 Survey, reflects the unemployment rate by province 
during 2002*: 
 
Table 19  Unemployment rate per province 
Province Employed Unemployed 
(strict) 
Unemployed 
(strict) as 
proportion of 
provincial 
economic active 
population 
Eastern Cape 1,628,000 638,000 28.1% 
Free State 767,000 386,000 35.5% 
Gauteng 2,776,000 1,027,000 27.0% 
KwaZulu-Natal 2,002,000 1,047,000 34.3% 
Limpopo 870,000 505,000 36.7% 
Mpumalanga 753,000 320,000 29.8% 
North West 822,000 364,000 30.7% 
Northern Cape 233,000 100,000 30.0% 
Western Cape 1,542,000 352,000 18.6% 
South Africa 11,393,000 4,738,000 29.4% 
2001 11,837,000 4,240,000 26.4% 
Percentage Change:  
2002 vs 2001 
-3.8% 11.7% 11.4% 
* Figures should add up vertically but may not, owing to rounding. 
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations 2002/3 Survey. 
 
The incidence and extent of poverty seems to be increasing in the Free 
State Province relative to other provinces.  Household income is the 
third lowest among the provinces and per capita income is the sixth 
lowest.  Its position on the Human Development Index (HDI) worsened 
from third to fifth place between 1999 and 2003 and its Gini coefficient155  
from fourth to fifth place.  In 1996 the province had the third lowest 
percentage of people living in poverty in the country, which was lower 
than the national average.  By 2003 the province had slipped to 6th 
place, with 51.9% of its people living in poverty compared to the national 
average of 46.2%.  Statistics South Africa (2008a) indicates that 5.5% of 
the Free State households fall within the first quintiles of the provincial 
population.  The first quintile constitutes the poorest of population, while 
the fifth quintile refers to the wealthiest of the population.  Seven point 
seven percent (7.7%) of Free State households fall within the fifth 
quintile (Statistics South Africa, 2008a).  The incidence of poverty is 
                                                 
155
 A measurement of income equality. 
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however much higher in rural areas (Statistics South Africa, 2008b), and 
it is most likely that the majority of the Free State’s households that fall 
within the first quintile live in the rural area of the province. 
The decline in gold mining in the province has contributed to this 
situation.  Since 1984, the number of unskilled personnel employed by 
the South African gold mining industry nationally has fallen from 450 000 
to 130 000 due to restructuring in the sector (Chamber of Mines).  It is 
estimated that each mining job has between seven and 12 dependents.  
Thus the wider social and economic damage – not just in the Free State 
or South Africa but also in neighbouring regions – is substantial.   
 
5.2.3 Local Economic Development 
 
The experience of LED in the Free State clearly is a mixed balance 
sheet (Nel et al., 2002).  The evaluation of 16 LED projects in the Free 
State by Marais et al. (2002) has shown that only a small percentage of 
LED projects implemented in the Free State have the potential to 
become financially viable.  They found that very few SMMEs established 
as a result of LED initiatives survived, with none being economically 
competitive.  The researchers also identified poor project design, 
training, implementation, market research and business planning in each 
of the projects evaluated (Marais et al., 2002).  Although there has been 
employment creation, most tend to be short-term jobs created through 
infrastructure projects.   In 2003, Mark Ingle investigated LED projects 
funded through the national government LED Fund, which is used to 
support targeted LED poverty-relief projects.  During this investigation, 
Ingle156 was unable to find a single long-term job created in the LED 
Fund projects.  Despite an investment in excess of R15 million in the 16 
projects studied by Marais et al., only 95 full-time, long-term jobs were 
created.  These jobs were all in agriculture.  In total, only 403 short-term 
jobs were created (Marais et al. 2002).  
                                                 
156
 Personal communication, January 2004 
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5.3 District and Local Context 
5.3.1 District Location and Population 
 
The Matjhabeng Municipality is located about 250km south of Gauteng 
and falls within the Lejweleputswa District Municipality.   
 
Figure 8    Free State Municipalities 
 
Source: The Demarcation Board 
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Matjhabeng Municipality consists of the Matjhabeng/Welkom Goldfields 
compromising of Virginia, Welkom, Odenadaalsrus, Hennenman, 
Ventersburg and Allanridge.  The populace is concentrated in the main 
nodes of Welkom, Odendaalsrus and Virginia.   
 
As can be seen from the table and chart below, the municipality’s 
population is in decline, dropping from 477 411 (1996 Census) to 408 
166 (2001 Census).   
 
Table 20  Matjabeng Municipality Population 
Persons 2001 1996 
African 356098 396812 
Coloured 8904 9050 
Indian 474 411 
White 42694 68241 
Total Population 408170 476927 
Sources: 1996 Census; 2001 Census 
 
Figure 9 Matjabeng Municipality Population 
 
Sources: 1996 Census; 2001 Census 
 
The reason for this decline in population can be contributed to the lack of 
employment opportunities in the area with the continuing decline of both 
the gold mining and agriculture sectors. 
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5.3.2 Economy 
 
Measured against all other municipalities in the province the Matjhabeng 
Municipality makes the second single largest contribution to the Gross 
Geographical Product (GGP) of the Free State Province, accounting for 
nearly a third of the GGP (Matjhabeng – Diverse City of Golden 
Opportunities, pp.5-8).  The table below demonstrates this.  
 
Table 21  Free State Municipal Gross Domestic Product for 2002 
Municipality Population GDP 
Motheo 26.0% 30.9% 
Lejweleputswa 26.9% 26.5% 
Thabo Mafutsanyane 26.3% 14.0% 
Northern Free State 16.3% 25.5% 
Xhariep 4.5% 3.1% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Free State Premier’s Economic Advisory Council 
 
This economic contribution to the provincial coffers is mainly the result of 
the mining industry.  The Matjhabeng Municipality remains critically 
dependent on mining, with 58% of its GDP being derived directly from 
that sector and almost 90% of the remaining, non-agricultural GGP 
linked to the mining sector.  Almost 90% of industries and supplier 
agencies based in the municipality are linked to the mining sector 
(Matjabeng Development Strategy). 
 
The Free State goldfields mines were developed in the 1940s with an 
original view to closure in the mid 1980s, but technological 
improvements in the 1980s and the discovery of new viable deposits 
extended the life of the mines for another decade or two.  This grace 
period is now rapidly coming to an end due to depleted deposits.  Areas 
with a narrow resource base, such as the Free State goldfields, are the 
worst affected by the decline in gold mining (Binns and Nel, 2001).  In 
Virginia, as well as in Welkom, the local economy has not diversified, 
and mine closures and downscaling have had severe socio-economic 
impacts.  
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Table 22   Matjabeng Municipality Employment Data 
Persons 2001 1996 
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing 5029 6181 
Community/Social/Personal 14315 15636 
Construction 2778 4449 
Electricity/Gas/Water 467 1253 
Financial/Insurance/Real Estate/Business 4790 4803 
Manufacturing 4133 4861 
Mining/Quarrying 30581 98787 
Other 11 - 
Private Households 11118 16670 
Transport/Storage/Communication 3265 5192 
Undetermined 7404 8658 
Wholesale/Retail 11795 12023 
Sources: 1996 Census; 2001 Census 
 
Figure 10  Matjabeng Municipality Employment Data 
 
Sources: 1996 Census; 2001 Census 
 
The above table and chart indicate the decrease in mining/quarrying 
jobs available in the municipal area.  It also clearly demonstrates the 
loss of jobs in both the agriculture and mining sector. 
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5.4 Virginia 
 
Virginia is the town within the Matjhabeng Municipality where SARM was 
located.  The map below indicates the position of Virginia and Meloding, 
the Virginia township, where the factory was located. 
 
Figure 11  Map of Virginia area 
 
 
 
Virginia has traditionally been disproportionately dependent upon 
mining.  It also has the least diversified local economy in the Free State 
goldfields.  This is not unusual as it is internationally recognized that in 
the more rural and remote areas, it is impossible for a mining community 
not to become dependent on the income and employment provided 
through the mine.  Consequently, closure or reduced activities of the 
mine has significant impacts on the well-being of community.  This is 
exacerbated in developing countries, such as South Africa, where 
alternative economic activity may be more limited, and where local 
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government and communities lack the resources to develop a process 
that would provide suitable alternatives (Sheldon et al., 2002). 
 
Dependency on the mine is often increased when communities are not 
informed of the mine’s activities and future plans, and communities are 
thus not encouraged to prepare for a future without the mine.  In South 
Africa, several mine-dependent communities were found by Hoadley et 
al (2003) to lack capacity to identify alternative economic activities.  
Virginia was identified as such a community. 
 
Hamman (2003) found that the Virginia community’s awareness of mine 
closure is non-existent as the general expectation is for the mines to 
provide employment for generations to come.  However, unemployment 
of the youth is considered an issue of concern, as educational 
qualifications do not necessarily assist in securing a job within the limited 
local economy.  Apart from schools, there is also no other way to 
formally further one’s education or learn a new skill in the town.  This 
absence of local vocational training centres requires people seeking 
such skills, to make use of Welkom’s facilities, more than 30km away. 
 
5.5 SARM  
 
During 2001 the South African Royal Manufacturers (SARM)157 was 
founded in Virginia, Free State, with its main focus on producing high 
carat gold rope chain for export to the USA market.   
 
The table below describes the details of the NIPP characteristics of the 
project as described in 2004 by DTI. 
                                                 
157
 Harmony Gold’s annual reports have used both RSAM and SARM when referring to 
this factory.  It is also referred to as RSAM in the 2002 NIPP report. 
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Table 23 SARM NIP project as reported in 2004 
South African Royal Manufacturing (SARM) 
Product: Gold rope chain 
Sector: Value-added beneficiation 
Benefits: Exports (up to 400kg per month); 
New markets;  
Technology and expertise transfer; 
Value-added 
Local company involved: SARM 
Total investment: US$ 9m 
Projected sales: US$ 37m in 2004, up to US$ 350m by 2011 
Location: Free State 
Other benefits:  500 jobs created, mostly for rural women, rising to  
1 000 jobs when full production is reached 
Source: DTI 2004 report, p. 26 
 
SARM was initiated as a project by Harmony Gold Mining Company with 
funding from the IDC, supplemented with US$9 million from the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium as part of their offset obligations (DTI, 2004).    
Harmony Gold Mining Company viewed the venture as fulfilling its social 
corporate investment obligations as well as answering the call for 
beneficiation of metals within the country.  The company would provide 
the premises for the factory as well as provide the gold needed for 
operations in the factory on loan directly from its refinery, Musuku 
Beneficiation Systems.158   
 
Direct financial investment for the business would come through IDC 
and the NIPP.  The NIPP obligor participating in this project was BAE 
Systems/SAAB.  BAE Systems/SAAB’s spokesperson, Linden Birns, 
said the following about the founding of SARM:  “We see SARM as a 
Harmony-initiated project as they introduced the project to us, but it was 
our financial contribution which caused the business to happen” (E-mail 
from Linden Birns, 15 September 2005).  The BAE Systems/SAAB 
consortium funding was provided in the form of a rotating loan facility 
that could be drawn down over a five year period, and could be refunded 
through export sales.159   
 
                                                 
158
 Information provided by Mr. Ferdi Dippenaar, Marketing Director of Harmony Gold, 
July 2005 
159
 Telephonic interview with Linden Birns, 05 July 2005 
 221
Technology transfer and access to markets internationally would come 
through the Royal Chain Canada Inc.   
 
The original shareholders and investors are described below. 
 
5.5.1 Harmony Gold Mining Company 
 
Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited was formed in 1950 as a Rand 
Mines-managed company.  The company was formed with the exclusive 
goal of exploiting the single Harmony mine lease in Virginia.   
 
Rand Mines was established in 1893 and was unbundled in 1992 when 
the mining interests were separated into two separate entities:  
Randgold and Exploration.  By 1997 it had been rationalized into three 
South African mining companies:  
• Durban Roodepoort Deep (now called DRD Gold), 
• Harmony Gold Mining, and 
• Crown Consolidated Recoveries. 
A fourth part became an offshore gold company, Randgold Resources, 
which operates the Syama mine in Mali. 
 
In 1997 Harmony Gold Mining Company severed its links with Randgold 
and became an independent, unhedged, South African gold producer. 
Since then, the company has expanded from the single mine in Virginia 
to becoming the world’s sixth largest gold producer by acquiring both 
South African and overseas assets.  Overseas assets are located 
primarily in Australia and Papua New Guinea.   
 
In 2007 Harmony Gold Mining Company was the sixth largest gold 
producer in the world.  In Financial Year 2004/2005, Harmony produced 
three million ounces of gold, predominantly from South African sources 
(Harmony Gold, 2005).  Eighty-nine percent of the company’s production 
was in South Africa with 11% production overseas during June 2005.  
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Harmony Gold Mining Company employed 53 588 people (including 
contractors) at the end of June 2005, of which 96% (51 610) were 
employed in South Africa.  During 2007 the company suffered huge 
financial losses resulting in the resignation of the chief executive officer 
and the financial manger.  The company was also forced to sell some of 
its assets to remain afloat. 
 
Harmony Gold has always prided itself in being in the forefront of gold 
beneficiation in South Africa.  The development of a jewellery 
manufacturing hub for Virginia was announced by the company during 
2000.  The project was described as a co-ordinated approach between 
Harmony, labour, government and other stakeholders to establish a 
leading South African jewellery industry.  Although mentioned in the 
Free State provincial plan, the jewellery manufacturing hub was not 
mentioned in the local Matjaheng Integrated Development Plans of any 
of the past five years.  The past five years have shown that very little of 
this planned hub has been successful. 
 
Similarly the company saw itself during the time of the establishment of 
SARM as a forerunner in corporate social responsibility and in doing so 
providing possibilities for sustainable development 
(www.harmony.co.za160; Harmony, 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005).  This 
mantra reminds one of the words of Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Propaganda 
Minister of the German Third Reich: “Repeat a lie a thousand times and 
it becomes the truth...” (Doob,1950).  It must be noted that senior 
management and governance at Harmony Gold changed substantially in 
August 2007 when the then CEO, Bernard Swanepoel, resigned.  At that 
time, Harmony Gold was deep in debt and dealing with an accounting 
mess (Miningmx, 2009).  
5.5.2 BAE Systems/SAAB Consortium 
BAE Systems 
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 Accessed 28 November 2006 
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British Aerospace is Europe’s biggest arms production company and 
conducts sales across the globe.  The company was first formed as a 
nationalized corporation in April 1977 through the merger of British 
Aircraft Corporation, Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Hawker Siddeley 
Dynamics and Scottish Aviation.  In 1981 the United Kingdom 
Government sold 51.57% of its shares and in 1985 sold the rest of its 
shares, keeping only a special one British Pound share.     
 
The now privately-owned company began to expand its holdings 
significantly and now has interests in areas spanning the range of 
avionics and defence systems, but it is primarily an arms company 
present on five continents, although based in the United Kingdom.  The 
company owns 50% of European Aeronautical Defence and Space 
Company (EADS), with the other 50% held by AeroSpatiale Matra of 
France and DaimlerChrysler.161   
 
Even though BAE is a private company, it, as well as other British arms 
exporters, receives assistance from the British government through the 
Defence Export Services Organisation, which advises companies on 
markets and facilitates access to overseas decision-makers (Miller, 
1996).  Miller further argues that the British defence industry uses tactics 
to increase its arms exports, including “a willingness to facilitate offset 
deals; the use of aid in underwriting arm sales; and the provision of a 
subsidy for sales to developing countries in the form of disproportionate 
amounts of credit for military, as opposed to civil, exports”.  This is done 
with the endorsement of the British government (Miller, 1996:5).   
SAAB 
 
Although SAAB, a Swedish company, is now mainly known by the man 
in the street as an automobile manufacturer, the company was originally 
built to manufacture military aircraft (bombers and fighters) to be used in 
                                                 
161
 Engineering News, February 10, 2000 
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World War II.  The factory was built in 1938.  The manufactured planes 
were mostly copies of German and American design and the first SAAB 
in-house designed aircraft, the SAAB 17, was completed in 1941.  
Shortly thereafter, a bomber, SAAB 18, also rolled off the production 
line.  In 1944, towards the end of World War II, SAAB began work on 
non-military aircraft – primarily the SAAB 90 and 91, which were small 
passenger planes (www.swedecar.com/saab_history162). 
 
Even though SAAB now primarily manufactures automobiles, it is still 
recognized as a large military production operation, and it still 
manufactures both civilian and military aircraft, such as the Viggen and 
now in its consortium with BAE Systems, the Gripen.  The military 
production arm of the company focuses on high technology defence, 
aviation and Space.  Shareholders include Investor AB, the 
Scandinavian Investment Group and now BAE Systems (www.saab.se). 
The BAE Systems/SAAB consortium 
 
Even though not mentioned on the BAE Systems website, a joint venture 
between SAAB and BAE Systems (Gripen International) was established 
in 2001 in order to collectively fulfil the two companies’ South African 
industrial participation (IP) commitments.  The joint venture is equally 
owned by SAAB and BAE and is registered in both Sweden and Britain 
(Gripen News, September 04, 2000).  In South Africa a company, The 
South Africa National Industrial Participation (SANIP), was established 
to act as the IP project manager in South Africa. 
The South African arms deal 
 
In terms of the South African arms deal, the BAE Systems/SAAB 
consortium agreement, signed in December 1999, was set in fixed dollar 
terms at a cost of US$2.2 billion, making it the largest part of the arms 
deal.   
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In terms of the deal, the companies will jointly supply the South African 
Air Force with 28 Gripen fighters and 24 Hawk trainers.  In terms of the 
attached offsets, the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium’s investment takes 
the form of a mix of 21 NIP and 12 DIP projects.  The specific areas 
were identified to include forestry, automotive, electricity, power 
generation, engineering and metals processing.  Work packages and 
technological transfers worth US$1.5 billion in South Africa’s defence 
and aerospace sector, as well as civil industrial areas identified by 
government for strategic development were also included (Gripen News, 
December 10, 1999).  Due to the size of the deal, the company will 
discharge the obligations over an eleven year period.   
Defence Industrial Participation 
 
According to the press release at the time, the DIP benefits from the 
BAE/SAAB consortium will come in three forms: 
• Local defence firms will earn over R4 billion via direct participation 
in the production of the aircraft and ships being procured.  This is 
worth about 20% of the total.  In addition, the suppliers are 
transferring technology worth about R3 billion in royalties and 
licence agreements to South African firms, and will direct export 
orders to South African firms. 
• Counter-purchase by the defence equipment suppliers of South 
African goods, including automotive components, furniture, 
fabricated metal goods and electronic goods worth approximately 
45% of the total value.   
• Foreign investment in South Africa associated by companies 
associated with the equipment suppliers – worth approximately 
35% (Defence Systems Daily; Press Release by Government 
Communication and Information Service, September 15, 1999). 
 
State-owned Denel is one of the local defence firms that stood to benefit 
from the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium DIP offsets. 
 226
National Industrial Participation 
 
Although it was originally announced in 1999 that the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium would initiate 21 NIP projects, by 2003 the 
list of these projects included 23 projects as demonstrated in the table 
below. 
 
Table 24  BAE Systems/SAAB’s NIPP projects’ geographic spread 
Geographic Area Number of Projects 
Gauteng: cities 8 
Gauteng: rural 2 
KwaZulu-Natal: cities 7 
KwaZulu-Natal: rural 3 
Eastern Cape: cities 3 
Eastern Cape: rural 1 
Western Cape: cities 2 
Western Cape: rural 1 
North West: rural 2 
Free State: rural 2 
Mpumalanga: rural 1 
Source: NIPP 2003 report 
 
In terms of its five NIP projects that are precious metal beneficiation 
projects or projects related to beneficiation, the BAE Systems/SAAB 
Consortium has had mixed success.  Its small sponsorship to the 
Harmony Jewellery School was limited to one year163, while funding 
towards Mintek’s gold technology and the Implats platinum and gold 
jewellery project have been successful to date.  However, its ventures 
into Oro-Masaka and SARM have not been successful with both projects 
grounding to a halt a few months after it was initiated.   
 
The gold advance scheme in association with Gold Fields, AngloGold 
Ashanti and Standard Bank of South Africa has been withdrawn (DTI, 
2009:37). 
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 Interview with Alta Wessels, Project Manager, Harmony Jewellery School, 16 May 
2005 
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5.5.3 Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
 
The Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (IDC) was 
established in 1940 to promote economic growth and industrial 
development in South Africa through the provision of both loans and 
equity financing at commercial levels (www.idc.co.za164).  Until the 
1990s loans were provided at very low interest rates.  Although it was 
originally 100% state-funded, it is now completely self-financing.  
 
The IDC’s loans directly accounted for around 12% of gross domestic 
fixed investment in manufacturing from 1998 to 2000 (IDC, 2001a, 
2001b). It has historically been oriented to the development of extremely 
large-scale mineral beneficiation projects and has close links with 
previously state-owned industrial enterprises such as Iscor and Sasol, 
as well as the major conglomerates.  In 1998, the IDC owned 11.3% of 
Gencor, 14.4% of Iscor, 9.1 per cent of Billiton and 8.2 per cent of Sasol.  
The projects in the non-ferrous metals and basic iron and steel sectors 
with major IDC participation alone accounted for approximately 25% of 
total manufacturing investment from 1992 to 1997 (IDC, 1997).  
 
From June 1994 to June 1999, over half the IDC's investments by value, 
were classified as being in basic, non-precious metals (IDC, 1999).  A 
greater focus in recent years on small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
as well as tourism and agriculture projects, has shifted the IDC project 
mix to some extent.   
 
SMEs are defined by the IDC as business ventures with total assets 
valued to less than R30 million.  Lending to SMEs accounted for around 
75% of the number of projects and 15% of the amount of finance 
authorized by the IDC in 2001.  According to Mr. Kevin Jacobs165, 
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 Accessed 10 January 2005 
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 Interview with Kevin Jacobs, Industry Analyst, IDC in 07 July 2005 
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jewellery manufacturing initiatives could qualify as SMEs provided that 
they fit the definition and have other donors that assist them with the 
machinery and other intensive capital requirements. 
 
IDC has funded, in partnership with the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium 
and Harmony Gold Mining Company, two gold jewellery factories located 
in Virginia.  Both these factories have failed.  These two ventures were 
IDC’s first steps in investing in gold beneficiation. 
5.5.4 Royal Chain Canada Inc. 
 
The Royal Chain Canada Inc. is based in Ontario, Canada and was first 
established in 1989.  The company is producing high quality gold chain 
for the design, wholesale and manufacturing trades.  The firm exports 
primarily to the USA (www.canaoro.com166). 
 
Enquiries about SARM via telephone calls and e-mails to Royal Chain 
Canada Inc. were not responded to date. 
 
5.5.6 Ownership post-2004 
 
In 2004 the ownership of SARM was reported as follows:   
• 40% is owned by IDC 
• 15% owned by Valentino Diaz, who was SARM Managing 
Director and Royal Chain Canada Inc. Vice President Sales (DTI, 
2003) 
• 15% owned by Luis Perez, the SARM CEO 
• 30% owned by Royal Chain Canada Inc.167 
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 Accessed 12 July 2006 
167
 Personal communication with Perez in April 2004; Mining Weekly, April 16, 2004; 
Mining Weekly, February 17, 2005 
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This new ownership structure indicates that at some stage in 2003 and 
2004 there was a management buy-in to the company.  The BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium was not mentioned because it is not seen as 
an owner as such, but rather a provider of start-up funding through a 
rotating loan facility that could be drawn down over a five year period, 
and the loan could be refunded to the BAE Systems/SAAB Consortium 
through profits made through export sales.168   
 
It is interesting to note that AgustaWestland has a different approach to 
carrying-out its obligation.  In its beneficiation NIP project, Filk Gold 
Chains of South Africa, it did not directly invest in (or loan money to) the 
project, but rather facilitated a buy-in from an Italian firm into the existing 
project.  In this way, the NIPP obligation is completed successfully in 
that the funding was transferred and the project benefited, but there is 
no ‘loan’ hanging over the head of the project.   
5.5.7 SARM Exports 
 
SARM started production in May 2002.  The factory aimed to export 
annually two tons of locally produced 10-, 14- and 18-carat gold rope 
chain.   
 
On 12 March 2003 the company released a press release that 
announced that it had already exported finished and semi-finished 
products to the value of US$3 million to North America since the start of 
operations, and that they aimed to export US$15 million worth of gold 
rope chain in the first year of full-scale production.  It could not be 
confirmed whether this was achieved.  SARM was supposed to feed 
Royal Chain Canada’s North American distribution network.   
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 Mr. Linden Birns, interviewed on 05 July 2005 
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DTI reported in 2004 that exports had reached up to 400kg of gold rope 
per month.  It projected sales of US$ 37 million for the 2004 financial 
year and sales up to US$ 350 million by 2011 (DTI 2004:26).   
 
5.5.8 SARM Employment 
 
Gold rope chain is hand-made and labour-intensive.  It was reported in 
the media that about 500 women was employed when the factory started 
production.  In 2003 Harmony Gold Mining Company reported in its 
annual report that the factory employed 700 people in that year 
(Harmony, 2003).  This in sharp contrast with information in the 2004 
NIPP report which indicated that 500 jobs were created; an article by 
Mining Weekly, February 17, 2005 which reported the creation of 600 
jobs; and yet another report by Mining Weekly169  published several 
months after the closure of the factory, which indicated that there were 
only 200 permanent jobs.  Without access to the company’s official 
records, it was not possible to ascertain exactly how many jobs there 
actually were. 
 
Although SARM reported in 2004 that it had employed 500 people with 
another 1000 jobs in the pipeline, the company closed abruptly in early 
December 2004170 leaving all workers unemployed.   
5.5.9 Theft and Fraud at SARM 
 
The SARM Managing Director and CEO were arrested on February 14, 
2005 on charges of fraud and theft.  Reports have subsequently 
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 April 15, 2005 
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 Some reports indicated that it closed in November 2004 (Business Day, May 27, 
2005).  Although it was not possible to get an exact closure date from key informants or 
the focus group discussions, the focus groups participants were adamant that  the 
factory was shut overnight during the ‘last days of November and early days of 
December 2004’ period. 
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revealed that Mr. Perez and Mr. Diaz were also directors of a USA-
based company called Mega Gold.171  In contrast with media reports that 
Royal Chain Canada Inc. was the international outlet for SARM, Mega 
Gold was SARM’s only overseas buyer.172  The fact that Valentino Diaz 
was also listed as Royal Chain Canada Inc.’s vice president of sales 
should have been a red flag to IDC, Harmony and BAE/SAAB before the 
business was even formalized.     
 
Linden Birns, the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium spokesperson, wrote 
in an e-mail to me in September 2005 that “the creditors moved to have 
SARM’s operations suspended in total to safeguard and secure their 
loans.  Messrs Dias (sic) and Perez left South Africa at around this time, 
but as was widely reported in the news media, they were arrested by the 
Scorpions in a sting operation when they returned to South Africa a few 
weeks later” (E-mail from Linden Birns, 15 September 2005).  The BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium considered itself to be a creditor.   
 
Harmony Gold Mining Company’s Marketing Director, Ferdi Dippenaar, 
was quoted in a Reuters press release on February 16, 2005 referring to 
the SARM Managing Director and CEO: “We became uncomfortable 
with their business practices.  Their company had bought gold from 
Harmony over a couple of years, and SARM owed Harmony 68 million 
Rand.”  Through this statement it was clear that Harmony Gold Mining 
Company had separated itself from SARM completely, referring to it as a 
separate entity, while viewing Harmony Gold Mining Company as an 
affected creditor. 
 
SARM was however not Harmony Gold Mining Company’s first 
encounter with Messrs Diaz and Perez and Mega Gold. 
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 There is a company called Mega Gold listed in Florida, USA.   
172
 The Star, February 16, 2006 
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5.5.9.1 Via D’Oro 
 
Harmony Gold Mining Company and the Free State Development 
Corporation (FDC)173 founded a gold jewellery company in 1999.  The 
company was called Via D’Oro (VDO).  Mega Gold obtained shares in 
VDO at some stage and also became the main buyer of the VDO 
jewellery in the USA.   
 
According to the Scorpions’ spokesperson Makhosini Nkosi as quoted in 
The Star: “In June 2000 the first batch of jewellery, valued at about 
US$35 000 was produced by VDO and sent to Mega Gold, which said 
that problems with the shipment would result in a loss of US$4 000.  
Two more shipments followed and VDO was ultimately conned out of 
US$195 000.  VDO was left stranded, owing Harmony R6 million as 
Perez disappeared after the third shipment” (The Star, February 16, 
2005).   
 
Harmony Gold Mining Company closed down VDO in February 2001 
resulting in job losses of 475.  According to the FDC website, SARM was 
established on the refurbished VDO premises and that most of the 
workers who lost their jobs were employed at SARM (www.fdc.co.za)174.  
This could not be verified at the focus groups held in May 2006, who 
could only vaguely recall VDO.  However, it appears more likely that 
SARM was established on the refurbished premises evacuated by 
OroMaska (which came into operation in 2001) after it took over the 
premises after VDO failed.   
 
The Scorpions spokesperson, Mr. Makhosini Nkosi, was further quoted 
in The Star with reference to SARM: “SARM’s only buyer was Mega 
Gold, which owes it R4 million for jewellery.  SARM owes Harmony Mine 
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 Other possible parties/owners are not known and it does not appear to be a NIP 
project. 
174
 Last accessed on October 18, 2006. 
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R68 million for gold provided” (The Star, February 16, 2005).  It has 
been impossible to get this verified as the repeated response from 
Harmony Gold Mining Company has been that the forensic investigation 
into the business of SARM is still ongoing.  All attempts to reach SARM’s 
liquidators and specifically Theo van den Heever were unsuccessful.  
The Business Day also reported that SARM bought gold on credit from 
Harmony Gold Mining Company to make jewellery which it then passed 
on to Mega Gold, owned by Perez and Diaz (who were both not only 
shareholders, but also directors with executive powers, in SARM) for 
sale in the USA market and for which SARM never was paid.175 
 
It is not clear why Harmony Gold Mining Company would enter into 
business relations with two individuals and their company who had led to 
the demise of VDO. 
5.5.10 The court case 
 
Mr. Diaz and Mr. Perez appeared in the Johannesburg Magistrate Court 
on February 16, 2005 on the charges of theft from SARM and were 
granted bail of R500 000.  The court case was postponed to March 10, 
2005 and transferred to the Virginia Magistrate Court.  On March 10 the 
case was transferred to the Welkom Regional Court and postponed until 
May 9, 2005.  In June 2006 the trial started, but the Scorpions indicated 
that they were not ready to proceed, leading to the case being removed 
from the court roll and Perez and Diaz free to leave the country. 
5.5.11 SARM’s Liquidation 
 
The company is still under liquidation and a forensic investigation by 
KPMG was still not complete in early 2007, and it appears as if it has 
now been put on the backburner indefinitely.  Enquiries about SARM to 
both KPMG and D&T Trust, the liquidators, were not responded to as 
they said they could not discuss the matter with me.  Theo van den 
                                                 
175
 The Business Day, May 27, 2005 
 234
Heever of D&T Trust was however quoted in the Business Day as 
saying that although the investigation had not been completed yet, there 
was a “fair amount of disingenuousness” (Business Day, May 27, 2005).  
During 2007 the machinery and other equipment owned by SARM was 
auctioned off as part of the liquidation process. 
 
At a meeting in July 2005 with representatives from IDC, I was told that 
they could not discuss an individual case, such as SARM with me, 
because they did not have the details and that the investigation was still 
not complete.  They said that as this was a bankrupt business, IDC 
would try and recoup monies after the investigation was completed, but 
that monies which could not be recouped would be written off as a 
loss.176  IDC was quoted in the Business Day as saying that ‘the venture 
failed because it had been based on a weak Rand’ (Business Day, May 
27, 2005).  This was not the case.  Even if there was a marginal truth to 
that statement, Filk Gold Chains of South Africa demonstrated that even 
with the stronger Rand, gold jewellery remained in high demand 
overseas and that gold jewellery manufacturers could remain afloat with 
the correct business practices and acumen.   
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described the background and context within which 
SARM was founded and operated in.   
 
The Free State Province has experienced a steady decline in GGP 
during the past decade and can be considered as one of the country’s 
poorer provinces.  One of the reasons for this is the steady decline in the 
gold mining industry in this area.  Virginia is located in the goldfields and 
has a town, which is completely reliant on gold mining.   It has a high 
level of poverty and unemployment.  In this town Harmony Gold Mining 
Company is the only mining company operating and thus finds itself 
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under pressure to invest in socio-economic projects and in recent years, 
the pressure to invest in gold beneficiation.  At the same time the NIPP 
obligors are looking for investment possibilities in order to complete their 
obligations.  SARM is established in this context.  Although on the 
surface the company fails because of theft of gold, there are more 
complex reasons for its failure.   
 
The findings of the evaluation are discussed in the next chapter.  The 
company is evaluated against the NIPP objectives: sustainable 
economic growth; establishment of new trading partners; foreign 
investment into South Africa; exports of South African “value-added” 
goods and services; job creation; human resource development; 
technology transfer; economic advantages for previously disadvantaged 
communities.   To further enhance the findings of the evaluation, SARM 
was also evaluated against the performance of two other jewellery 
manufacturing beneficiation projects:  Filk Gold Chains of South Africa 
and Silplat (Pty) Ltd (discussed in chapter 4).   
 236
 
6 FINDINGS 
 
SARM was evaluated against the NIPP objectives as described in earlier 
chapters.  To further enhance the findings of the evaluation, SARM was 
also evaluated against the performance of two other jewellery 
manufacturing beneficiation projects:  Filk Gold Chains of South Africa 
and Silplat (Pty) Ltd, which were discussed in detail in Chapter 4.   
 
6.1 Foreign investment into South Africa 
6.1.1 Direct cash foreign investment 
 
Direct foreign investment can be a major stimulus to economic growth in 
developing countries. One of the main objectives of the NIPP is to 
encourage direct foreign investment into South Africa.  The main catalyst 
of this investment should be the NIPP obligors and the vehicle for such 
investment would be a business venture that would be beneficial for the 
country.  DTI guidelines indicate that business proposals linked with 
NIPP and offsets should be made on the principles of mutual benefit and 
good business sense (DTI, 2001).   
 
NIPP 
Objectives 
Filk Gold 
Chains of SA 
SARM Silpat 
Foreign 
investment into 
South Africa 
 
US$1.5 million  US$9 million.   US$47million (2004 NIP 
annual report, p. 26) 
US$25 million  
(Implats press release, 07 April 
2004) 
 
Of the three projects, Filk Gold Chains received the least direct foreign 
cash investment.  The Filk Gold Chains project received US$1.5 million 
cash investment from Agusta Westland as part of Agusta Westland’s 
NIPP obligations (DTI, 2002).  SARM received a cash injection of US$9 
million from the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium (DTI, 2004).  Although 
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the exact amount is uncertain, compared to the other two projects, 
Silplat received the most direct foreign cash investment.  The venture is 
said to have received a combined foreign and local investments worth 
US$25 million (Implats Press Release, April 07, 2004), the DTI 2004 
NIPP Annual Report list the project as receiving investment worth US$ 
47 million from the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium alone, excluding 
local investment.   
 
In terms of offsets and projects linked to offsets, it is critical to ask how 
the offset activity is being financed.  If it is fully financed by capital raised 
outside the weapons purchasing nation, then it is actually bringing in 
fresh capital.  In the case of SARM, only approximately 50% of the 
investment was foreign.  SARM received US$9 million from BAE 
Systems/SAAB, 40% of the complete funding package came from the 
IDT.  Harmony Gold provided most of the machinery (originally 
purchased for the two ventures that failed previously) as well as the 
buildings that housed the business. 
 
Internationally the sale or donation of redundant mine infrastructure as a 
means of supporting business development and alternative economic 
activities is common closure practice (World Bank and IFC, 2002a).  
There are commercial benefits associated with the responsible transfer 
of redundant mine assets to new business ventures for the mining 
company.  In the present South African legislative and accounting 
framework, mining infrastructure is unique in that it is the only asset that 
is not depreciated to zero value during its commercial life.  International 
mine legislation, including South African legislation, requires that the 
company restores the mining site to a stable, non-mining condition, 
preferably one resembling the status quo prior to mining.  Thus mining 
infrastructure in the form of buildings can become quite a liability to the 
owners.  As an alternative the building may be sold or transferred to 
another entity but only after it has been determined that this new owner 
possesses the means to manage the impacts upon the land – which 
would be minimal in the case of a jewellery factory.    
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In the case of a business being the new owner, its ability to generate a 
positive cash flow over a period of years and on a scale capable of 
dealing with the impacts, is deemed adequate assurance.  The transfer 
of the building into the name of another business does not require a 
payment from the receiving business in order to allow the mining 
company to qualify to remove the infrastructure from its list of liabilities.  
There is thus benefit for both sides.  The new business venture can 
acquire premises with at near zero costs, which is a huge advantage as 
it frees the business venture from having a lease, or the need to 
purchase a substantial capital asset.  This is an immediate inherent 
competitive advantage for any business. 
 
Harmony Gold Mining Company has been providing the buildings for the 
factories and accommodation for overseas workers.  According to the 
Harmony Gold annual reports beneficiation enterprises are being 
established in existing excess company infrastructures.  It was not 
possible to ascertain whether these buildings had been transferred to 
the jewellery manufacture companies and whether the buildings have 
been removed from Harmony Gold Mining Company’s list of assets.  
The information was deemed confidential. 
 
6.1.2 Foreign technology transfer 
 
In terms of the South African Industrial Participation policy, foreign 
investment also includes technology transfer into the country.  
Technology transfers can play a significant role in increasing the 
factory’s competitiveness and the quality of their output, while on a 
broader social level building the indigenous manufacturing capacity.  
However, research has shown that in many cases technology transfers 
do not provide sufficient input to develop or sustain indigenous 
manufacturing capacity (Cawthra, 2000; Martin, 1996; Struys, 2002).  
The limitations of technology transfer are not limited to the NIP 
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programmes.  Haines (2006) reports that within the DIP, trends include 
limited technology transfer; concerns about leaching of local technology 
and loss of local intellectual capital; as well as little or no planned 
domestic conversion of imported technology as part of the offsets.    
 
NIPP 
Objectives 
Filk Gold 
Chains of SA 
SARM Silpat 
Technology 
Transfer 
Yes, albeit not 
100% due to 
protection of 
own turf by 
overseas 
company 
Could not be 
established for 
sure, although 
report of purchase 
of casting 
machinery from 
Italy, however 
conditions of 
these deals not 
established 
Yes, albeit not 100% 
due to protection of 
own turf by overseas 
company 
 
Filk Gold Chains of South Africa only has approximately 10% of the 
technology capacity of Gruppo Industriale Filk.  South African technology 
is years behind that of Italy.177 
 
Apart from labour, all input costs in jewellery manufacturing in South 
Africa are expensive.  This is because all machinery to mass produce 
jewellery is manufactured overseas and needs to be imported, which 
makes the purchase foreign exchange dependent. 
 
It is not clear whether South Africa is receiving state-of-the-art 
technology through the NIPP initiatives, but it is highly unlikely.  In a 
forced situation, where companies are forced to cooperate instead of 
doing it because it makes good business sense, such as is the case with 
the NIPP projects, the transfer of technology cannot be sustainable 
because the transferring company will not stop advancing in its own 
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knowledge and technological prowess, and it would be most unlikely that 
they will enhance the receiving company’s to be on par with their own as 
the receiving company still essentially remains a market competitor.   
 
Mr. Tarlie, OroAfrica178, confirmed this and believes that the Italian firm, 
Gruppo Industriale Filk, would not transfer all their knowledge or make 
the newest and most advanced technology available to the receiving 
firm, as they would need to protect their own industry.  In order to 
address this the supplier in some offset cases agrees to invest in 
physical plant and technology in the purchasing country and purchase 
back a certain proportion of the output produced there by the receiving 
company using the technology and plant.  In this way, uncertainty about 
the quality of the technology and plant is mitigated as the receiving firm 
will be sharing the risk with the obligor (Williamson, 1993).  This scenario 
does not appear to have been the case in any of the three projects.  
 
In the case of SARM it is not clear where the technology came from, 
whether Canada or India.  This is not clear because SARM took over the 
premises from which Oro-Maska operated and presumably used the 
machinery available on the premises179.   
 
In 2004, Mining Weekly180 reported that SARM was starting to use 
casting methods to complement the chain processes, and that 
machinery had been installed.  The Free State Development Corporation 
also reported that SARM had successfully negotiated with an Italian 
investor to form a joint venture worth R120 million, which would create 
50 to 60 jobs.  This was reported nowhere else and my enquiry about 
this to Harmony Gold Mining Company was not responded to.  It is 
possible that this joint venture had produced the gold casting machines.  
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 As part of the SARM liquidation process all machinery and other equipment that 
formed part of the business were auctioned during 2007.  Both OroAfrica and Silplats 
bought equipment at the auction. 
180
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Mining Weekly further reported that technicians were brought in from 
Peru to operate the machinery and that a person had been sent to Italy 
for training.  It is not clear if this person was South African or Peruvian.  
The focus group participants were unaware of South African employees 
that were sent overseas for training. 
 
Even though it was reported in Harmony Gold Mining Company’s annual 
reports and several media articles that the investors in SARM had 
transferred technology, skills and management expertise to SARM, this 
could not be verified sufficiently.   
 
6.2 New foreign trading partners and sustained exports 
 
For offsets to carry genuine economic impact, world demand for the 
underlying products must be increased (Miramon, 1985).  Even though 
the high gold price led to a drop in the demand for gold jewellery 
internationally in recent years, this is not considered to a serious or long-
term condition and there still appears to be sufficient demand world-
wide.   
 
In 2000, South Africa exported approximately 15% of its gold 
manufactured jewellery to US, UK and Australia (Jewellery Council of 
South Africa).  In comparison, OroAfrica, the largest gold jewellery 
producer in SA currently, exports 80% of its products to those countries.    
The local market buys predominantly 9ct jewellery, and once the local 
market is saturated, 9ct gold products are exported primarily to Australia, 
UK and Mauritius.  Few 9ct gold products are exported to the US, who 
prefers 14 and 18ct gold products.181  OroAfrica distributes through 
world-leading jewellery brands, such as Fope, Ronco and Piero Milano.  
At this time Silplat relies primarily on its Italian partner, Silmar, for 
international distribution.  Like Filk, Silmar is a well-known international 
brand name.   
                                                 
181
 Mr. Mark Tarlie, OroAfrica, interviewed in July 2003 
 242
 
NIPP 
Objectives 
Silk Gold 
Chains of SA 
SARM Silpat 
Establishment 
of new trading 
partners 
Yes, there are 
distribution 
agreements with 
various overseas 
distributors in 
USA, Europe 
and Far East 
Had an exclusive 
deal with one US-
based company.  
Led to fraud and 
theft. 
Yes, working 
through Silmar to 
establish trading 
partners in Europe 
and elsewhere 
Exports of 
South African 
“Value-added” 
goods and 
services 
 
Yes Yes, over a one 
year period, 
although the bulk 
of these goods 
were not paid for. 
Yes 
 
Clusters are important vehicles for access to global value chains for new 
enterprises (Nadvi and Barrientos, 2004).  Compared to Filk Gold 
Chains of South Africa and Silplat, SARM was lagging behind.  Both 
companies produce gold products for both the national (local) and 
international markets.  SARM was not producing for the local or even 
national market and its main challenge was to be globally competitive.  
But its business was not well placed within linkages and clusters, and 
SARM only had one market outlet: Mega Gold in the USA.  In contrast 
with media reports that Royal Chain Canada Inc. was the international 
outlet for SARM, Mega Gold was SARM’s only overseas buyer.182 
 
Linkages between the Agusta Filk Gold Chains of South Africa, the BAE 
SARM, or even BAE Silplat projects are non-existent.  Indeed, within the 
Strategic Defence Programme project portfolio, contact between the 
main obligors appears at best rudimentary.  The Department of Trade 
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and Industry appears to be dealing with obligors on an individual basis 
(Haines and Wellmann, 2005).   
 
SARM appears to have sold its products exclusively to Mega Gold, 
which appears to be based in Florida in the USA.  It is not a well-known 
entity in the international jewellery trade.  Royal Chain Canada Inc. was 
reported to be one of the main investors in the business and it owned 
30% of SARM.  It does not appear as if any products were sold to Royal 
Chain Canada Inc. but even if products were sold to the Canadian 
company, the company only exports to the USA and not to other 
international countries. 
 
Both Filk Gold Chains of South Africa and Silplat have linkages to 
Europe through their Italian alliances.  This allows them not only 
available markets but also a link with a well-established brand name.  
These Italian firms in turn have forward linkages to other international 
markets, such as North America and the East.   Silplat have different 
and individual forward linkages for both its two main precious metals, 
gold and platinum, products. 
    
Filk Gold Chains of South Africa has during its lifespan managed to sign 
numerous distribution deals with some of the world’s leading jewellery 
brands, such as Fope, Ronco and Pierre Milano.  These distribution 
deals still exist and OroAfrica is reaping the benefits.  The foreign brand 
names have secure export markets in the United States, their biggest 
partner; Brazil; UK; Europe; Australia and Mauritius.   
6.2.1 Export Credit Calculations 
 
The manner in which credits are awarded for exported products under 
the NIPP has been criticized by researchers.   
 
The NIPP credit system measures each credit as equal to one US dollar 
of the NIP obligation amount.  Certain types of projects, such as 
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research and development projects, are awarded greater credits.  
Credits are awarded accumulatively over the NIP obligation period and 
based upon successful performance.   Export credits are awarded on the 
basis of the total value of the exported product, rather than on the value 
added by the investment.  This can result in severe distortion when 
dealing with gold beneficiation.  Export credits are claimed on the full 
value of the export rather than on the value-added.  For a high-value 
commodity like gold, this can lead to bloated calculations.  Thus: if the 
gold price is US$400/ounce, and the beneficiated costs are 
US$100/ounce, the credit would be calculated as if the total value of the 
credits were US$500/ounce.   
 
In order for credits to be awarded, economic activity must be shown as 
clearly generated by the offset obligation and that it would not have 
happened anyway without the offset.  This is nearly impossible to 
measure and ascertain especially in situations where the business 
already exists prior to the offset intervention and the offset’s aim is to 
enlarge its existing activities.  Also problematic is the rule that 
companies can claim full offset credits for investments they claim to 
have “facilitated” from other sources, such as local banks or IDC or FDC.  
Many projects are majority-funded by the IDC or local banks, with the 
foreign arms company investing little, yet they can claim full offset 
credits.   
 
In 2004 it was reported that the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium 
achieved 149% of its investment milestone.  This milestone included 
SARM, as well as Musuku Beneficiation Systems.  Whether the credits 
will be adapted to reflect the failure of SARM could not be confirmed by 
Mr. Dion Harold of DTI183.  The NIPP 2005/2006 Annual Report did not 
comment on the failure of SARM or how this will affect BAE 
Systems/SAAB’s credits.  It did however indicate that the BAE 
Systems/SAAB consortium had met a milestone with US$2.3 billion 
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worth of credits (p. 24).  The report credits gold beneficiation and the 
Gold Loan Scheme184 as the main contributing projects to this milestone.  
It is important to note that of 13 December 2007 the Gold Advance 
Scheme had not assisted a single jeweller as yet and the pilot is 
considered to have been flawed and not successful.185   
 
6.3 Job creation 
 
NIPP 
Objectives 
Silk Gold 
Chains of SA 
SARM Silpat 
Job creation 
 
Yes, jobs 
increased with 
more than 50% 
since the NIPP 
intervention 
Approximately 
200 permanent 
jobs plus some 
contract workers, 
however all jobs 
were temporary 
and not 
sustainable  
Saved the 120 jobs 
that was in 
existence prior to 
the NIPP 
intervention.  These 
jobs have been 
sustained. 
Upliftment of 
members of 
previously 
disadvantaged 
communities 
Yes, employs 
predominantly 
Coloured and 
Black workers, 
large amounts 
females, in line 
with Western 
Cape 
demography, 
also employs 
deaf women, 
which looks good 
in terms of 
Equity. 
Employed 
previously 
unemployed 
Black women 
from the local 
area, yet did not 
provide 
sustainable jobs, 
so it was not a 
sustainable 
improvement of 
the 
disadvantaged 
community 
Employs 
predominantly 
Coloured and Black 
workers, largely 
female 
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The number of jobs created in the jewellery manufacturing sector 
depends on the type of manufacturing engaged in.  Those 
manufacturers who primarily use machinery require fewer employees to 
manufacture jewellery compared to those manufacturers who use cast 
methods or who make hand-made jewellery.  Hand-made jewellery is 
labour-intensive and requires more staff than either of the other two 
methods.   
6.3.1 SARM 
 
SARM produced primarily hand-made gold rope, which is very labour-
intensive and can lead to creation of a large number of jobs.  Several 
figures of how many jobs had been created at SARM have been bandied 
about.  Harmony Gold Mining Company reported in its annual reports 
that SARM created 700 jobs, DTI reported in 2004 that it was 500 jobs, 
the Mining Weekly reported in February 2005 that 600 jobs had been 
created, and in April 2005 the same Mining Weekly reported that there 
were in actual fact only 200 permanent jobs and some contract workers.   
 
SARM imported eight workers from Peru with the understanding that 
they will be used to provide on-the-job training for local employees.186  
The local employees were semi- and unskilled workers from the Virginia 
area.  The focus group participants, who are all ex-SARM employees, 
were not sure how many people worked at the factory, but none of the 
participants or their colleagues with whom they have contact, were 
permanently employed.  They were all employed on short-term 
contracts.  At the time of SARM’s closure, these contracts were 
suspended and because they were not permanent workers, they did not 
qualify legally to be retrenched nor could they qualify to go through the 
retrenchment steps as legislated in the labour legislation.   
 
According to the focus group participants, they were told that once the 
liquidation process is completed and once the creditors were paid, and 
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provided that there were any funds left, the workers would benefit.  
When asked whether they are kept informed about the liquidation 
process, they said no.  They did report though that when the factory shut 
down, they were told that should it re-open they will be re-hired.  When 
asked whether they had any continued contact with Harmony Gold 
Mining Company, or a representative from SARM, to provide them with 
updates and keep them informed, they said no.  This confirms that 
Harmony Gold Mining Company does not interact with community 
stakeholders on a regular basis, as required from a good corporate 
citizen.  The behaviour of good corporate citizens with regards to their 
employees encompasses a broad range of operational issues.  These 
include fair pay, a safe work place, equal opportunities, the promotion of 
diversity and support for employee development (Tuffrey, undated).  
SARM fell short on several of these aspects.   
 
Those focus group participants who were lucky enough to find 
alternative employment took those jobs.  Unfortunately these are in the 
minority and the majority remains unemployed. 
 
6.3.2 Silplat and Filk Gold Chains 
 
The NIPP expectation of the Silplat project is that it will provide 120 
sustained jobs (DTI, 2004).  At the time of the formation of Silplat, SA 
Link had 120 permanent staff members.  The new venture absorbed all 
the SA Link employees (Implats, 2004; Confirmed by Mr Johan Smit, 
CEO of Silplat, on 31 August 2007).  These 120 jobs have remained 
sustained even through the recent economic downturn.  The employees 
are predominantly female and from previously disadvantaged population 
groups. 
 
The 2002 and 2003 DTI reports expected the Filk Gold Chains of South 
Africa joint venture to create employment for 115 persons by the end of 
the obligation period, 2006.  In November 2004 OroAfrica employed 128 
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employees and by early 2006 it had increased to 160 permanent 
employees.187  The project created 120 permanent jobs by March 2007 
at the time of the completion of the obligation.   
 
According to Mr. Peter Cloete, Secretary of the Jewellers and 
Goldsmiths Union (Cape)188, the company had a remarkable growth 
after Filk Gold Chains of South Africa was formed and started operating. 
He estimates an increase of at least 50% of employees who fall within 
his union’s bargaining units.  In 2003 that was a total number of 
approximately 80 members from both Filk Gold Chains of South Africa 
and Trigold.  He estimates the total number of staff (inclusive of 
secretarial and other “white collar” staff) of OroAfrica as a group to be 
about 150 staff members.  The staff members are similar to the Western 
Cape demographics and in line with the Employment Equity Act of 1998.   
 
Mr. Mark Tarlie confirmed that in June 2003 they employed 148 workers, 
and had at one stage employed 180 workers, but due to the 
deterioration of the South African economy during the period 2001-2003 
the company had to retrench some staff members.  A further 20 workers 
were retrenched in early 2004, when even though the company 
increased the volume of its products sold by up to 15%, the strong Rand 
and the strong gold price, resulted in a drop in Rand turn-over for the 
company, forcing it to retrench employees.189   By early March 2006, 
OroAfrica confirmed 160 permanent employees.190 
 
The number of jobs held by Trigold and Filk Gold Chains of South Africa 
were not segregated during the monitoring and for statistical purposes. 
For the purposes of the NIP calculations, it appears as if both 
companies’ employees are lumped together.  This was confirmed by Mr 
Tarlie, via e-mail on 09 October 2003. 
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The Deaf Federation of South Africa191 do however keep separate 
statistics per company and have confirmed that Filk Gold Chains of 
South Africa employed four deaf women and that Trigold employed two 
deaf women on the factory floor and assembly line.  OroAfrica started 
employing deaf women in May 2003.  These women were still in the 
employ of OroAfrica at 31 August 2007.   
 
The most important question though is whether these jobs are 
sustainable.  The 60% appreciation of the Rand against the US Dollar 
since its lowest level in January 2001 (R13.65 to the US Dollar) is not a 
positive factor, since this swing caused havoc among the South African 
mining and manufacturing exporters. This combined with the constantly 
weakening US Dollar which drove up the gold price to a 25-year high 
during 2006192 combined with a relatively strong Rand against the US 
Dollar could have spelled doom for OroAfrica, yet the company appears 
to be weathering the storm very well.  Throughout the past seven years 
it has maintained between 115 and 120 permanent employees, as well 
as temporary workers who might be required for special jobs. 
 
6.3.3 Unionization 
 
The presence of a strong union and bargaining council is a step towards 
the protection workers’ rights.   
 
The Western Cape and Gauteng are the only provinces that have a 
union that represents persons specifically working in the jewellery 
manufacturing and retail sector.  According to Mr. Peter Cloete, 
                                                 
191
 Telephonic interview with Wasima Herabai, recruitment officer of the Deaf 
Federation of SA (Cape) on 02 September 2003 
192
 The price of gold topped US$600/ounce in March/April 2006, marking a 25-year 
high.  It rose to US$730/ounce in May 2006, then sliding down to hover around 
between US$570-600. 
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Secretary of the Jewellers and Goldsmiths Union (Cape)193 no union 
exists under which the SARM workers would fall in the Free State.  They 
would not be represented by the Mine Workers Union (MUN).  The focus 
group participants confirmed that they did not belong to a union and that 
there were no visits to them by any union representatives.   
 
There are approximately 780 members in the Jewellers’ and Goldsmith’s 
Union in the Western Cape, of which 600 are employed in actual 
manufacturing, while the rest are employed in retailing jewellery.194  
According to Wesgro, the Western Cape is the only province in South 
Africa that has a bargaining council for the jewellery industry.  Both 
Silplat and OroAfrica belong to the bargaining council.  The main aim of 
such a council is to negotiate collective agreements between employers’ 
and employees’ organizations.195  There is no gender discrimination in 
the application of these wages.  It is understood that the employer shall 
provide training to all employees to enable them to move upward from 
the minimum wages.   
 
All employees of OroAfrica (Filk Gold Chains of South Africa) and Silplat 
are protected under these conditions.  The workers at SARM did 
however not have these protections in place. 
 
6.4 Sustainable economic growth 
6.4.1 Skills development 
 
South Africa’s legislative and moral push towards affirmative action 
makes it critically important that firms give particular attention to 
developing their internal human capacities through both skills 
development and stable employment policies.  The development of 
human resources should be seen as more than just job-related skills 
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training, but also as a means of resolving social pathologies.  It can 
enhance broad political stability and a way of re-equipping those whose 
existing skills are redundant or lacking.  This is crucial in the light of 
continued reduction of gold mining in the country.   
 
 
NIPP 
Objectives 
Silk Gold Chains 
of SA 
SARM Silpat 
Human 
Resource 
Development 
Training happening 
on continuous 
basis in-house on-
the-job, also in Italy 
and through 
AngloGold Ashanti 
initiatives 
Some in-house 
on-the-job 
training.   
Training happening 
on continuous basis 
in-house on-the-job 
 
 
The South African gold mining industry employs substantially more 
people than in other gold mining countries because it is involved in 
labour-intensive, deep-level, hard-rock, underground mining.  
Nevertheless, the gold mining industry is declining by approximately 8% 
annually in South Africa and due to continued mine closures the 
numbers employed in the gold mining industry keeps falling (Virtual 
Metals, 2007).  
  
Companies do not function in isolation from the society around them.  It 
is estimated that each mining job has between seven and twelve 
dependents.  Thus the wider social and economic damage, not just in 
South Africa but also in neighbouring countries in the region, is 
substantial.  In South African communities there is frequently a lack of 
entrepreneurship and business orientation, making the residents reliant 
on the formal sector for employment.  Unfortunately few residents would 
have any of the skills required by available jobs.  Workers who have lost 
their jobs due to mine closure or downscaling, and whose skills are 
redundant, need to be re-skilled.  Many of the women who moved to 
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areas near mines post-1994 have either only worked as domestic 
workers or remained unemployed.  Effective local economic 
development requires that local skills are retained and utilized.  It would 
make sense that when a jewellery manufacturing facility is established 
within a traditionally gold mining area, such as Virginia, the retrenched 
miners and their female relatives would be given first option to be 
employed.  SARM rightfully targeted the unemployed women in the 
Virginia area for employment.  
 
The South African metal industry, which includes the jewellery 
manufacturing sector, faces considerable challenges related to skills and 
craftsmanship.196  Within the jewellery manufacturing sector, specifically 
within those factories which has been funded through the NIPP, there 
are two specific issues faced in terms of attaining skilled workers.  More 
so than non-NIPP sponsored manufacturers, they are faced with the 
following options:      
• Do they train low-skilled workers through a training programme, 
which might mean the delay in production until all skills are 
acquired? 
• Do they hire away skilled workers from the limited pool existing 
within the country? or 
• Do they import skilled workers from abroad? 
 
Workers at both Filk Gold Chains of South Africa and Silplats benefited, 
and continue to benefit, through on-the-job training for semi-skilled 
workers, while technical and assembly-line workers are sent on 
exchange training programmes both nationally and internationally to 
acquire skills that are then passed on through on-the-job training.  This 
was possible as both were existing factories, with skilled employees at 
the time of the NIPP intervention.   
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During the first five years of Filk Gold Chains of South Africa’s 
operations, six persons spent up to three months at Gruppo Industriale 
Filk plant in Italy for training.  The rest of the staff members were trained 
in Cape Town as part of in-house and on-the-job training.197  Training 
and research is also funded by AngloGold Ashanti in their various 
endeavours to promote the beneficiation of gold in South Africa.  It is 
difficult to discern which knowledge transfer, whether from Gruppo 
Industriale Filk or from AngloGold Ashanti, was more valuable to Filk 
Gold Chains of South Africa and continues to be for OroAfrica.  Yet 
according to Paul Romer’s theory, which argues that expenditure by 
business on research and development creates a basis and environment 
for long-term sustainable growth, it is irrelevant which knowledge 
transfer benefited the company the most (Romer, 1993a; 1994).  All that 
is important and relevant is that the company, and ultimately the country, 
benefits. 
 
As SARM was not built on an existing factory with existing skilled labour 
in place, the decision was made to bring foreign skilled workers into the 
country to work at the factory.  Eight workers were imported from Peru 
with the understanding that they will be used to provide on-the-job 
training for local employees198.  The local employees were semi- and 
unskilled workers from the Virginia area.  A DTI news release199 reported 
that local SARM workers had been given comprehensive skills training.  
The women in the focus groups said they were given on-the-job training.   
 
Assuming the acquired skills are both relevant and transferable, the kind 
of human capital investment involved in raising workers’ skills through 
training programmes, is a real contribution to development.  In SARM’s 
case the skills acquired by the women would only become relevant for 
the majority of the women if another similar factory opens within the 
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area, which has not happened yet.  Only five (29%) of the 17 ex-workers 
participating in the focus groups, have managed to find other work.  
None of these jobs were factory-related work or relevant to the training 
they received from SARM.   
 
The 1998 Skills Development Act encourages firms to take workplace-
based training more seriously.  Every employer in South Africa is obliged 
to pay 0.5% of its payroll to the Skills Development Fund,200 which is 
used to establish Sector Education and Training Associations (SETA) 
responsible for training.  Employers can apply to SETAs for training for 
their employees, or can claim up to 50% of its skills levy back if it can 
show that it is registered with the SETA and busy with in-house-training.  
The jewellery manufacturing industry resides under the Mining 
Qualifications Authority SETA.  Mr. Perez of SARM was quoted in 
Mining Weekly as having approached government for re-imbursement of 
training expenses: “We are preparing a submission to the Department of 
Trade and Industry and the Department of Labour to recover part of the 
cost incurred in training” (Mining Weekly, April 16, 2004).  This implies 
that training did occur and that SARM was registered with the SETA.   
As the Mining Qualifications Authority SETA would have been the logical 
place to direct such a request for re-imbursement, I approached the 
SETA to find out if such submissions had been made and whether re-
imbursements have taken place.  Although this request for information 
had been made as early as August 2005 and repeated six times during 
the following two years, no response has been forthcoming to date. 
6.5 Sustainable growth 
The sustained success of a local business will influence the overall 
sustainable economic growth in the local area in which it operates.  This 
happens through its continued creation of work opportunities to the local 
population, the provision of services to the local economy, and the 
payment of taxes to the local and national government. 
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NIPP 
Objectives 
Silk Gold Chains 
of SA 
SARM Silpat 
Sustainable 
economic 
growth 
Yes, factory 
growing in terms of 
products and staff 
levels 
No Yes, at this time 
 
In heavily mined areas such as the Free State goldfields, mine-
sponsored development projects are important vehicles for stimulating 
local economic growth and development.  The sustainability of these 
projects are crucial and it is becoming more internationally accepted that 
arrangements must be in place to continue the life of projects after initial 
project funding from the mining company stops.     
 
In terms of mining areas, local government and mining companies have 
a shared responsibility for the sustainability of the community post mine-
closure.  Possible partnerships between the mine and the local authority 
must be established and in operation during the life-of-mine so that the 
transition to alternative economic activities is a continuous process.  Any 
projects proposed by the partnership should form an integral part of the 
municipality’s Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and should assist 
mining companies with the integration of their development plans with 
those managed by local municipalities.   
 
Provincial governments are also important as the bulk of government 
fiscal allocation201 is at the provincial level.  Provinces are required to 
compile Provincial Growth and Development Strategies (PGDS), which 
is in effect an IDP at provincial level.  Close scrutiny of the Free State 
PGDS revealed that although the importance of mining as a proportion 
                                                 
201
 It should be noted though that mining falls under the Department of Minerals and 
Energy, a national-level department, which has no corresponding provincial 
department, unlike Department of Trade and Industry. Department of Labour, and 
Department of Agriculture, which all have provincial counterparts.   
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of the provincial GDP was recognized, mining as a development partner 
was not addressed as a significant matter.  Any development 
suggestions that deal with mining are at best ad hoc in nature.  No 
mention is made specifically of offsets or beneficiation projects. 
 
In terms of the Mining Charter, mining companies are required to 
monitor and report the results of their involvement in the IDP process.  
The following Mining Charter questions must be answered: 
• Has the company co-operated in the formulation of IDPs and is 
the company co-operating with government in the implementation 
of these plans for communities where mining takes place and for 
major labour sending areas?   
• Has there been effort on the side of the company to engage the 
local mine community and major sending areas communities? 
• Companies will be required to cite a pattern of consultation, 
indicate money expenditures, and show a plan. 
 
At the time that SARM was operational, it was not yet compulsory for 
mining companies to respond to the Mining Charter.  It was thus not 
possible to ascertain how Harmony Gold Mining Company responded to 
these points in their annual score card submission.  
 
Often extra effort would be required from the mine company aiming to 
participate in the IDP process, as local governments are frequently 
under-resourced and they also lack capacity and essential skills.    
Requests to the Matjhabeng Municipality to access their IDP committee 
meeting minutes for the past six years were declined.  I had hoped to be 
able to assess whether Harmony Gold Mining Company played any role 
in the discussions and whether these jewellery factory initiatives were 
discussed at these meetings. 
 
There is no evidence that Harmony Gold Mining Company or any of the 
other SARM partners conducted any social impact assessments, or 
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whether they engaged with the broader Virginia community when SARM 
was conceptualized or implemented.  There is no evidence that 
Harmony Gold Mining Company or any other of SARM’s owners 
engaged with the community regarding SARM since the closure of the 
business.   
 
The most important condition for long-term success and sustainability for 
offset projects is that the project is designed to suit a specific economic 
or regional policy initiative.  The more tailored an offset activity can be to 
existing policies or strategies, the better the prospects for success in 
terms of long-term policy goals.  Just as important is the local 
development plans.  The more an offset project fits into the existing IDP, 
the more likely it is to be supported by other local government initiatives, 
which can add to its success and sustainability.  
 
Linkages of mining companies’ local economic development initiatives 
with the local government planning and IDPs are thus extremely 
important and can ensure that such ventures are compatible with 
surrounding development initiatives.  There appears to be limited co-
operation or partnerships between Harmony Gold Mining Company and 
the Matjhabeng Municipality.  None of the three Harmony Gold jewellery 
factories over the years are mentioned in the municipality’s IDPs 
(Matjhabeng 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005).    Nel and Binns found that in 
Matjhabeng “formalized partnerships do not figure prominently in local 
economic development initiatives” (Nel and Binns, 202:267).  Instead it 
appears as if Harmony Gold Mining Company more frequently works 
with the provincial structures instead of the local authority structures.  
Two of the failed Harmony Gold factory initiatives, VDO and Oro-Maska 
were funded by the Free State Development Corporation.   
 
Beneficiation requires the following: 
 
• Both foreign and local investment 
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• Skills, and where those are lacking, skills training must be 
available. 
• Working capital  
• Markets and the demand for the products both locally and 
internationally 
• Steady supply of the raw materials needed 
• Government incentives and support 
 
All available evidence indicates that SARM had all of these requirements 
met.  Then why did the other two jewellery initiatives work and SARM 
fail?  The most obvious point is that the Filk Gold Chains and Silplat 
initiatives were built on existing and successful jewellery manufacturing 
enterprises, instead of starting from scratch, as was the case with 
SARM.  There is a tendency to start a new enterprise, rather than 
support and grow existing business to enable it to expand and create 
more sustainable employment.  Both of these successful NIPP 
beneficiation initiatives had performed extensive due diligence studies 
and they both have monitoring systems in place with all the required 
checks and balances to keep the businesses healthy even in difficult 
times such as in recent years (Wellmann, 2005).  The gradual 
weakening of the US Dollar on global currency markets in recent years 
led to the appreciation of the South African Rand and this rendered the 
country’s products less competitive globally.  Yet the Silplats and the 
OroAfrica initiatives adapted to these fluctuations successfully.  They 
have ensured that they have sustainable markets that can withstand the 
fluctuations of the international demands for their products; they have 
invested heavily in training and skills development for their employees 
and have used the government incentives and other opportunities 
available at this time to their fullest potential. 
 
Like any other business decision, the choice of offset projects need to be 
based on a realistic assessment of long-term prospects for the 
production line, technology and markets to survive in international 
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competition.    None of the partners or initiators of the project appears to 
have done a thorough due diligence study.  According to BAE 
Systems/SAAB’s Linden Birns202, Harmony Gold proposed the project to 
them and on the basis of that, funding was provided.  According to Kevin 
Jacobs of the IDC203, funding would have been provided to the project 
based on Harmony Gold’s proposal.  None of the previously failed 
projects in the same town on the same premises appears to have raised 
a red flag.  Neither did the fact that the company would be managed by 
the same persons that caused the failure of VDO, one of the previous 
companies established there.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
The findings conclude that there is really no reason why SARM should 
have failed.    Apart from what can be considered to be ill-intentions of its 
owners and investors, the company had the potential to be successful. 
The evaluation’s findings raise the question of how much direct foreign 
investment should offsets projects contain.  In the case of SARM, 40% 
of the cash funding came from within the country through the IDC, while 
Harmony Gold Company provided the land, buildings and gold loans, 
which would diminish the investment made by the BAE Systems/SAAB 
consortium to be less than 50%.  The evaluation further raises the issue 
of the transfer of foreign technology.  The conclusion is reached that 
such a transfer will never really happen to the extent anticipated by 
those who conceptualise these offset deals, as it makes no business 
sense, especially not from the obligor’s shoes. 
 
The SARM evaluation further highlights the importance of foreign trading 
partners and how valuable these can be to a small company provided 
that the obligor has a genuine interest in sharing markets (or that there 
are actually markets to share).  If this part of an offsets deal is 
                                                 
202
 E-mail from Linden Birns, 15 September 2005 
203
 Interviewed on July 07, 2005 
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implemented well, and provided the company produces good quality 
products to international standards, it can lead to sustained exports that 
will benefit both the company, the local economy in which it operates, 
and the country. 
 
This chapter shows how difficult it is to create new sustainable long-term 
jobs.  It is easier to sustain long-term jobs that already exist, but then the 
offsets should focus on developing an existing brownfield project instead 
of rushing into creating new companies.  Sustained growth of a company 
(and indeed a country) is closely linked to developing the skills of local 
workers instead of foreign workers.   
 
The overall conclusions that can be drawn from this study are discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
SARM is an offset project, which is simultaneously a precious metal 
beneficiation project that forms part of a mining company’s corporate 
social investment. 
 
This evaluation of SARM is an ex-post evaluation that is knowledge-
oriented and aimed to contribute to the broader international debate on 
military offsets, and specifically to the debate around the South African 
NIPP.  SARM was evaluated in the context of the 1998 South African 
arms deal; the South African NIPP; the decentralization of government 
and its powers, obligations and needs; as well as the fast changing 
South African mining industry and the legislation governing it.  The 
objectives of the evaluation were to (i) explore the 1998 arms deal, and 
in particular the offsets component of the deal; (ii) explore the 
background to SARM and its predecessors in order to understand the 
relationship between the main characters involved; and to (iii) evaluate 
SARM against other similar projects.  These objectives were 
accomplished successfully within the limitations created by the lack of all 
relevant documentation, and the evaluation has made it possible to 
document valuable lessons that can inform future NIPP projects. 
 
The first of these lessons are that there is a tendency by offset obligors 
to start ‘greenfields’ projects instead of building on already existing 
‘brownfields’ projects.  SARM was a ‘greenfields’ project, while the two 
other NIPP projects against which it was compared, OroAfrica and 
Silplats, are ‘brownfields’ projects that were built on existing and 
successful jewellery manufacturing enterprises, which both continue to 
exist successful.  Social, human and manufactured capitals are critical 
components of the sustainability of a company.  Both of these successful 
NIPP beneficiation initiatives have increased and developed their social 
and human capital through sustainable job-creation (or in the very least 
sustaining existing jobs); through training to enhance the human capital; 
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and by delivering value to both society as a whole and other businesses 
who provide services to them.  
 
The second lesson from this evaluation is the necessity for strict 
financial accountability in these projects.  Financial capital is not only 
crucial to the survival of the business, but also to the sustainability and 
growth of the other capitals (social, human, manufactured and natural).  
Financial accountability is thus crucial.  Both the successful beneficiation 
initiatives performed extensive due diligence studies and they both have 
monitoring systems in place with all the required checks and balances to 
keep the businesses healthy even in difficult times such as in recent 
years (Wellmann, 2005).  There is no evidence of financial accountability 
in the management of the SARM.  The gradual weakening of the US 
Dollar on global currency markets during recent years led to the 
appreciation of the South African Rand and this rendered the country’s 
products less competitive globally.  Yet Silplats and OroAfrica have 
ensured that they have sustainable markets that can withstand the 
fluctuations of the international demands for their products; they have 
invested heavily in training and skills development for their employees 
and have used the government incentives and other opportunities 
available at this time to their fullest potential. 
 
The third lesson is the need for the implementers of offsets projects to 
embrace the triple bottom line and to balance the need for short-term 
competitiveness and financial gain and in doing so earning a moral 
‘licence to operate’.  Hew (2006) argues that offsets fall into the realm of 
corporate social investment, linking the idea that offsets can be a vehicle 
for socio-economic projects and a vehicle to reduce poverty and 
inequality in developing countries.  Although I do not agree with Hew 
that offsets can be viewed as corporate social investment, SARM was 
described by Harmony Gold as part of its corporate social investment in 
the Virginia area.  SARM thus played the role of both being an offset 
project with BAE Systems/SAAB as the obligor, while at the same time 
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SARM was also a corporate social investment initiated by Harmony 
Gold.     
 
In a corporate context, sustainability means that each business venture 
must balance the need for long-term viability and prosperity of the 
business itself, the communities in which it operates, and the 
environment, with the requirement for short-term competitiveness and 
financial gain (King Committee, 2002).  Unfortunately this balance was 
not in place when SARM was created and in operation.  SARM was 
established with outdated business principles within a modern South 
African legislative and trade environment.  “In decades past, if people 
had gathered in order to establish a company to produce goods, they 
would have applied to a regulator for a license, hired a premise, bought 
a plant, and proceeded to manufacture without much regard to the 
impact on the environment, or the interests of other stakeholders.  The 
permission from the regulator to manufacture goods would have been 
the ‘license to operate’.  Today, the license to operate a company is 
much more complex” (Kings Committee, 2002:8).  There is no evidence 
that SARM embraced the triple bottom line, a concept that puts equal 
value on the economic, social and environmental aspects of a company. 
 
A further twist in the SARM case is that the project is also a gold 
beneficiation project.  There are many legal advantages to starting 
precious metal beneficiation factories, least of all being able to 
‘exchange’ credits for beneficiation against implementing BEE 
obligations, and being able to ‘write off’ against tax infrastructure 
‘donated’ to factories.  With the DTI being entirely responsible for 
monitoring the NIPP, but lacking capacity, essential skills and being 
under-resourced; and very frequently using potentially biased 
organisations to monitor NIPP projects on their behalf, there is very little 
incentive to really make any of these factories sustainable beyond the 
first few months when both mining and NIPP credits are calculated and 
awarded.   
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Although I do agree with Hew’s (2006) assertion that offsets can be 
successful on condition that the offset programme is properly conceived 
and implemented, and utilizes the right resources; I do not think that 
these conditions currently exist in South Africa.  The DTI is entirely 
responsible for ensuring that the NIPP is carried out properly, but there 
is not an efficient system for monitoring these types of investments in 
South Africa.  According to Mr. Dion Harold of the DTI, there is no 
monitoring and evaluation system in place for these projects.  They are 
basically monitored on an ad hoc basis.  The lack of, or the insufficient, 
monitoring and evaluation of such projects means that lessons from the 
failure of one project cannot be transferred to new initiatives.  Mr. Harold 
also indicated that there is a high turn-over in staff in the unit that 
monitors the NIPP.  He had replaced the previous manager dedicated to 
the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium projects and was not even aware of 
SARM at the time of our interview several months after he filled the post.  
He was unable to provide me with information that was project specific.   
And this is the fourth lesson of this evaluation – the necessity for strict 
monitoring and evaluation processes in any Industrial Participation 
programme and/or projects combined with the need for regular 
independent evaluations. 
 
Even though the DTI monitors the performance of the obligors through 
six-monthly reports and review meetings, this is supplemented with site 
visits by institutions such as the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) and Mintek on behalf of the DTI (DTI, 2004).  Mintek is 
however involved in the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium NIP SARM 
project through Musuku Beneficiation Systems and several projects 
being done with Harmony Gold, which raises questions of impartiality 
and bias concerning the NIPP inspections.  It is thus recommended that 
an independent body be appointed to monitor the NIPP and the various 
projects. 
 
The fifth lesson points to the necessity that foreign direct investment 
should be hundred percent foreign investment, and not local investment 
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masquerading as foreign investment.  SARM had limited foreign direct 
investment, and indeed most of the investment in the business was 
sourced from local funders.  When the project failed, the main local 
funder, the state-owned IDC, lost a large sum of money that could have 
been invested in a more successful venture.  Foreign direct investment 
has many benefits and when it is successfully harnessed, as is the case 
with OroAfrica, it can create employment with high added value.  
However, in an offset set-up, the foreign investor’s activities need to be 
monitored closely to ensure that the investment is focussed on delivering 
that it set out to do.  Unfortunately, without the capacity to apply 
conditions to foreign investors or to monitor them, the South African 
government has limited scope to promote technology transfers and 
linkages with domestic producers and to develop a competitive 
advantage.  The findings also highlight the farcical manner in which 
offsets credits are calculated, and how impossible it is for technology 
transfer to take place to the extent anticipated by those who 
conceptualise these offsets deals, purely because it makes very little 
business sense from the obligor’s shoes. 
 
Foreign direct investment, whether as part of NIPP or not, often takes 
the form of large projects with potentially damaging social and 
environmental effects.  It is further recommended that an independent 
body be commissioned to monitor and assess the socio-economic and 
environmental impact of such projects.  This will force companies to 
interact with the various affected stakeholders, such as the broader local 
community, the local government, employees, trade unions, owners, 
shareholders, customers, business partners, suppliers, and government.  
It will also heighten transparency and accountability. 
 
In conclusion it is clear that there would have been no technical reason 
for SARM to have failed.  The company was not constrained by the 
availability of gold material, or working capital, or infrastructure.  Having 
all these available, actually gave the factory an advantage over other 
jewellery manufacturers.  Its failure, however, highlights (i) the lack of 
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due diligence by IDC, the state-owned entity that provided a large part of 
the funding; (ii) the lack of operational monitoring and evaluation of the 
NIPP; (iii) an incidence where ‘foreign direct investment’ was not all it 
proposed to be; (iv) the confusion and murkiness that guides NIPP credit 
calculations and awards; (v) the general lack of understanding of 
sustainability of projects linked to socio-economic policies; (vi) and the 
lack of political will to investigate the failure of these types of projects. 
 
In contrast, the continued success of the OroAfrica and Silplat ventures 
highlight that if conceived well with a proper due diligence investigation 
in place; combined with real foreign direct investment, and a genuine 
interest by the foreign investor to share international markets (or that 
there are actually existing markets to share); and provided the company 
produces good quality products to international standards; small 
individual offset projects can be successful.  There is however still a 
need to assess the variety of offsets projects (beyond just beneficiation 
projects) linked to the 1998 arms deal to establish how many are indeed 
relatively successful. 
 
One has to agree with Hadjiminas (undated) that offsets are here to 
stay, and that very few (if any) governments are willing to take the 
plunge to get rid of them.  As offsets are now firmly entrenched in South 
African government procurement policies, they will no doubt continue to 
form part of the country’s procurement landscape for the foreseeable 
future.  Keeping this in mind, it is cautioned that an independent body 
should be appointed to monitor the NIPP and its individual projects; and 
even more importantly it is cautioned that the job creation promised by 
offsets projects never quite materialises to the extent that is envisioned, 
and neither does the promised exponential local economic growth linked 
to such projects.  The best option for offsets is to develop existing 
‘brownfields’ and to, in the very least, maintain the jobs that existed prior 
to the offsets intervention and in doing so encourage a realistic, steady 
growth of the local economy. 
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There still exists a need for a thorough evaluation of the NIPP 
programme, to assess how many offset projects were successful, even if 
just marginally. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Results of informal two-minute questionnaires conducted 
in Virginia 
 
The survey was administered in Virginia central business district in May 
2007. 
Fifty respondents were chosen at random, irrespective of gender and 
economical background.  Questions were asked both in English and 
Afrikaans. 
 
The following questions were asked: 
6. Do you know about the weapons deal?  47 said yes, 3 no. 
7. Do you know about offsets? 12 said yes. 
8. Do you know about SARM?  17 said yes 
9. When did you hear about SARM:  
o Before the opening of the factory = 0 
o During the time the factory was functioning = 3 
o After the closing of the factory? = 14 
 
Most respondents heard about the arms deal due to the press.  All 17 
respondents who had heard about SARM heard so via friends or 
acquaintances.  Some said that they also read about the theft of the gold 
in newspapers.  None of the respondents knew about the link between 
SARM and the arms deal. 
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Appendix B 
 
People Interviewed 
 
 
Person Interviewed Date 
  
Dr. R. Williams 12 July 2002 
02 August 2002 
Ms Chandrika Jogessar, DTI 19 September 2002 
Ms. Wasima Herabai, Deaf 
Federation of South Africa 
02 September 2003 
Mr. Mark Tarlie, OroAfrica June 2003 
November 2004 
21 April 2005 
18 October 2005 
Mr. Zikode, DTI 06 August 2003 
08 December 2004 
Mr. Luis Perez, SARM 19 April 2004 
Ms Lebo Mogotsi, AngloGold 
Ashanti 
12 October 2004 
  
Mr. Dieter Rowe-Setz, Wits 
Technikon  
12 February 2005 
Mr. Peter Cloete, Cape Jewellers 
and Goldsmith Union 
02 September 2003 
16 May 2006 
Mr. Ferdi Dippenaar, Harmony 
Gold Mining Company 
15 March 2005 
Mr. Dion Haroldt, DTI 23 June 2005 
Mr. Kevin Jacobs, IDC 07 July 2005 
Mr. Linden Birns, BAE 
Systems/SAAB 
05 July 2005 
Mr. Roger Baxter, Chamber of 
Mines 
06 July 2005 
Ms Alta Wessels, Harmony 
Jewellery School 
12 March 2006 
Dr. Paul Jourdan, Mintek 08 July 2005 
07 February 2006 
Mr. Denzel Young, Musuku 
Beneficiation Systems 
12 July 2005 
21 September 2005 
15 February 2006 
Mr. Steven Nathan, OroAfrica 11 March 2006 
Ms Marjory, COSATU 16 May 2006 
Mr. J. Diemond, US Department of 
Commerce 
19 October 2006 
Mr. Michael Wightman, Musuku 26 March 2007 
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Beneficiation Systems 
De Wet Schutte, Harmony Gold 
Mining Company 
03 April 2007 
Mr. Johan Smit, Silplat (Pty) Ltd 31 August 2007 
12 September 2007 
01 November 2007 
Mr. Gary Nathan, OroAfrica 31 August 2007 
Mr. Anton Meinesz, OroAfrica 31 August 2007 
Mr. Derek Engelbrecht, Implats 12 September 2007 
Mr. Konrad van Essen, OroAfrica 01 November 2007 
Mr. Bernard Stern, Metal 
Concentrators 
01 November 2007 
12 November 2007 
Ms. Joanne Jones, AngloGold 
Ashanti 
07 December 2007 
Mr. Rudi Jordaan, Gold Fields 05 December 2007 
Mr. Tim Buchanan, Gold Fields 12 May 2007 
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Appendix C 
 
Description of arms purchased in the deal 
 
In Holden (2008: 18-20), the weaponry purchased in the arms deal are 
described as follows: 
 
The corvettes: Four German-built corvettes were purchased.  
Measuring 121 metres, they are smaller than the frigates that the Navy 
previously used.  They are equipped with a sophisticated system, which 
makes up 40 percent of their total cost.  The corvettes are supposed to 
be the workhorses of the Navy, providing the capacity for search-and-
rescue operations, maritime patrols with an eye on law enforcement, and 
a helicopter launching-pad, which substantially increases surveillance 
range.  The corvettes also have ‘blue sea’ capacity (the ability to sail in 
parts of the ocean far away from the shore), which means that they can 
sail as far south as Marion Island.  (Information gained from ‘The 
hardware’, SABC Special Report.  Available at www.armsdeal-
vpo.co.za) 
 
The submarines: Three submarines were purchased to replace South 
Africa’s Daphne submarines, on the assumption, Terry Crawford-Browne 
has noted, that submarines make small navies important (Crawford-
Browne, 2007:130).  Thus deterring foreign powers from attacking the 
country, the submarines are also intended to provide a stealthy way of 
protecting South Africa’s coastal trade, by being able to spy on illegal 
activity and feed this information to surface ships, and to provide support 
in peace-keeping operations (Information gained from ‘The hardware’, 
SABC Special Report.  Available at www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za) 
 
The Cape Argus (05 December 2007) speculated that due to a lack of 
skilled staff to operate all the purchased submarines, two of the three 
would have to be mothballed.    
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The Gripen: Twenty-eight Gripen were purchased.  A ‘multi-role combat 
aircraft’, according to its official website, which also calls it ‘the wings of 
your nation’ (www.gripen.com).  This nippy supersonic attack fighter has 
replaced the Cheetah C and Cheetah D fighters that were on the SAAF’s 
inventory.  It can be used to provide armed cover and support for land-
based attacks, reconnaissance, air-borne dogfights and airspace control 
(Information gained from ‘The hardware’, SABC Special Report.  
Available at www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za).  Built as a joint initiative by 
Britain and Sweden, it is also used by the air forces of Sweden, the 
Czech republic, Hungary and Thailand. 
 
The Hawk: Twenty-four Hawks were purchased.  Built by British 
Aerospace, the Hawk provides trainees with flight experience before 
they move on to the supersonic Gripens.  It can also do limited search 
and rescue missions, reconnaissance and patrolling (‘The hardware’, 
SABC Special Report.  Available at www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za).  It 
replaces the Impala trainers used by the SAAF, and was chosen over 
the cheaper Italian Aeromacchi MB339.  The selection of the Hawk 
attracted considerable criticism.  Even the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF), 
which uses the Hawk, found that the Aeromacchi was ‘far and away 
better than anything the RAF currently possesses” (‘A significantly 
inferior product’, The Citizen, 7 January 2004). 
 
The Helicopters: The 30 Light-Utility Helicopters were bought from 
Agusta in Italy to replace the SAAF’s 40-year old French Alouette 
helicopters.  They can accommodate up to eight people, and can also be 
used to carry up to two stretchers.  They are intended to be used for 
search and rescue operations, medical and humanitarian assistance, 
helping with police patrols and patrolling South Africa’s borders 
(Information gained from ‘The hardware’, SABC Special Report.  
Available at www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za). 
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Appendix D 
The SAAF tier training system 
 
The following table was compiled by Holden (2008:95) to describe the 
South African Air Force’s (SAAF) tier training system. 
 
 TIER ONE TIER TWO TIER THREE 
1995 
Three-tier system 
Astra trainers.  Pilots 
would train on the 
Astra fighters before 
moving on to the 
impala trainers.  The 
SAAF did not want to 
replace the Astras. 
Impala MKI and MKII 
trainers.  Pilots would 
train on these planes 
before moving on to 
the actual war-time 
fighter.  The SAAF 
originally wanted this 
tier to be replaced 
with an aircraft that 
could be used for 
training and combat. 
Cheetah fighters. 
After training on the 
previous two tiers, 
pilots would graduate 
to the Cheetah, which 
was the war-time 
combat fighter.  The 
SAAF wanted to 
replace these fighters, 
but only at a later 
stage as the 
Cheetahs would still 
be operational for 
over a decade. 
Early 1997 
Two –tier system 
N/A Astra trainers.  Pilots 
would train on the 
Astra and move 
directly on to the 
supersonic war-time 
fighter. 
An ALFA (advanced 
Light Fighter 
Aircraft).  The SAAF 
recommended 
purchasing a new 
fighter to replace the 
aging Cheetahs that 
would be used to fight 
in combat. 
Late 1997 
Three-tier system 
Astra trainers. Pilots 
would learn to fly 
combat planes in the 
Astra and graduate to 
the second tier. 
The Lead-In Fighter 
Trainer (LIFT).  Pilots 
would train for 
supersonic flight in 
the LIFT before 
graduating to the 
ALFA.  Importantly, 
the LIFT would have 
no combat role 
functions, unlike what 
was proposed in 
The Advanced Light 
Fighter Aircraft 
(ALFA). After 
completing training on 
the LIFT, pilots would 
graduate to flying the 
war-time combat 
fighter.  BAE’s Gripen 
was the ALFA chosen 
in 1999. 
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1995.   
BAE’s Hawk was the 
LIFT chosen in 1999. 
 
